Abstract: A method and apparatus for reducing incentives for oligopolistic collusion comprises making managerial compensation dependent on relative profits rather than absolute profits. Since the managers of the firms in the industry are thereby placed in a zero-sum game, their compensation will be totally insensitive to gains in absolute profits resulting from collusion.

Abstract: An integrated display including a plurality of analog gauges concentrically arranged about a common center. Each analog gauge includes a pointer indicating a value of a parameter represented by the analog gauge. The integrated display is optionally semi-transparent and superimposed over a background view in a computer game, simulation, or other software application. The pointer and analog gauge may move relative to each other, or one may be fixed at an easily recognizable location while the other moves to indicate a current value of a parameter. This display can also be used on an electronic device to indicate a plurality of independent parameters in a minimal space.

Abstract: A method of eliciting an unbiased prediction of an unknown variable value from at least one of a group of forecasters. This method of compensating individual forecasters can be applied to an entire group of forecasters so as to elicit an unbiased collective prediction. The method yields nearly unbiased predictions from risk-averse forecasters whenever at least two forecasters are employed to make the same prediction. The method involves: aggregating the predictions of the forecasters, both with and without the particular prediction of the individual forecaster; computing collective losses for both of the aggregated predictions; calculating the individual forecaster's marginal contribution to predictive accuracy, based on the difference in collective losses; and computing and paying the individual forecaster's compensation as a function of the individual's marginal contribution.