Abstract: A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

Abstract: The present disclosure relates to a device for determining a height of a fluid surface in a fluid container. In some embodiments, the device comprises: a first sound transducer and a second sound transducer for transmitting and receiving sound signals; a reference element disposed at a predetermined distance from the second sound transducer in a fluid space of the fluid container; a deflection element in the fluid space to deflect sound signals by a predetermined angle in the direction of the reference element; and a control unit. The two sound transducers are adjacent a base portion of the fluid container and aligned similarly. The control unit is configured to establish a speed of sound within a fluid in the fluid space based at least in part on travel of the second sound signals and thereby to establish the height of the fluid surface over the base portion of the fluid container dependent on the first sound signals and the speed of sound within the fluid.

Abstract: A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

Abstract: A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

Abstract: A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

Abstract: A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

Abstract: The present disclosure relates to sensors, and the teaching may be applied to a device for determining a speed of a sound signal in a fluid in a fluid container. A device may include: a sound transducer for transmitting and receiving sound; a first reflector element and a second reflector element integrally formed in a reference element to reflect sound generated by the sound transducer back to the sound transducer; and a control unit operating to: ascertain a first signal runtime related to a first reflection of the sound signal from the first reflector element; a second signal runtime related to of a second reflection of the sound signal from the second reflector element; and calculate the speed as a function of the two.

Abstract: A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

Abstract: A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

Abstract: A fill level sensor for detecting the fill level of a liquid in a container includes an ultrasonic transceiver, an inner tube for arrangement inside the container, the inner tube being arranged above the ultrasonic transceiver such that a liquid present in the container forms a liquid column in the inner tube the level of which can be detected by the ultrasonic transceiver, an outer tube surrounding the inner tube, and a cap which covers the inner tube and the outer tube toward the top. The cap has an inner tubular section adjoining the inner tube, an outer tubular section adjoining the outer tube, an inner vent opening for the inner tubular section and an outer vent opening for the outer tubular section.

Abstract: A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

Abstract: A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

Abstract: A fill level sensor for detecting the fill level of a liquid in a container includes an ultrasonic transceiver, an inner tube for arrangement inside the container, the inner tube being arranged above the ultrasonic transceiver such that a liquid present in the container forms a liquid column in the inner tube the level of which can be detected by the ultrasonic transceiver, an outer tube surrounding the inner tube, and a cap which covers the inner tube and the outer tube toward the top. The cap has an inner tubular section adjoining the inner tube, an outer tubular section adjoining the outer tube, an inner vent opening for the inner tubular section and an outer vent opening for the outer tubular section.

Abstract: A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

Abstract: A railway vital or critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform with railway vital system failure-free standards. The vital system uses a pair of COTS personal computers and operating systems with asymmetric communications capability. Each computer and operating system may differ for additional redundancy. Both computers receive and verify vital systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first computer has sole capability to send vital system output messages including the output data and an output security code, but only the second computer has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of either computer's hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a vital system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other vital systems.

Abstract: A railway vital or critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform with railway vital system failure-free standards. The vital system uses a pair of COTS personal computers and operating systems with asymmetric communications capability. Each computer and operating system may differ for additional redundancy. Both computers receive and verify vital systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first computer has sole capability to send vital system output messages including the output data and an output security code, but only the second computer has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of either computer's hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a vital system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other vital systems.

Abstract: Apparatus for stacking sheets comprises a collecting bin with a front stationary abutment and a rear limiting element adjustable to various sheet size ranges. A first deflecting roller, adjustable in the entrance direction of the sheets and mounted on a rear limiting element, provides support for a transport belt transporting the sheets. The rear limiting element is mounted on a support which is movable in the entrance direction by means of two parallel threaded spindles rotatable by a stepping motor. A second deflecting roller which is associated with the outer side of the transport belt facing the sheet stack is arranged on the support, whereas the first deflecting roller is located on the inner side of the transport belt. Adjacent to the second deflecting roller, a stationary deflecting roller is arranged such that the transport belt is guided along an S-shaped path.