Abstract: An integrity verification subsystem can verify the integrity of software and firmware modules on a computing device at load time and/or at run time, independently of any operating systems that may be installed on the computing device. Some versions of the integrity verification subsystem can operate in physical and/or virtualized system environments, including virtualized mobile device architectures.

Abstract: A provisioning system can separately and independently provision different components for different purposes on a computing platform, and enforce component-specific purposes associated with the use of the individual provisioned components during operation of the platform. Some versions of the provisioning subsystem may operate on a virtualized mobile computing device and networked devices under control of the computing device. In some embodiments, the provisioning subsystem can enforce a desired “purpose” of a provisioned component while simultaneously denying a corresponding “anti-purpose.

Abstract: A policy arbitration system manages the fundamental communications and isolation between executable components and shared system resources of a computing device, and controls the use of the shared resources by the executable components. Some versions of the policy arbitration system operate on a virtualized mobile computing device to dynamically compile and implement policy rules that are issued periodically by multiple different independent execution environments that are running on the computing device. Semi-dynamic policy changes allow for context enabled policy changes that enforce the desired system and component “purpose” while simultaneously denying the “anti-purpose”.

Abstract: Polymorphic computing architectures can support and control separate, independently executable domains and other components on a computing platform. In some embodiments, the architectures may control the different domains and/or components according to different purposes. In some embodiments, the architectures can control domains and/or components to enforce a desired “purpose” of a domain/component while simultaneously denying a corresponding “anti-purpose”.

Abstract: A domain manager system as disclosed herein can control the selective activation of multiple independently-operable execution environments or domains on a computing device in accordance with one or more policies. In some embodiments, activation of a domain may at least temporarily transform a general purpose computing device into a specific purpose computing device or “appliance” by disabling use of one or more shared system resources by other domains.

Abstract: A provisioning system can separately and independently provision different components for different purposes on a computing platform, and enforce component-specific purposes associated with the use of the individual provisioned components during operation of the platform. Some versions of the provisioning subsystem may operate on a virtualized mobile computing device and networked devices under control of the computing device. In some embodiments, the provisioning subsystem can enforce a desired “purpose” of a provisioned component while simultaneously denying a corresponding “anti-purpose.

Abstract: A policy arbitration system manages the fundamental communications and isolation between executable components and shared system resources of a computing device, and controls the use of the shared resources by the executable components. Some versions of the policy arbitration system operate on a virtualized mobile computing device to dynamically compile and implement policy rules that are issued periodically by multiple different independent execution environments that are running on the computing device. Semi-dynamic policy changes allow for context enabled policy changes that enforce the desired system and component “purpose” while simultaneously denying the “anti-purpose”.

Abstract: Polymorphic computing architectures can support and control separate, independently executable domains and other components on a computing platform. In some embodiments, the architectures may control the different domains and/or components according to different purposes. In some embodiments, the architectures can control domains and/or components to enforce a desired “purpose” of a domain/component while simultaneously denying a corresponding “anti-purpose.

Abstract: A domain manager system as disclosed herein can control the selective activation of multiple independently-operable execution environments or domains on a computing device in accordance with one or more policies. In some embodiments, activation of a domain may at least temporarily transform a general purpose computing device into a specific purpose computing device or “appliance” by disabling use of one or more shared system resources by other domains.

Abstract: An integrity verification subsystem can verify the integrity of software and firmware modules on a computing device at load time and/or at run time, independently of any operating systems that may be installed on the computing device. Some versions of the integrity verification subsystem can operate in physical and/or virtualized system environments, including virtualized mobile device architectures.