Abstract: A method is provided for generating a secret sequence of values in a first device as a function of measured physical properties of a transmission channel between the first device and at least one second device. With this method, movements are detected by at least one sensor, which have an effect on the physical properties of the transmission channel. The measurement of the physical properties of the transmission channel is carried out as a function of the detected movements.

Abstract: A method is described for generating a secret sequence of values in a first device as a function of measured physical properties of a transmission channel between the first device and at least one second device. In this context, movements are detected by at least one sensor, and as a function of the detected movements, it is determined whether values of the physical properties of the transmission channel measured during the detected movements are suitable for generating the secret sequence of values.

Abstract: An embedded system wherein the system includes a computer, a watchdog, and an electrical power supply. The computer is electrically connected to the power supply. The power supply is connected in terms of measurement to the watchdog. The watchdog is configured in such a way that the watchdog measures a power consumption of the computer, ascertains a first power signature on the basis of the power consumption, carries out a comparison of the first power signature with a specified second power signature, and introduces specified measures if the comparison fails.

Abstract: A method for operating a primary unit which exchanges pieces of information with a secondary unit, including receiving first pieces of information from the secondary unit, the first pieces of information formed as a function of at least one first measured value of a physical variable in the area of the secondary unit and as a function of a first random number; measuring the physical variable in the area of the primary unit to obtain a second measured value; ascertaining a first estimated value for the first random number as a function of the first pieces of information and the second measured value; measuring the physical variable in the area of the primary unit to obtain a third measured value; forming second pieces of information as a function of the first estimated value and the third measured value; transmitting the second pieces of information to the secondary unit.

Abstract: A method for generating a secret key via a reciprocal communication channel connecting a first communication node and a second communication node, wherein the first communication node obtains a first sample by a measurement of the communication channel, the first communication node performs a quantization of the first sample, the first communication node performs a matching of the quantized sample with the second communication node via the communication channel, during the matching, the first communication node obtains and quantizes a second sample by a second measurement of the communication channel and the communication nodes obtain the key from the samples by a privacy amplification.

Abstract: A method for reconciling bit strings over a communications network. A first subscriber ascertains error correction information for each one of a plurality of different blocks, which each include a predetermined number of bits from a first bit string, and transmits the same over the communications network. Each of the blocks having at least one bit in common with at least one other one of the blocks.

Abstract: A method for executing a safety-critical function of a computing unit in a cyber-physical system, a request being received for the execution of the safety-critical function, an environment-specific and/or user-specific measurement value being acquired by at least one sensor of the computing unit, the environment-specific measurement value describing an environment of the computing unit, the user-specific measurement value describing an interaction of a user with the computing unit, the safety-critical function being executed if the environment-specific and/or the user-specific measurement value fulfills a specified criterion.