Abstract: A method of generating a synthetic network includes receiving, by a group structure identification module, anonymized input data related to an original network. The anonymized input data includes an anonymized list of nodes, a list of edges and a list of groups. The method further includes determining, by the group structure identification module, for each pair of nodes, a probability of an edge between the pair of nodes. A resulting list of probabilities corresponds to a summary group structure. The method further includes generating, by a synthetic random network generation module, at least one synthetic random network based, at least in part, on the determined probabilities.

Abstract: The present invention includes a method and system for trading goods and services through recurring auctions. Recurring auctions are increasingly popular form of markets for perishable and time-sensitive resources. Traditional auctions strive to motivate bidders to bid their true valuation of the resources traded. Yet, when successful, they also quickly divide the recurring auction bidders into permanent winners and permanent losers. The latter have no incentive to stay in the market, so they leave, decreasing the competitive pressure and depressing pricing. The present invention introduces a novel winner selection method to maintain customers' interest in auction participation that employs participant retention mechanism in assigning traded resources to bidders. The winners are selected from a wider range of bidder ranks than in traditional auction mechanisms. For a group of bidders, winner selection takes into account bid values, and winnings and participation of each bidder in the previous auction rounds.

Abstract: The present invention includes a method and system for trading goods and services through recurring auctions. Recurring auctions are increasingly popular form of markets for perishable and time-sensitive resources. Traditional auctions strive to motivate bidders to bid their true valuation of the resources traded. Yet, when successful, they also quickly divide the recurring auction bidders into permanent winners and permanent losers. The latter have no incentive to stay in the market, so they leave, decreasing the competitive pressure and depressing pricing. The present invention introduces a novel winner selection method to maintain customers' interest in auction participation that employs participant retention mechanism in assigning traded resources to bidders. The winners are selected from a wider range of bidder ranks than in traditional auction mechanisms.