Abstract: A secure communications and location authorization system using a power line or a potion thereof as a side-channel that mitigates man-in-the-middle attacks on communications networks and devices connected to those networks. The system includes a power grid server associated with a substation, or curb-side distribution structure such as a transformer, an electric meter associated with a structure having electric service and able to communicate with the power grid server, a human authorization detector input device connected to the electric meter and the power grid server. The human authorization detector is able to receive an input from a user physically located at the structure and capable of communicating with the power grid server via the electric meter. The user's physical input into the device causing a request to be sent to the power grid server that then generates a location certificate for the user.

Abstract: A secure communications and location authorization system using a power line or a potion thereof as a side-channel that mitigates man-in-the-middle attacks on communications networks and devices connected to those networks. The system includes a power grid server associated with a substation, or curb-side distribution structure such as a transformer, an electric meter associated with a structure having electric service and able to communicate with the power grid server, a human authorization detector input device connected to the electric meter and the power grid server. The human authorization detector is able to receive an input from a user physically located at the structure and capable of communicating with the power grid server via the electric meter. The user's physical input into the device causing a request to be sent to the power grid server that then generates a location certificate for the user.

Abstract: A secure communications and location authorization system using a power line or a portion thereof as a side-channel that mitigates man-in-the-middle attacks on communications networks and devices connected to those networks. The system includes a power grid server associated with a substation, or curb-side distribution structure such as a transformer, an electric meter associated with a structure having electric service and able to communicate with the power grid server, a human authorization detector input device connected to the electric meter and the power grid server. The human authorization detector is able to receive an input from a user physically located at the structure and capable of communicating with the power grid server via the electric meter. The user's physical input into the device causing a request to be sent to the power grid server that then generates a location certificate for the user.

Abstract: A secure communications and location authorization system using a power line or a portion thereof as a side-channel that mitigates man-in-the-middle attacks on communications networks and devices connected to those networks. The system includes a power grid server associated with a substation, or curb-side distribution structure such as a transformer, an electric meter associated with a structure having electric service and able to communicate with the power grid server, a human authorization detector input device connected to the electric meter and the power grid server. The human authorization detector is able to receive an input from a user physically located at the structure and capable of communicating with the power grid server via the electric meter. The user's physical input into the device causing a request to be sent to the power grid server that then generates a location certificate for the user.

Abstract: A secure communications and location authorization system using a power line or a portion thereof as a side-channel that mitigates man-in-the-middle attacks on communications networks and devices connected to those networks. The system includes a power grid server associated with a substation, or curb-side distribution structure such as a transformer, an electric meter associated with a structure having electric service and able to communicate with the power grid server, a human authorization detector input device connected to the electric meter and the power grid server. The human authorization detector is able to receive an input from a user physically located at the structure and capable of communicating with the power grid server via the electric meter. The user's physical input into the device causing a request to be sent to the power grid server that then generates a location certificate for the user.

Abstract: A secure communications and location authorization system using a power line or a potion thereof as a side-channel that mitigates man-in-the-middle attacks on communications networks and devices connected to those networks. The system includes a power grid server associated with a substation, or curb-side distribution structure such as a transformer, an electric meter associated with a structure having electric service and able to communicate with the power grid server, a human authorization detector input device connected to the electric meter and the power grid server. The human authorization detector is able to receive an input from a user physically located at the structure and capable of communicating with the power grid server via the electric meter. The user's physical input into the device causing a request to be sent to the power grid server that then generates a location certificate for the user.

Abstract: Real routable external addresses may be pooled rather than assigned to nodes and may be dynamically bound to connections by a proxy or gateway device in ways that spread apparent identity of individual nodes across multiple of the external addresses. In general, these spread identity techniques may be employed at one end or the other of a connection, as well as at both ends. In a typical double-ended configuration, the architecture and associated techniques provide “double-blindfolding,” wherein true identities (addresses) of communicating peers are always hidden from each other. In some double-ended configurations, dynamic binding may be employed at a fine level of granularity, for instance allowing individual packets associated with given connection to bear different apparent source addresses and/or different apparent destination addresses. In some single-ended configurations, a spread identity proxy is interposed between an information server and a plurality of requestors.

Abstract: A method for performing reconstruction using a residue number system includes selecting a set of moduli. A reconstruction coefficient is estimated based on the selected set of moduli. A reconstruction operation is performed using the reconstruction coefficient.

Abstract: Real routable external addresses may be pooled rather than assigned to nodes and may be dynamically bound to connections by a proxy or gateway device in ways that spread apparent identity of individual nodes across multiple of the external addresses. In general, these spread identity techniques may be employed at one end or the other of a connection, as well as at both ends. In a typical double-ended configuration, the architecture and associated techniques provide “double-blindfolding,” wherein true identities (addresses) of communicating peers are always hidden from each other. In some double-ended configurations, dynamic binding may be employed at a fine level of granularity, for instance allowing individual packets associated with given connection to bear different apparent source addresses and/or different apparent destination addresses. In some single-ended configurations, a spread identity proxy is interposed between an information server and a plurality of requesters.

Abstract: A secure communications and location authorization system using a power line or a potion thereof as a side-channel that mitigates man-in-the-middle attacks on communications networks and devices connected to those networks. The system includes a power grid server associated with a substation, or curb-side distribution structure such as a transformer, an electric meter associated with a structure having electric service and able to communicate with the power grid server, a human authorization detector input device connected to the electric meter and the power grid server. The human authorization detector is able to receive an input from a user physically located at the structure and capable of communicating with the power grid server via the electric meter. The user's physical input into the device causing a request to be sent to the power grid server that then generates a location certificate for the user.

Abstract: Real routable external addresses may be pooled rather than assigned to nodes and may be dynamically bound to connections by a proxy or gateway device in ways that spread apparent identity of individual nodes across multiple of the external addresses. In general, these spread identity techniques may be employed at one end or the other of a connection, as well as at both ends. In a typical double-ended configuration, the architecture and associated techniques provide “double-blindfolding,” wherein true identities (addresses) of communicating peers are always hidden from each other. In some double-ended configurations, dynamic binding may be employed at a fine level of granularity, for instance allowing individual packets associated with given connection to bear different apparent source addresses and/or different apparent destination addresses. In some single-ended configurations, a spread identity proxy is interposed between an information server and a plurality of requesters.

Abstract: A fast CORDIC algorithm and the resulting VLSI architecture for the evaluation of trigonometric functions are disclosed. The new method employs signed digits to represent intermediate operands and requires a constant scaling or normalization factor which can be pre-computed and made available in read-only hardware for any desired target precision (i.e., word length). The speedup is achieved by performing CORDIC iterations in parallel in two separate modules. Each module executes a “double step” or two basic CORDIC rotations at every iteration cycle. Two angles arctan 2−2i and arctan 2−(2i+1) are used in each step i of the method. As a result, approximately {fraction (n/2)} steps (exactly ⌈ n + 3 2 ⌉ steps) are required to evaluate sine/cosine of n bit input argument up to n bits of accuracy.