Abstract: According to certain embodiments, a method comprises performing a posture assessment at a trust anchor in order to determine whether a hardware component is authorized to run on a product. Performing the posture assessment comprises determining a random value (K), encrypting the random value (K) using a long-term key associated with the hardware component in order to yield an encrypted value, communicating the encrypted value to the hardware component, and receiving, from the hardware component, a message encrypted using the random value (K). The message comprises an identifier associated with the hardware component. Performing the posture assessment further comprises determining whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product based at least in part on the identifier associated with the hardware component. The method further comprises performing an action that depends on whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product.

Abstract: According to certain embodiments, a method performed by a trust anchor comprises determining a random value (K), encrypting the random value (K) using a long-term key associated with a hardware component in order to yield an encrypted value, communicating the encrypted value to the hardware component, and receiving a response encrypted using the random value (K). The response is received from the hardware component. The method further comprise encrypting a schema using the random value (K) and sending the encrypted schema to the hardware component. The schema indicates functionality that the hardware component is authorized to enable.

Abstract: Techniques and architecture are described to control a debug port access employing the debug image signed offline by a challenge/response mechanism, where the signed image itself is tied to an ECID of a chip together with debug lifecycle information coming from fuses and a hash of a loader being debugged. All these inputs form a nonce (the debug image) that ties the debug image to the hardware being debugged and is restricted to the current debug lifecycle. The cryptographically signed debug image is authenticated by a boot image (or the chip) with a public key in the debug image. The debug image may be expanded to secure maintenance using a secure maintenance blob or “firmware maintenance certificate or nonce.” The secure maintenance blob also includes a natural attribute list of low-level features to be enabled upon verification of the secure maintenance blob.

Abstract: A method of operating a system-on-chip (SOC) including decrypting, by isolated Root of Trust (RoT) code, a Stock Keeping Unit (SKU) license code from a host during bootup of a device. Then validating, by the isolated RoT code, the SKU license code with firmware and at least one built-in key of a plurality of built-in keys from secure storage. Finally, enabling or disabling, by the isolated RoT code, at least one feature set of a plurality of feature sets comprising resources configured at the SOC based on at least one SKU license code which has been decrypted by isolated RoT code using at least one built-in key and authenticated by firmware.

Abstract: According to certain embodiments, a method comprises performing a posture assessment at a trust anchor in order to determine whether a hardware component is authorized to run on a product. Performing the posture assessment comprises determining a random value (K), encrypting the random value (K) using a long-term key associated with the hardware component in order to yield an encrypted value, communicating the encrypted value to the hardware component, and determining whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product based at least in part on whether the trust anchor receives, from the hardware component, a response encrypted using the random value (K). The method further comprises allowing or preventing the hardware component from running on the product based on whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product.

Abstract: According to certain embodiments, a method comprises receiving an encrypted value from a trust anchor. The encrypted value is received by a hardware component, and the encrypted value is associated with a posture assessment in which the trust anchor determines whether the hardware component is authorized to run on a product. The method further comprises obtaining a random value (K) based on decrypting the encrypted value. The decrypting uses a long-term key associated with the hardware component. The method further comprises communicating an encrypted response to the trust anchor. The encrypted response is encrypted using the random value (K). The encrypted response enables the trust anchor to determine whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product.

Abstract: According to certain embodiments, a method comprises performing a posture assessment at a trust anchor in order to determine whether a hardware component is authorized to run on a product. Performing the posture assessment comprises determining a random value (K), encrypting the random value (K) using a long-term key associated with the hardware component in order to yield an encrypted value, communicating the encrypted value to the hardware component, and receiving, from the hardware component, a message encrypted using the random value (K). The message comprises an identifier associated with the hardware component. Performing the posture assessment further comprises determining whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product based at least in part on the identifier associated with the hardware component. The method further comprises performing an action that depends on whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product.

Abstract: According to certain embodiments, a method comprises receiving an encrypted value from a trust anchor. The encrypted value is received by a hardware component, and the encrypted value is associated with a posture assessment in which the trust anchor determines whether the hardware component is authorized to run on a product. The method further comprises obtaining a random value (K) based on decrypting the encrypted value. The decrypting uses a long-term key associated with the hardware component. The method further comprises communicating an encrypted response to the trust anchor. The encrypted response is encrypted using the random value (K). The encrypted response enables the trust anchor to determine whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product.

Abstract: According to certain embodiments, a method performed by a trust anchor comprises determining a random value (K), encrypting the random value (K) using a long-term key associated with a hardware component in order to yield an encrypted value, communicating the encrypted value to the hardware component, and receiving a response encrypted using the random value (K). The response is received from the hardware component. The method further comprise encrypting a schema using the random value (K) and sending the encrypted schema to the hardware component. The schema indicates functionality that the hardware component is authorized to enable.

Abstract: According to certain embodiments, a method comprises performing a posture assessment at a trust anchor in order to determine whether a hardware component is authorized to run on a product. Performing the posture assessment comprises determining a random value (K), encrypting the random value (K) using a long-term key associated with the hardware component in order to yield an encrypted value, communicating the encrypted value to the hardware component, and determining whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product based at least in part on whether the trust anchor receives, from the hardware component, a response encrypted using the random value (K). The method further comprises allowing or preventing the hardware component from running on the product based on whether the hardware component is authorized to run on the product.

Abstract: Presented herein are methodologies for securing BIOS/bootloader function including booting a computer system from a BIOS image stored in a first boot flash device, detecting an indication of a pending BIOS upgrade, in response to detecting the indication of a pending BIOS upgrade, accessing an upgraded BIOS image stored on a second boot flash device, validating a version of the upgraded BIOS image, authenticating the upgraded BIOS image using a signature stored in a first region of the second boot flash device, when the version of the upgraded BIOS image is validated, and the upgraded BIOS image is authenticated, writing the signature to a second region of the second boot flash device that is different from the first region, locking the second region of the second boot flash device, and rebooting the computer system from the second boot flash device.

Abstract: A method includes modifying a product with a first configuration such that the product is configured in accordance with a second configuration, generating data representative of the second configuration, obtaining a signed version of the data representative of the second configuration, and storing the signed version of the data representative of the second configuration in a wireless read/write accessory that is affixed to the product, wherein the wireless read/write accessory includes a prior signed version of data representative of the first configuration.

Abstract: Presented herein are methodologies for securing BIOS/bootloader function including booting a computer system from a BIOS image stored in a first boot flash device, detecting an indication of a pending BIOS upgrade, in response to detecting the indication of a pending BIOS upgrade, accessing an upgraded BIOS image stored on a second boot flash device, validating a version of the upgraded BIOS image, authenticating the upgraded BIOS image using a signature stored in a first region of the second boot flash device, when the version of the upgraded BIOS image is validated, and the upgraded BIOS image is authenticated, writing the signature to a second region of the second boot flash device that is different from the first region, locking the second region of the second boot flash device, and rebooting the computer system from the second boot flash device.

Abstract: Techniques are provided for monitoring power consumption for individual systems or devices as a way to detect illicit or rogue hardware, e.g., addition of an unauthorized integrated circuit (IC), which may have been added to an existing system. Techniques include monitoring a power on sequence of a system, the power on sequence including one or more distinct stages, determining for each stage of the one or more distinct stages of the power on sequence, whether an observed power load of any distinct stage has deviated from an expected power load according to a power profile for the system, and when the observed power load of a given distinct stage has deviated from the expected power load, performing an action indicating that a deviation from the expected power load has occurred. The power profile specifies expected power characteristics of the system for each stage of a power on sequence.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a computing device receives an image that has been signed with a first key, wherein the image includes a first computational value associated with it. A second computational value associated with the image is determined and the image is signed with a second key to produce a signed image that includes both the first and second computational values. Prior to loading the dual-signed image, the computing device attempts to authenticate the dual-signed image using both the first and second computational values, and, if successful, loads and installs the dual-signed image.

Abstract: Techniques are provided for monitoring power consumption for individual systems or devices as a way to detect illicit or rogue hardware, e.g., addition of an unauthorized integrated circuit (IC), which may have been added to an existing system. Techniques include monitoring a power on sequence of a system, the power on sequence including one or more distinct stages, determining for each stage of the one or more distinct stages of the power on sequence, whether an observed power load of any distinct stage has deviated from an expected power load according to a power profile for the system, and when the observed power load of a given distinct stage has deviated from the expected power load, performing an action indicating that a deviation from the expected power load has occurred. The power profile specifies expected power characteristics of the system for each stage of a power on sequence.

Abstract: A trusted guard module stores one or more identifiers, each identifier uniquely identifying a respective electronic component of one or more electronic components in a circuit, wherein each electronic component is previously programmed with its respective identifier. In one embodiment, the one or more electronic components are in communication with the guard module via a test data channel. A query is sent from the guard module to one of the components via the test data channel, requesting that the queried component provide its respective identifier to the guard module. The guard module then receives a response from the queried component via the test data channel. The guard module compares the response to the stored identifier for the queried component. If the response fails to correspond to the stored identifier for the queried component, the guard module asserts an alarm condition.

Abstract: Techniques are provided for monitoring power consumption for individual systems or devices as a way to detect illicit or rogue hardware, e.g., addition of an unauthorized integrated circuit (IC), which may have been added to an existing system. Techniques include monitoring a power on sequence of a system, the power on sequence including one or more distinct stages, determining for each stage of the one or more distinct stages of the power on sequence, whether an observed power load of any distinct stage has deviated from an expected power load according to a power profile for the system, and when the observed power load of a given distinct stage has deviated from the expected power load, performing an action indicating that a deviation from the expected power load has occurred. The power profile specifies expected power characteristics of the system for each stage of a power on sequence.

Abstract: A trusted processor is pre-booted using a secure pre-boot loader integrated with the trusted processor. The trusted processor verifies whether an external boot loader is valid, and when valid, the trusted processor is booted using the external boot loader, thereby enabling trusted operation of the trusted processor. The trusted processor verifies whether a firmware image for a field programmable device is valid, and when valid, a firmware image loading process for the field programmable device is triggered. When the firmware image loading process is triggered, the firmware image is loaded into the field programmable device and the field programmable device is released to execute of the firmware image. The field programmable device verifies whether an external boot loader for an untrusted processor is valid, and when valid, the untrusted processor is booted using the external boot loader for the untrusted processor, thereby enabling trusted operation of the untrusted processor.

Abstract: A method includes modifying a product with a first configuration such that the product is configured in accordance with a second configuration, generating data representative of the second configuration, obtaining a signed version of the data representative of the second configuration, and storing the signed version of the data representative of the second configuration in a wireless read/write accessory that is affixed to the product, wherein the wireless read/write accessory includes a prior signed version of data representative of the first configuration.