Abstract: Systems and methods for protecting block cipher computation operations, from external monitoring attacks.

Abstract: The invention relates to an electronic transaction method for a system comprising a user-associated payment device 3 or 4 and a payment terminal 1. The payment device 3 or 4 and the payment terminal 1 perform a cryptographic key exchange 500 before performing a transaction step 501. The payment device includes personal information PI about the user. The payment terminal includes a transaction policy including a condition relative to the personal information Pi. The method includes a verification step 510, 520, 530, prior to the transaction step 501, for securely verifying the condition of the transaction policy relative to the personal information using the cryptographic key.

Abstract: A payment system including an electronic cash register associated with a physical point of sale of a merchant; and a payment acquisition device for advantageously cooperating with a payment issuing device of a client via a first link. Such a payment acquisition device transmits payment transaction messages (MSGT) to a bank server via a second link in order to implement electronic payment transactions. The payment acquisition device is configured to include a mechanism for capturing a view of any invoice issued by an electronic cash register, and the processing unit of such a payment acquisition device is configured to trigger the capture of at least one digital representation of the invoice and to automatically detect and determine therefrom the payment amount of the relevant financial transaction.

Abstract: Systems and methods for protecting from external monitoring attacks cryptographic data processing operations involving universal polynomial hash functions computation.

Abstract: An integrated circuit may implement a masked substitution box that includes substitution function components, a decoder, and a logic component. Each of the substitution function components may receive a same input value and a different mask value and may generate a respective output mask value based on the same input value and respective different mask value The decoder may receive an input mask value and generate a decoded output value that is based on the received input mask value. The logic component may select one of the output mask values from one of the substitution function components based on the decoded output value.

Abstract: Systems and methods for protecting from external monitoring attacks cryptographic data processing operations involving computation of a universal polynomial hash function, such as GHASH function. An example method may comprise: receiving an input data block, an iteration result value, and a mask value; performing a non-linear operation to produce a masked result value, wherein a first operand of the non-linear operation is represented by a combination of the iteration result value and the input data block, and the second operand of the non-linear operation is represented by a secret hash value, and wherein one of the first operand or the second operand is masked using a mask value; determining, based on the mask value, a mask correction value; and producing a new iteration result value by applying the mask correction value to the masked result value.

Abstract: Systems and methods for protecting block cipher computation operations, from external monitoring attacks.

Abstract: Systems and methods for protecting from external monitoring attacks cryptographic data processing operations involving universal polynomial hash functions computation.

Abstract: Systems and methods for protecting from external monitoring attacks cryptographic data processing operations involving computation of a universal polynomial hash function, such as GHASH function. An example method may comprise: receiving an input data block, an iteration result value, and a mask value; performing a non-linear operation to produce a masked result value, wherein a first operand of the non-linear operation is represented by a combination of the iteration result value and the input data block, and the second operand of the non-linear operation is represented by a secret hash value, and wherein one of the first operand or the second operand is masked using a mask value; determining, based on the mask value, a mask correction value; and producing a new iteration result value by applying the mask correction value to the masked result value.

Abstract: Systems and methods for protecting block cipher computation operations, from external monitoring attacks.

Abstract: An integrated circuit may implement a masked substitution box that includes substitution function components, a decoder, and a logic component. Each of the substitution function components may receive a same input value and a different mask value and may generate a respective output mask value based on the same input value and respective different mask value The decoder may receive an input mask value and generate a decoded output value that is based on the received input mask value. The logic component may select one of the output mask values from one of the substitution function components based on the decoded output value.

Abstract: Systems and methods for protecting from external monitoring attacks cryptographic data processing operations involving universal polynomial hash functions computation.

Abstract: An integrated circuit may implement a masked substitution box that includes a counter that generates counter values. An input mask component may generate unmasked input values based on a combination of respective counter values and an input mask value. Furthermore, a substitution function component may receive the unmasked input values and may generate output values based on respective unmasked input values and a substitution function. An output mask component may generate masked output values based on a combination of respective output values and an output mask value. The masked output values may be stored at memory elements.

Abstract: An integrated circuit may implement a masked substitution box that includes a counter that generates counter values. An input mask component may generate unmasked input values based on a combination of respective counter values and an input mask value. Furthermore, a substitution function component may receive the unmasked input values and may generate output values based on respective unmasked input values and a substitution function. An output mask component may generate masked output values based on a combination of respective output values and an output mask value. The masked output values may be stored at memory elements.

Abstract: Systems and methods for protecting block cipher computation operations, from external monitoring attacks.

Abstract: Systems and methods for protecting from external monitoring attacks cryptographic data processing operations involving computation of a universal polynomial hash function, such as GHASH function. An example method may comprise: receiving an input data block, an iteration result value, and a mask value; performing a non-linear operation to produce a masked result value, wherein a first operand of the non-linear operation is represented by a combination of the iteration result value and the input data block, and the second operand of the non-linear operation is represented by a secret hash value, and wherein one of the first operand or the second operand is masked using a mask value; determining, based on the mask value, a mask correction value; and producing a new iteration result value by applying the mask correction value to the masked result value.

Abstract: Systems and/or methods that facilitate secure electronic communication of data are presented. A cryptographic component facilitates securing data associated with messages in accordance with a cryptographic protocol. The cryptographic component includes a randomized exponentiation component that facilitates decryption of data and generation of digital signatures by exponentiating exponents associated with messages. An exponent is divided into more than one subexponent at an exponent bit that corresponds to a random number. Exponentiation of the first subexponent can be performed based on a left-to-right-type of exponentiation algorithm, and exponentiation of the second subexponent can be performed based on a right-to-left square-and-multiply-type of exponentiation algorithm. The final value is based on the exponentiations of the subexponents and can be decrypted data or a digital signature, which can be provided as an output.

Abstract: Systems, devices and/or methods that facilitate mutual authentication for processor and memory pairing are presented. A processor and a suitably equipped memory can be provided with a shared secret to facilitate mutual authentication. In addition, the memory can be configured to verify that the system operating instructions have not been subjected to unauthorized alterations. System integrity can be ensured according to the disclosed subject matter by mutual authentication of the processor and memory and verification of the authenticity of system operating instructions at or near each system power up. As a result, the disclosed subject matter can facilitate relatively low complexity assurance of system integrity as a replacement or supplement to conventional techniques.

Abstract: A method of detecting a fault attack during a cryptographic operation using at least one look-up table including a plurality of sub-tables each having a same number of values of a fixed bit length, a fixed relation existing between values at same locations in each sub-table, the method including: performing a load operation to retrieve from the look-up table data values from a same location in each sub-table; verifying that the fixed relation exists between at least two of the data values; and generating an output signal based on the verification.

Abstract: Systems and methods that facilitate securing data associated with a memory from security breaches are presented. A memory component includes nonvolatile memory, and a secure memory component (e.g., volatile memory) used to store information such as secret information related to secret processes or functions (e.g., cryptographic functions). A security component detects security-related events, such as security breaches or completion of security processes or functions, associated with the memory component and in response to a security-related event, the security component can transmit a reset signal to the secure memory component to facilitate efficiently erasing or resetting desired storage locations in the secure memory component in parallel and in a single clock cycle to facilitate data security. A random number generator component can facilitate generating random numbers after a reset based on a change in scrambler keys used by a scrambler component to descramble data read from the reset storage locations.