Abstract: A system for testing a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver includes signal generators, antennas coupled to respective signal generators and having overlapping antenna radiation patterns, and processing circuitry. The signal generators generate respective test signals. Each of the test signals is a combination of multiple GNSS navigational signals which are generated using a set of ranging codes. The processing circuitry selects respective sets of ranging codes for the signal generators, such that the sets of ranging codes are separately insufficient to lock a GNSS receiver and are jointly sufficient to lock a GNSS receiver.

Abstract: A system for testing a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver includes signal generators, antennas coupled to respective signal generators and having overlapping antenna radiation patterns, and processing circuitry. The signal generators generate respective test signals. Each of the test signals is a combination of multiple GNSS navigational signals which are generated using a set of ranging codes. The processing circuitry selects respective sets of ranging codes for the signal generators, such that the sets of ranging codes are separately insufficient to lock a GNSS receiver and are jointly sufficient to lock a GNSS receiver.

Abstract: An attack detector for detecting attacks on a satellite navigation system obtains navigation messages extracted from satellite navigation signals and/or additional parameters of the satellite navigation signal from source devices. The obtained navigation messages and/or parameters are analyzed to detect satellite navigation spoofing attacks. An indicator is issued when an attack is detected.

Abstract: A device for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing includes processing circuitry which detects correlation peaks for PRNs in a satellite navigation signal. The TOAs of subframes of navigation messages associated with each of correlation peaks are recorded and analyzed to determine if they fall within a specified time window. Based on the analysis, the correlation peaks are classified as legitimate or as spoofed. A correct geographic location is computed from the navigation data associated with the legitimate correlation peaks. Corresponding methods for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing may be embodied in a hardware-based GNSS receiver and in a software-based GNSS receiver.

Abstract: A device for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing includes processing circuitry which detects correlation peaks for PRNs in a satellite navigation signal. The TOAs of subframes of navigation messages associated with each of correlation peaks are recorded and analyzed to determine if they fall within a specified time window. Based on the analysis, the correlation peaks are classified as legitimate or as spoofed. A correct geographic location is computed from the navigation data associated with the legitimate correlation peaks. Corresponding methods for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing may be embodied in a hardware-based GNSS receiver and in a software-based GNSS receiver.

Abstract: A device for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing includes processing circuitry which detects correlation peaks for PRNs in a satellite navigation signal. The TOAs of subframes of navigation messages associated with each of correlation peaks are recorded and analyzed to determine if they fall within a specified time window. Based on the analysis, the correlation peaks are classified as legitimate or as spoofed. A correct geographic location is computed from the navigation data associated with the legitimate correlation peaks. Corresponding methods for mitigating satellite navigation spoofing may be embodied in a hardware-based GNSS receiver and in a software-based GNSS receiver.