Abstract: A computing device's trusted platform module (TPM) is configured with a cryptographic watchdog timer which forces a device reset if the TPM fails to solve a cryptographic challenge before the expiration of the timer. The computing device's TPM is configured to generate the cryptographic challenge, to which the computing device does not possess the cryptographic token for resolution. While the watchdog timer counts down, the computing device requests a cryptographic token from a remote service to solve the challenge. The remote service transmits the cryptographic token to the computing device so long as the remote service identifies no reason to withhold the token, such as the computing device being infected with malware. The interoperability of the computing device and remote service enables the remote service to exercise control and reset capabilities over the computing device.

Abstract: A computing device's trusted platform module (TPM) is configured with a cryptographic watchdog timer which forces a device reset if the TPM fails to solve a cryptographic challenge before the expiration of the timer. The computing device's TPM is configured to generate the cryptographic challenge, to which the computing device does not possess the cryptographic token for resolution. While the watchdog timer counts down, the computing device requests a cryptographic token from a remote service to solve the challenge. The remote service transmits the cryptographic token to the computing device so long as the remote service identifies no reason to withhold the token, such as the computing device being infected with malware. The interoperability of the computing device and remote service enables the remote service to exercise control and reset capabilities over the computing device.

Abstract: The subject disclosure is directed towards certifying cryptographic data for a crypto-processor outside of a controlled environment. The crypto-processor and a certifying entity maintain shared secret data for the purpose of verifying security of cryptographic key generation by the crypto-processor's firmware. In order to certify new cryptographic keys, the crypto-processor uses the shared secret data to verify the crypto-processor's firmware/hardware to the certifying entity. By protecting the shared secret data from exposure to compromised firmware, the shared secret data may be used to compute another secret conveying to the certifying entity whether the firmware can be trusted or not.

Abstract: The subject disclosure is directed towards certifying cryptographic data for a crypto-processor outside of a controlled environment. The crypto-processor and a certifying entity maintain shared secret data for the purpose of verifying security of cryptographic key generation by the crypto-processor's firmware. In order to certify new cryptographic keys, the crypto-processor uses the shared secret data to verify the crypto-processor's firmware/hardware to the certifying entity. By protecting the shared secret data from exposure to compromised firmware, the shared secret data may be used to compute another secret conveying to the certifying entity whether the firmware can be trusted or not.