Abstract: A semiconductor substrate of an integrated circuit is protected by a coating. The semiconductor includes a front face and a rear face. To detect a breach of the integrity of a semiconductor substrate of an integrated circuit from the rear face, an opening of the coating facing the rear face of the substrate is detected. In response thereto, an alarm is generated. The detection is performed by making resistance measurements with respect to the semiconductor substrate and comparing the measured resistance to a nominal resistive value of the semiconductor substrate.

Abstract: A cryptographic circuit performs a substitution operation of a cryptographic algorithm based on a scrambled substitution table. For each set of one or more substitution operations of the cryptographic algorithm, the circuit performs a series of sets of one or more substitution operations of which: one is a real set of one or more substitution operations defined by the cryptographic algorithm, the real set of one or more substitution operations being based on input data modified by a real scrambling key; and one or more others are dummy sets of one or more substitution operations, each dummy set of one or more dummy substitution operations being based on input data modified by a different false scrambling key.

Abstract: The disclosure concerns an electronic chip including a resistive region and a first switch of selection of a first area in contact with the resistive region.

Abstract: An electronic chip includes a first well having a first PN junction located therein, a second buried well located under and separated from the first well, and a first region forming a second PN junction with the second well. A detection circuit is coupled to the first well and configured to output a digital signal that has a first logic value when a potential difference within the first region is above a threshold and a second logic value when the potential difference within the first region is below the threshold.

Abstract: A circuit for protecting an integrated circuit against fault injection attacks includes an element including a dielectric which is destroyed, resulting in the occurrence of a short-circuit. The element is connected between two terminals that receive a power supply voltage of the integrated circuit.

Abstract: An electronic chip includes a first well having a first PN junction located therein, a second buried well located under and separated from the first well, and a first region forming a second PN junction with the second well. A detection circuit is coupled to the first well and configured to output a digital signal that has a first logic value when a potential difference within the first region is above a threshold and a second logic value when the potential difference within the first region is below the threshold.

Abstract: The disclosure concerns an electronic chip including a resistive region and a first switch of selection of a first area in contact with the resistive region.

Abstract: A cryptographic circuit performs a substitution operation of a cryptographic algorithm based on a scrambled substitution table. For each set of one or more substitution operations of the cryptographic algorithm, the circuit performs a series of sets of one or more substitution operations of which: one is a real set of one or more substitution operations defined by the cryptographic algorithm, the real set of one or more substitution operations being based on input data modified by a real scrambling key; and one or more others are dummy sets of one or more substitution operations, each dummy set of one or more dummy substitution operations being based on input data modified by a different false scrambling key.

Abstract: A semiconductor substrate of an integrated circuit is protected by a coating. The semiconductor includes a front face and a rear face. To detect a breach of the integrity of a semiconductor substrate of an integrated circuit from the rear face, an opening of the coating facing the rear face of the substrate is detected. In response thereto, an alarm is generated. The detection is performed by making resistance measurements with respect to the semiconductor substrate and comparing the measured resistance to a nominal resistive value of the semiconductor substrate.

Abstract: A circuit for protecting an integrated circuit against fault injection attacks includes an element including a dielectric which is destroyed, resulting in the occurrence of a short-circuit. The element is connected between two terminals that receive a power supply voltage of the integrated circuit.

Abstract: A system and method for encrypting data. The system includes a controller and a processing element (PE) array coupled to the controller. The PE array is operative to perform one or more of encryption functions and decryption functions using an encryption algorithm. According to the system and method disclosed herein, by utilizing the PE array, the system encrypts and decrypts data efficiently and flexibly.

Abstract: A system and method for encrypting data. The system includes a controller and a processing element (PE) array coupled to the controller. The PE array is operative to perform one or more of encryption functions and decryption functions using an encryption algorithm. According to the system and method disclosed herein, by utilizing the PE array, the system encrypts and decrypts data efficiently and flexibly.

Abstract: A method is provided for processing a virtual address for a program requesting a DMA transfer. The program is designed to be run in user mode on a system on a chip that includes a central processing unit, a memory management unit, and a DMA controller. The virtual address is a source virtual address or a destination virtual address and has a size of N bits. According to the method, the virtual address is divided into at least two fields of bits. For each of the fields, there is created an N-bit address word comprising a prefix having a given value associated with the field and having more than 1 bit, and the field. The DMA controller is programmed using multiple store instructions that include one store instruction relating to each of the address words created.

Abstract: A method is provided for processing a virtual address for a program requesting a DMA transfer. The program is designed to be run in user mode on a system on a chip that includes a central processing unit, a memory management unit, and a DMA controller. The virtual address is a source virtual address or a destination virtual address and has a size of N bits. According to the method, the virtual address is divided into at least two fields of bits. For each of the fields, there is created an N-bit address word comprising a prefix having a given value associated with the field and having more than 1 bit, and the field. The DMA controller is programmed using multiple store instructions that include one store instruction relating to each of the address words created.