Abstract: Techniques for reconstructing a die unique wrapping key from non-volatile (NVM) memory by a memory controller circuit are described. In certain examples, a computer system includes a processing circuit to perform one or more operations according to the one or more values; a non-volatile memory; and a memory controller circuit coupled to the non-volatile memory, the memory controller circuit to: read data from the non-volatile memory, read a key mask from the non-volatile memory, perform a hashing operation on the data from the non-volatile memory to generate a digest value, perform a reversible function on the digest value and the key mask to recover a wrapping-key, and decrypt encrypted data of the data with the wrapping-key to recover one or more values for the processing circuit.

Abstract: An apparatus is described including cryptography circuitry to generate authentication tags to provide integrity protection for plaintext and ciphertext.

Abstract: Various examples of the present disclosure relate to apparatuses, methods, computer systems and computer-readable media for generating and using random values. Some aspects of the present disclosure relate to an apparatus for a computer system, the apparatus comprising memory circuitry, machine-readable instructions, and processor circuitry to execute the machine-readable instructions to determine different canary values for corresponding different threads of a program, and start the thread of the program, with the determined canary value being used as stack canary for the thread of the program.

Abstract: An apparatus is described including cryptography circuitry to generate authentication tags to provide integrity protection for plaintext and ciphertext.

Abstract: An apparatus is described including cryptography circuitry to generate authentication tags to provide integrity protection for plaintext and ciphertext.

Abstract: Methods, apparatus, systems and articles of manufacture (e.g., physical storage media) for software defined silicon security are disclosed. Example apparatus include a trusted agent determiner to (i) determine respective reputation scores associated with a plurality of agents in a mesh network, the plurality of agents associated with a plurality of semiconductor devices, respective ones of the semiconductor devices including circuitry configurable to provide one or more features, and (ii) select, based on the respective reputation scores, a first agent from the plurality of the agents to transmit a request to activate or deactivate at least one of the one or more features. Example apparatus also include an agent interface to, in response to the request, broadcast an activation or deactivation of the least one of the one or more features to the mesh network to cause the trusted agent determiner to update the reputation score of the first agent.

Abstract: Methods, apparatus, systems and articles of manufacture (e.g., physical storage media) for software defined silicon security are disclosed. Example apparatus include a trusted agent determiner to (i) determine respective reputation scores associated with a plurality of agents in a mesh network, the plurality of agents associated with a plurality of semiconductor devices, respective ones of the semiconductor devices including circuitry configurable to provide one or more features, and (ii) select, based on the respective reputation scores, a first agent from the plurality of the agents to transmit a request to activate or deactivate at least one of the one or more features. Example apparatus also include an agent interface to, in response to the request, broadcast an activation or deactivation of the least one of the one or more features to the mesh network to cause the trusted agent determiner to update the reputation score of the first agent.

Abstract: The present disclosure is directed to systems and methods to protect against SCA and fault injection attacks through the use of a temporary or ephemeral key to cryptographically alter input data portions. Universal resistant block (URB) circuitry receives a seed data value and a at least one secret key data value and generates an ephemeral key output data value. Cryptographic circuitry uses the ephemeral key data value to transform an input data portion to produce an transformed output data portion. The use of an SCA or fault injection attack on the transformed output data portion will reveal only the ephemeral key data value and not the at least one secret key data value. Further, where a unique ephemeral key data value is used to transform each input data portion, an attacker cannot discover the ephemeral key in a piecemeal manner and must instead discover the complete ephemeral key data value—significantly increasing the difficulty of performing a successful SCA or fault injection attack.

Abstract: An apparatus is described including cryptography circuitry to generate authentication tags to provide integrity protection for plaintext and ciphertext.

Abstract: Embodiments described herein enable independently recoverable security for processor and peripheral communication, enabling a processor without native non-volatile memory to generate and recover credentials in response to a firmware update. The processor and peripheral can each have credentials burned into secure fuses. The processor can derive a shared secret from the secure fuses using security attributes that are based on the security version number of firmware within the processor and the peripherals to which the processor is to security communicate. The processor and peripherals can generate ephemeral session keys from the shared secret and nonces. The ephemeral session keys can be used to secure communications between the processor and the peripherals.

Abstract: The present disclosure is directed to systems and methods to protect against SCA and fault injection attacks through the use of a temporary or ephemeral key to cryptographically alter input data portions. Universal resistant block (URB) circuitry receives a seed data value and a at least one secret key data value and generates an ephemeral key output data value. Cryptographic circuitry uses the ephemeral key data value to transform an input data portion to produce an transformed output data portion. The use of an SCA or fault injection attack on the transformed output data portion will reveal only the ephemeral key data value and not the at least one secret key data value. Further, where a unique ephemeral key data value is used to transform each input data portion, an attacker cannot discover the ephemeral key in a piecemeal manner and must instead discover the complete ephemeral key data value—significantly increasing the difficulty of performing a successful SCA or fault injection attack.

Abstract: Embodiments described herein enable independently recoverable security for processor and peripheral communication, enabling a processor without native non-volatile memory to generate and recover credentials in response to a firmware update. The processor and peripheral can each have credentials burned into secure fuses. The processor can derive a shared secret from the secure fuses using security attributes that are based on the security version number of firmware within the processor and the peripherals to which the processor is to security communicate. The processor and peripherals can generate ephemeral session keys from the shared secret and nonces. The ephemeral session keys can be used to secure communications between the processor and the peripherals.