Abstract: A method, computing system, and computer-readable medium comprising instructions to establish a chain of trust for components of a computing environment. A respective public/private key pair is generated using a multivariate quadratic function F for each component of the computing environment. In response to a challenge from a verifier, a current prover component sends a response that the verifier uses to determine whether to trust the current prover component. The response may include a first commitment value and a second commitment value, which are determined for the current prover component using a public key of a previous prover component. At least one of the first and second commitment values can be determined using a polar function G, which is a polar form of the multivariate quadratic function F.

Abstract: Embodiments of a system and method for creating a chain of trust are generally described herein. A method may include generating a private secret value, determining a public test value using the private secret value, sending, from a first device in a trusted environment with a second device and a third device, the public test value to the second device, receiving, at the first device outside the trusted environment, a challenge from the third device, determining a verification to the challenge using the private secret value, sending, from the first device outside the trusted environment, the verification to the second device, and receiving, at the first device outside the trusted environment, confirmation from the third device that the verification was successfully verified by the second device and the third device.

Abstract: Embodiments of a system and method for creating a chain of trust are generally described herein. A method may include generating a private secret value, determining a public test value using the private secret value, sending, from a first device in a trusted environment with a second device and a third device, the public test value to the second device, receiving, at the first device outside the trusted environment, a challenge from the third device, determining a verification to the challenge using the private secret value, sending, from the first device outside the trusted environment, the verification to the second device, and receiving, at the first device outside the trusted environment, confirmation from the third device that the verification was successfully verified by the second device and the third device.

Abstract: Embodiments of a system and method for creating a chain of trust are generally described herein. A method may include generating a private secret value, determining a public test value using the private secret value, sending, from a first device in a trusted environment with a second device and a third device, the public test value to the second device, receiving, at the first device outside the trusted environment, a challenge from the third device, determining a verification to the challenge using the private secret value, sending, from the first device outside the trusted environment, the verification to the second device, and receiving, at the first device outside the trusted environment, confirmation from the third device that the verification was successfully verified by the second device and the third device.

Abstract: A method, computing system, and computer-readable medium comprising instructions to establish a chain of trust for components of a computing environment. A respective public/private key pair is generated using a multivariate quadratic function F for each component of the computing environment. In response to a challenge from a verifier, a current prover component sends a response that the verifier uses to determine whether to trust the current prover component. The response may include a first commitment value and a second commitment value, which are determined for the current prover component using a public key of a previous prover component. At least one of the first and second commitment values can be determined using a polar function G, which is a polar form of the multivariate quadratic function F.

Abstract: Embodiments of an invention for protecting a secure boot process against side channel attacks are disclosed. In one embodiment, an apparatus includes cryptography hardware, a non-volatile memory, a comparator, and control logic. The cryptography hardware is to operate during a first boot process. The non-volatile memory includes a storage location in which to store a count of tampered boots. The comparator is to perform a comparison of the count of tampered boots to a limit. The control logic is to, based on the first comparison, transfer control of the apparatus from the first boot process to a second boot process.

Abstract: Embodiments of a system and method for creating a chain of trust are generally described herein. A method may include generating a private secret value, determining a public test value using the private secret value, sending, from a first device in a trusted environment with a second device and a third device, the public test value to the second device, receiving, at the first device outside the trusted environment, a challenge from the third device, determining a verification to the challenge using the private secret value, sending, from the first device outside the trusted environment, the verification to the second device, and receiving, at the first device outside the trusted environment, confirmation from the third device that the verification was successfully verified by the second device and the third device.

Abstract: In one embodiment, an apparatus includes a storage controller to couple to a storage device. The storage controller may include a first counter to maintain a first count of incoming read requests to the storage device, a second counter to maintain a second count of incoming write requests to the storage device, and a workload analysis logic to calculate a workload ratio based at least in part on the first count and the second count, compare the workload ratio to an estimated workload ratio, and issue a tamper alert based at least in part on the comparison. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Embodiments of an invention for protecting a secure boot process against side channel attacks are disclosed. In one embodiment, an apparatus includes cryptography hardware, a non-volatile memory, a comparator, and control logic. The cryptography hardware is to operate during a first boot process. The non-volatile memory includes a storage location in which to store a count of tampered boots. The comparator is to perform a comparison of the count of tampered boots to a limit. The control logic is to, based on the first comparison, transfer control of the apparatus from the first boot process to a second boot process.

Abstract: An apparatus and method for zero knowledge proof security techniques within a computing platform. One embodiment includes a security module executed on a processing core to establish a domain of trust among a plurality of layers by sending a challenge from a verification layer to a first prover layer, the challenge comprising an indication of at least one selected option; in response to receiving the challenge, generating first verification information at the first prover layer based on the secret and the indication of the selected option; sending the first verification information to at least a second prover layer, the second prover layer generating second verification information based on the first verification information and the indication of the selected option; and performing a verification operation at the verification layer using the second verification information based on the selected option.

Abstract: An apparatus and method for zero knowledge proof security techniques within a computing platform. One embodiment includes a security module executed on a processing core to establish a domain of trust among a plurality of layers by sending a challenge from a verification layer to a first prover layer, the challenge comprising an indication of at least one selected option; in response to receiving the challenge, generating first verification information at the first prover layer based on the secret and the indication of the selected option; sending the first verification information to at least a second prover layer, the second prover layer generating second verification information based on the first verification information and the indication of the selected option; and performing a verification operation at the verification layer using the second verification information based on the selected option.

Abstract: Briefly, in accordance with one embodiment of the invention, a system includes a device under test (DUT) having a joint test access group (JTAG) port. The JTAG port may be accessed with a high speed and an integrated circuit adapted to access the JTAG port of the DUT.