Abstract: An authentication model dynamically adjusts authentication factors required for access to a remote resource based on changes to a risk score for a user, a device, or some combination of these. For example, the authentication model may conditionally specify the number and type of authentication factors required by a user/device pair, and may dynamically alter authentication requirements based on changes to a current risk assessment for the user/device while the remote resource is in use.

Abstract: Attachments or other documents can be transmitted to a sandbox environment where they can be concurrently opened for remote preview from an endpoint and scanned for possible malware. A gateway or other intermediate network element may enforce this process by replacing attachments, for example, in incoming electronic mail communications, with links to a document preview hosted in the sandbox environment.

Abstract: An authentication model dynamically adjusts authentication factors required for access to a remote resource based on changes to a risk score for a user, a device, or some combination of these. For example, the authentication model may conditionally specify the number and type of authentication factors required by a user/device pair, and may dynamically alter authentication requirements based on changes to a current risk assessment for the user/device while the remote resource is in use.

Abstract: A threat management facility stores a number of entity models that characterize reportable events from one or more entities. A stream of events from compute instances within an enterprise network can then be analyzed using these entity models to detect behavior that is inconsistent or anomalous for one or more of the entities that are currently active within the enterprise network.

Abstract: An authentication model dynamically adjusts authentication factors required for access to a remote resource based on changes to a risk score for a user, a device, or some combination of these. For example, the authentication model may conditionally specify the number and type of authentication factors required by a user/device pair, and may dynamically alter authentication requirements based on changes to a current risk assessment for the user/device while the remote resource is in use.

Abstract: Entity models are used to evaluate potential risk of entities, either individually or in groups, in order to evaluate suspiciousness within an enterprise network. These individual or aggregated risk assessments can be used to adjust the security policy for compute instances within the enterprise network. A security policy may specify security settings such as network speed, filtering levels, network isolation, levels of privilege, and the like.

Abstract: An interface for a threat management facility of an enterprise network supports the use of third-party security products within the enterprise network by providing access to relevant internal instrumentation and/or a programmatic interface for direct or indirect access to local security agents on compute instances within the enterprise network.

Abstract: A security platform uses a sensor-event-analysis-response methodology to iteratively adapt to a changing security environment by continuously creating and updating entity models based on observed activities and detecting patterns of events that deviate from these entity models.

Abstract: A threat management facility stores a number of entity models that characterize reportable events from one or more entities. A stream of events from compute instances within an enterprise network can then be analyzed using these entity models to detect behavior that is inconsistent or anomalous for one or more of the entities that are currently active within the enterprise network.

Abstract: A ledger stores chain of custody information for files throughout an enterprise network. By identifying files with a homologous identifier such as a fuzzy hash that permits piecewise evaluation of similarity, the ledger can be used to track a chain of custody over a sequence of changes in content, ownership, and file properties. The ledger can be used, e.g., to evaluate trustworthiness of a file the first time it is encountered by an endpoint, or to apply enterprise policies based on trust.

Abstract: Threat detection instrumentation is simplified by providing and updating labels for computing objects in a context-sensitive manner. This may include simple labeling schemes to distinguish between objects, e.g., trusted/untrusted processes or corporate/private data. This may also include more granular labeling schemes such as a three-tiered scheme that identifies a category (e.g., financial, e-mail, game), static threat detection attributes (e.g., signatures, hashes, API calls), and explicit identification (e.g., what a file or process calls itself). By tracking such data for various computing objects and correlating these labels to malware occurrences, rules can be written for distribution to endpoints to facilitate threat detection based on, e.g., interactions of labeled objects, changes to object labels, and so forth.

Abstract: A ledger stores chain of custody information for files throughout an enterprise network. By identifying files with a homologous identifier such as a fuzzy hash that permits piecewise evaluation of similarity, the ledger can be used to track a chain of custody over a sequence of changes in content, ownership, and file properties. The ledger can be used, e.g., to evaluate trustworthiness of a file the first time it is encountered by an endpoint, or to apply enterprise policies based on trust.

Abstract: Entity models are used to evaluate potential risk of entities, either individually or in groups, in order to evaluate suspiciousness within an enterprise network. These individual or aggregated risk assessments can be used to adjust the security policy for compute instances within the enterprise network. A security policy may specify security settings such as network speed, filtering levels, network isolation, levels of privilege, and the like.

Abstract: An authentication model dynamically adjusts authentication factors required for access to a remote resource based on changes to a risk score for a user, a device, or some combination of these. For example, the authentication model may conditionally specify the number and type of authentication factors required by a user/device pair, and may dynamically alter authentication requirements based on changes to a current risk assessment for the user/device while the remote resource is in use.

Abstract: Threat detection instrumentation is simplified by providing and updating labels for computing objects in a context-sensitive manner. This may include simple labeling schemes to distinguish between objects, e.g., trusted/untrusted processes or corporate/private data. This may also include more granular labeling schemes such as a three-tiered scheme that identifies a category (e.g., financial, e-mail, game), static threat detection attributes (e.g., signatures, hashes, API calls), and explicit identification (e.g., what a file or process calls itself). By tracking such data for various computing objects and correlating these labels to malware occurrences, rules can be written for distribution to endpoints to facilitate threat detection based on, e.g., interactions of labeled objects, changes to object labels, and so forth.

Abstract: Entity models are used to evaluate potential risk of entities, either individually or in groups, in order to evaluate suspiciousness within an enterprise network. These individual or aggregated risk assessments can be used to adjust the security policy for compute instances within the enterprise network. A security policy may specify security settings such as network speed, filtering levels, network isolation, levels of privilege, and the like.

Abstract: An authentication model dynamically adjusts authentication factors required for access to a remote resource based on changes to a risk score for a user, a device, or some combination of these. For example, the authentication model may conditionally specify the number and type of authentication factors required by a user/device pair, and may dynamically alter authentication requirements based on changes to a current risk assessment for the user/device while the remote resource is in use.

Abstract: Attachments or other documents can be transmitted to a sandbox environment where they can be concurrently opened for remote preview from an endpoint and scanned for possible malware. A gateway or other intermediate network element may enforce this process by replacing attachments, for example, in incoming electronic mail communications, with links to a document preview hosted in the sandbox environment.

Abstract: Threat detection instrumentation is simplified by providing and updating labels for computing objects in a context-sensitive manner. This may include simple labeling schemes to distinguish between objects, e.g., trusted/untrusted processes or corporate/private data. This may also include more granular labeling schemes such as a three-tiered scheme that identifies a category (e.g., financial, e-mail, game), static threat detection attributes (e.g., signatures, hashes, API calls), and explicit identification (e.g., what a file or process calls itself). By tracking such data for various computing objects and correlating these labels to malware occurrences, rules can be written for distribution to endpoints to facilitate threat detection based on, e.g., interactions of labeled objects, changes to object labels, and so forth.

Abstract: An enterprise security system is improved by instrumenting endpoints to explicitly label network flows with cryptographically secure labels that identify an application or other source of each network flow. Cryptographic techniques may be used, for example, to protect the encoded information in the label from interception by third parties or to support cryptographic authentication of a source of each label. A label may provide health, status, or other heartbeat information for the endpoint, and may be used to identify compromised endpoints, to make routing decisions for network traffic (e.g., allowing, blocking, rerouting, etc.), to more generally evaluate the health of an endpoint that is sourcing network traffic, or for any other useful purpose.