Abstract: In an embodiment, a method for generating and distributing keys retains the scalability of a group VPN, but also provides true pair-wise keying such that an attacker who compromises one of the devices in a VPN cannot use the keys gained by that compromise to decrypt the packets from the other gateways in the VPN, or spoof one of the communicating gateways. The method is resistant to collusion when co-operating attackers overtake several VPN gateways and observe the keys stored in those gateways. In an embodiment, a VPN gateway comprises a cryptographic data processor configured to encrypt and to decrypt data packets; group key management logic; and Key Generation System logic. In one approach a gateway performs, in relation to adding a group member, receiving in a security association (SA) message secret data for use in the KGS; and derives keys for secure communication with one or more peer VPN gateways using the secret data.

Abstract: A packet forwarding process, on a data communications device, forwards a packet to a plurality of destinations within a network from that data communications device using an “encrypt, then replicate” method. The packet forwarding process receives a packet that is to be transmitted to the plurality of destinations, and applies a security association to the packet using security information shared between the data communications device, and the plurality of destinations, to create a secured packet. The secured packet contains a header that has a source address and a destination address. The source address is inserted into the header, and then the packet forwarding process replicates the secured packet, once for each of the plurality of destinations. After replication, the destination address is inserted into the header, and the packet forwarding process transmits each replicated secured packet to each of the plurality of destinations authorized to maintain the security association.

Abstract: A packet forwarding process, on a data communications device, forwards a packet to a plurality of destinations within a network from that data communications device using an “encrypt then replicate” method. The packet forwarding process receives a packet that is to be transmitted to the plurality of destinations, and applies a security association to the packet using security information shared between the data communications device, and the plurality of destinations, to create a secured packet. The secured packet contains a header that has a source address and a destination address. The source address is inserted into the header, and then the packet forwarding process replicates the secured packet, once for each of the plurality of destinations. After replication, the destination address is inserted into the header, and the packet forwarding process transmits each replicated secured packet to each of the plurality of destinations authorized to maintain the security association.

Abstract: A computer system for authenticating, encrypting, and transmitting a secret communication, where the encryption key is transmitted along with the encrypted message, is disclosed. In an embodiment, a first transmitting processor encrypts a plaintext message to a ciphertext message using a data key, encrypts the data key using a key encrypting key, and sends a communication comprising the encrypted data key and the ciphertext message. A second receiving processor receives the communication and then decrypts the encrypted data key using the key encrypting key and decrypts the ciphertext message using the data key to recover the plaintext message.

Abstract: A mechanism for providing strong anti-replay protection at a security gateway in a network for protection against an attacker duplicating encrypted packets. The mechanism assigns a unique sequence number to each encrypted packet and a time stamp. A receiving security gateway rejects packets that have a duplicative sequence number or that is too old to protect itself against replay attacks. Each security gateway checks off the sequence numbers as they are received knowing that the sending security gateway assigns sequence numbers in an increasing order. The receiving security gateway remembers the value of the highest sequence number that it has already seen as well as up to N additional sequence numbers. Any packet with a duplicative sequence number is discarded. In addition to the sequence number, each packet also has an associated time stamp that corresponds to an epoch during which it should be received. If the packet is received after the epoch has expired, the packet is rejected.

Abstract: A method comprises, in a network comprising VPN gateway devices configured only for plaintext data communication, configuring a policy server with a security policy including DO NOT ENCRYPT statements temporarily overriding PERMIT statements defining which packets should be encrypted; selecting one sub-group of the VPN gateway devices in which tunnel-less encryption is not configured; configuring of the VPN gateway devices in the sub-group for tunnel-less encryption by: configuring each device in a passive mode of operation in which the device is configured to receive either encrypted packets or plaintext packets matching encryption policy; configuring local DO NOT ENCRYPT statements matching traffic that is currently being converted to ciphertext; removing, from the access control list of the policy server, DO NOT ENCRYPT statements referring to protected LAN CIDR blocks behind the VPN gateway devices in the selected sub-group; configuring the sub-group to send encrypted packets by removing, from each of the

Abstract: A method, apparatus and computer program product for providing secure multipoint Internet Protocol Virtual Private Networks (IPVPNs) is presented. A packet lookup is performed in order to determine a next hop. A VPN label is pushed on the packet, as is an IP tunnel header. Group encryption through the use of DGVPN is further utilized. In such a manner secure connectivity and network partitioning are provided in a single solution.

Abstract: Nodes in a network include a pseudo-timestamp in messages or packets, derived from local pseudo-time clocks. When a packet is received, a first time is determined representing when the packet was sent and a second time is determined representing when the packet was received. If the difference between the second time and the first time is greater than a predetermined amount, the packet is considered to be stale and is rejected, thereby deterring replay. Because each node maintains its own clock and time, to keep the clocks relatively synchronized, if a time associated with a timestamp of a received packet is later than a certain amount with respect to the time at the receiver, the receiver's clock is set ahead by an amount that expected to synchronize the receiver's and the sender's clocks. However, a receiver never sets its clock back, to deter attacks.

Abstract: The present invention provides a method of determining whether database located on a first router is synchronized with the database located on a second router by performing a hash function on the values contained in a link state database to derive a SHA-1 digest value. In an embodiment, the digest value is based on LSA type. The digest value is exchanged initially during a database description packet swap between the first router and second router. If the digest values are the same, the databases are already synchronized. The routers thus skip the database description packet exchange of LSAs in the database and go directly to FULL state, indicating full synchronization between databases on the first and second router and announcing adjacency to each other. If the digest differs, normal database description packet exchange is performed as specified in OSPF.

Abstract: A method and apparatus for providing routing protocol support for distributing encryption information is presented. Subnet prefixes reachable on a first customer site in an encrypted manner are identified, as are security groups the subnet prefixes belong to. An advertisement is received at a first Customer Edge (CE) device in the first customer site, the advertisement originating from a Customer (C) device in the first customer site. The advertisement indicates links, subnets to be encrypted, and security group identifiers. The prefixes and the security group identifiers are then propagated across a service provider network to a second CE device located in a second customer site. In such a manner, encryption and authentication is expanded further into a customer site, as customer devices are able to indicate to a service provider network infrastructure and other customer devices in other customer sites which local destinations require encryption/authentication.

Abstract: A system provides a request for a policy from a policy server, and receives the policy from the policy server. The policy indicates processing to be applied to a traffic partition passing through the device. The system configures the policy within a routing structure associated with the traffic partition for the policy in the device, and routes a stream of traffic for the routing structure in accordance with the policy for that routing structure.

Abstract: A system transmits, to a hub from a first spoke, first routing information associated with the first spoke. The system receives, at the first spoke, from the hub, second routing information associated with a plurality of spokes in communication with the hub. The plurality of spokes includes a second spoke. The system resolves, at the first spoke, a next hop determination for the packet based on the second routing information received from the hub. The system routes the packet from the first spoke to the second spoke using the next hop determination.

Abstract: Various embodiments of the disclosed subject matter provide methods and systems for improved efficiency in spoke-to-spoke network communication. Embodiments provide systems and methods for registering a spoke with a hub, updating at least one database with spoke registration information at the hub, and advertising the spoke registration information to other spokes using a single control plane that includes transport security, peer discovery, and unicast routing information.

Abstract: A packet forwarding process, on a data communications device, forwards a packet to a plurality of destinations within a network from that data communications device using an “encrypt then replicate” method. The packet forwarding process receives a packet that is to be transmitted to the plurality of destinations, and applies a security association to the packet using security information shared between the data communications device, and the plurality of destinations, to create a secured packet. The secured packet contains a header that has a source address and a destination address. The source address is inserted into the header, and then the packet forwarding process replicates the secured packet, once for each of the plurality of destinations. After replication, the destination address is inserted into the header, and the packet forwarding process transmits each replicated secured packet to each of the plurality of destinations authorized to maintain the security association.

Abstract: Conventional mechanisms exist for denoting such a communications group (group) and for establishing point-to-point, or unicast, secure connections between members of the communications group. In a particular arrangement, group members employ a group key operable for multicast security for unicast communication, thus avoiding establishing additional unicast keys for each communication between group members. Since the recipient of such a unicast message may not know the source, however, the use of the group key assures the recipient that the sender is a member of the same group. Accordingly, a system which enumerates a set of subranges (subnets) included in a particular group, such as a VPN, and establishing a group key corresponding to the group applies the group key to communications from the group members in the subnet.

Abstract: Nodes in a network include a pseudo-timestamp in messages or packets, derived from local pseudo-time clocks. When a packet is received, a first time is determined representing when the packet was sent and a second time is determined representing when the packet was received. If the difference between the second time and the first time is greater than a predetermined amount, the packet is considered to be stale and is rejected, thereby deterring replay. Because each node maintains its own clock and time, to keep the clocks relatively synchronized, if a time associated with a timestamp of a received packet is later than a certain amount with respect to the time at the receiver, the receiver's clock is set ahead by an amount that expected to synchronize the receiver's and the sender's clocks. However, a receiver never sets its clock back, to deter attacks.

Abstract: Various systems and method are disclosed for automatically disseminating key server contact information in a network. For example, one method (e.g., performed by a discovery server) involves generating a discovery message that includes at least one list of one or more key servers and then sending that discovery message to one or more members of a key management protocol group. Each list of key servers can include contact information for one or more key servers and indicate the priority of each key server relative to other key servers within the list.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a technique for updating an address associated with a first entity in a communications network with a second entity in the communications network wherein the address is used to forward information to the first entity from the second entity. The first entity registers a first address associated with the first entity with the second entity. The first entity determines that a second address associated with the first entity is to be used instead of the first address to communicate with the first entity. The first entity generates an update message containing the second address, the update message obviating having to register the second address with the second entity. The first entity forwards the update message to the second entity to cause the second entity to use the second address instead of the first address to forward information to the first entity.

Abstract: A system and method for facilitating anti-replay protection with multi-sender traffic is disclosed. The system employs time-based anti-replay protection wherein a sender transmits a data packet with a pseudo-timestamp encapsulated in a metadata payload. At the receiving end, the receiver compares the pseudo-timestamp information received with its own pseudo-time, determines if a packet is valid, and rejects a replay packet. The pseudo-time information is transmitted through the metadata payload and new fields need not be added to the IPSec (IP Security) Protocol, thus the existing hardware can be employed without any changes or modifications.

Abstract: Systems and/or methods of secure communication of information between multi-domain virtual private networks (VPNs) are presented. A dynamic group VPN (DGVPN) can reside in one domain and a disparate DGVPN can reside in a disparate domain. An administrative security authority (ASA) can be employed in each domain. Each ASA can generate and exchange respective keying material and crypto-policy information to be used for inter-domain communications when routing data from a member in one DGVPN to a member(s) in the disparate DGVPN, such that an ASA in one domain can facilitate encryption of data in accordance with the policy of the other domain before the data is sent to the other domain. Each ASA can establish a key server to generate the keying material and crypto-policy information associated with its local DGVPN, and such material and information can be propagated to intra-domain members.