Abstract: A security model is provided in a transactional logging infrastructure that is arranged as a protected subsystem built on an underlying secure file system. Files in the underlying file system used by virtual log streams are protected from direct user writes, and are written-to only through the protected subsystem that is brokered by a machine-wide principal so that virtual log files sharing the same multiplexed physical log are kept secure from each other. Log file handles and user- and kernel-mode objects are exposed to log clients through interfaces using consistent security semantics for both dedicated and virtual logs. Log clients are agnostic of the underlying secure file system and can only manipulate file system containers—abstract objects that implement the physical log and used to virtualize the file system by normalizing input/output operations—by using the interfaces brokered by the principal in the protected subsystem.

Abstract: A transactional logging service is provided to user-mode and kernel-mode log clients by utilizing a marshalling area to buffer a set of log records that a log client assembles into a log stream. Disk I/O (input/output) functionality is then separately brokered using a kernel-mode address space for a single dedicated physical log, or virtual logs multiplexed to a single log, which is written to stable storage that contains log records from across all of the log streams. Physical log writes are handled by a shared log flush queue and physical log reads are provided by a file system cache that underlies the service. A multi-level cache hierarchy is utilized when a log client needs to access a log record. A series of caches are queried in order of increasing latency until the targeted log record is located. The target log record is only read from disk in the event that it missed at each cache in the hierarchy.

Abstract: Transactions among kernel objects utilize application program interfaces (APIs) to implement operations on a transaction object and APIs to implement operations on a resource manager object.

Abstract: A security model is provided in a transactional logging infrastructure that is arranged as a protected subsystem built on an underlying secure file system. Files in the underlying file system used by virtual log streams are protected from direct user writes, and are written-to only through the protected subsystem that is brokered by a machine-wide principal so that virtual log files sharing the same multiplexed physical log are kept secure from each other. Log file handles and user- and kernel-mode objects are exposed to log clients through interfaces using consistent security semantics for both dedicated and virtual logs. Log clients are agnostic of the underlying secure file system and can only manipulate file system containers—abstract objects that implement the physical log and used to virtualize the file system by normalizing input/output operations—by using the interfaces brokered by the principal in the protected subsystem.

Abstract: A transactional logging service is provided to user-mode and kernel-mode log clients by utilizing a marshalling area to buffer a set of log records that a log client assembles into a log stream. Disk I/O (input/output) functionality is then separately brokered using a kernel-mode address space for a single dedicated physical log, or virtual logs multiplexed to a single log, which is written to stable storage that contains log records from across all of the log streams. Physical log writes are handled by a shared log flush queue and physical log reads are provided by a file system cache that underlies the service. A multi-level cache hierarchy is utilized when a log client needs to access a log record. A series of caches are queried in order of increasing latency until the targeted log record is located. The target log record is only read from disk in the event that it missed at each cache in the hierarchy.