Abstract: Disclosed are systems, apparatuses, methods, and computer-readable media for providing security postures for a service provided by a heterogenous system. A method for verifying trust by a service node includes receiving a request for a security information of the service node from a client device, wherein the request includes information identifying a service to receive from the service node, identifying a related node to communicate with the service node based on the service, after identifying the related node, requesting a security information of the related node, generating a composite security information from the security information of the service node and the security information of the related node, and sending the composite security information to the client device. The composite security information provides security claims for a service implemented by a heterogenous devices that have different trusted execution environments.

Abstract: The present disclosure is directed to systems and methods to address cryptoprocessor hardware scaling limitations, the method including the steps of establishing a communication path between a centralized server and a client device; generating, by the centralized server, a nonce for transmission to the client device, wherein the nonce is associated with an active time interval and corresponds to one of an existing nonce or a new nonce; transmitting the nonce to the client device; receiving a signed attestation result that includes the nonce from the client device, wherein, the signed attestation result comprises a previously-generated signed attestation result if the nonce corresponds to the existing nonce previously received by the client device; and the signed attestation result comprises a new signed attestation result if the nonce corresponds to the existing nonce newly received by the client device or corresponds to the new nonce.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and computer-readable media are disclosed for measurement of trustworthiness of network devices prior to their configuration and deployment in a network. In one aspect of the present disclosure, a method for pre-configuration of network devices includes receiving, at a dynamic host configuration server, a first request from a network device for configuration data, the configuration data including at least an IP address; sending, by the dynamic host configuration server, a second request to the network device for attestation information; verifying, by the dynamic host configuration server, the network device based on the attestation information; and assigning, by the dynamic host configuration server, the configuration data to the network device upon verifying the network device.

Abstract: The present technology discloses a method for enriching local crypto-processor queries with software-defined networking augmented information, comprising sending, from a virtual machine installed on a physical host, a request for trust verification data; augmenting, by an identity verification system on the physical host, the request for trust verification data with encrypted information from an external entity; receiving, at a trusted processor module on the physical host, the request for trust verification data; receiving, at the virtual machine, the trust verification data; and assessing, at the virtual machine, a state of the physical host based on the trust verification data.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for discovering trustworthy devices through attestation and authenticating devices through mutual attestation. A relying node in a network environment can receive attestation information from an attester node in the network environment as part of a unidirectional push of information from the attester node according to a unidirectional link layer communication scheme. A trustworthiness of the attester node can be verified by identifying a level of trust of the attester node from the attestation information. Further, network service access of the attester node through the relying node in the network environment can be controlled based on the level of trust of the attester node identified from the attestation information.

Abstract: Technologies for proving packet transit through uncompromised nodes are provided. An example method can include receiving a packet including one or more metadata elements generated based on security measurements from a plurality of nodes along a path of the packet; determining a validity of the one or more metadata elements based on a comparison of one or more values in the one or more metadata elements with one or more expected values calculated for the one or more metadata elements, one or more signatures in the one or more metadata elements, and/or timing information associated with the one or more metadata elements; and based on the one or more metadata elements, determining whether the packet traversed any compromised nodes along the path of the packet.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for authenticating access control messages include receiving, at a first node, access control messages from a second node. The first node and the second node including network devices and the access control messages can be based on RADIUS or TACACS+ protocols among others. The first node can obtain attestation information from one or more fields of the access control messages determine whether the second node is authentic and trustworthy based on the attestation information. The first node can also determine reliability or freshness of the access control messages based on the attestation information. The first node can be a server and the second node can be a client, or the first node can be a client and the second node can be a server. The attestation information can include Proof of Integrity based on a hardware fingerprint, device identifier, or Canary Stamp.

Abstract: Technologies for attestation techniques, systems, and methods to confirm the integrity of a device for establishing and/or maintaining a trustworthy encrypted network session. An example method can include sending, via a server and using a cryptographic security protocol, a message associated with establishing an encrypted network session; receiving a response from a client device; identifying a level of trust of the client device based on the response; determining whether to perform a next step in the cryptographic security protocol based on the level of trust, wherein the cryptographic security protocol comprises at least one of a Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, a Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, and an Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocol.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for evaluation of trustworthiness of network devices are proposed. In one aspect, a first network device can determine a first determine a first probability of a security compromise of a second network device based on visible indicators. The first network device can also determine a second probability of the security compromise of the second device based on invisible indicators. The first network device also determines a trust degradation score for the second network device and establishes, based on the trust degradation score, a specified type of communication session with the second network device.

Abstract: Technologies for proving packet transit through uncompromised nodes are provided. An example method can include receiving a packet including one or more metadata elements generated based on security measurements from a plurality of nodes along a path of the packet; determining a validity of the one or more metadata elements based on a comparison of one or more values in the one or more metadata elements with one or more expected values calculated for the one or more metadata elements, one or more signatures in the one or more metadata elements, and/or timing information associated with the one or more metadata elements; and based on the one or more metadata elements, determining whether the packet traversed any compromised nodes along the path of the packet.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for authenticating access control messages include receiving, at a first node, access control messages from a second node. The first node and the second node including network devices and the access control messages can be based on RADIUS or TACACS+ protocols among others. The first node can obtain attestation information from one or more fields of the access control messages determine whether the second node is authentic and trustworthy based on the attestation information. The first node can also determine reliability or freshness of the access control messages based on the attestation information. The first node can be a server and the second node can be a client, or the first node can be a client and the second node can be a server. The attestation information can include Proof of Integrity based on a hardware fingerprint, device identifier, or Canary Stamp.

Abstract: Technologies for attestation techniques, systems, and methods to confirm the integrity of a device for establishing and/or maintaining a trustworthy encrypted network session. An example method can include sending, via a server and using a cryptographic security protocol, a message associated with establishing an encrypted network session; receiving a response from a client device; identifying a level of trust of the client device based on the response; determining whether to perform a next step in the cryptographic security protocol based on the level of trust, wherein the cryptographic security protocol comprises at least one of a Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, a Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, and an Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocol.

Abstract: A verifier peer system transmits a request to an application of another peer system to obtain integrity data of the application. In response to the request, the verifier peer system obtains a response that includes kernel secure boot metrics of the other peer system and integrity data of the application and of any application dependencies. If the verifier peer system determines that the response is valid, the verifier peer system evaluates the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics against a set of Known Good Values to determine whether the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics are valid. If the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics are valid, the verifier peer system determines that the other peer system is trustworthy.

Abstract: A methodology for requesting at least one signed security measurement from at least one module is provided. The methodology includes receiving the at least one signed security measurement from the at least one module; validating the at least one signed security measurement; generating a signed dossier including all validated signed security measurements in a secure enclave, the signed dossier being used by an external network device for remote attestation of the device.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for evaluation of trustworthiness of network devices are proposed. In one aspect, a first network device can determine a first determine a first probability of a security compromise of a second network device based on visible indicators. The first network device can also determine a second probability of the security compromise of the second device based on invisible indicators. The first network device also determines a trust degradation score for the second network device and establishes, based on the trust degradation score, a specified type of communication session with the second network device.

Abstract: A verifier peer system transmits a request to an application of another peer system to obtain integrity data of the application. In response to the request, the verifier peer system obtains a response that includes kernel secure boot metrics of the other peer system and integrity data of the application and of any application dependencies. If the verifier peer system determines that the response is valid, the verifier peer system evaluates the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics against a set of Known Good Values to determine whether the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics are valid. If the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics are valid, the verifier peer system determines that the other peer system is trustworthy.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for assessing reliability and trustworthiness of devices operating within a network. A recipient node in a network environment can receive a neighbor discovery (ND) message from an originating node in the network environment that are both implementing a neighbor discovery protocol. Trustworthiness of the originating node can be verified by identifying a level of trust of the originating node based on attestation information for the originating node included in the ND message received at the recipient node. Connectivity with the recipient node through the network environment can be managed based on the level of trust of the originating node identified from the attestation information included in the ND message.

Abstract: A methodology for requesting at least one signed security measurement from at least one module with a corresponding cryptoprocessor is provided. The methodology includes receiving the at least one signed security measurement from the at least one module with the corresponding cryptoprocessor; validating the at least one signed security measurement; generating a signed dossier including all validated signed security measurements in a secure enclave, the signed dossier being used by an external network device for remote attestation of the device.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for assessing reliability and trustworthiness of devices operating within a network. A recipient node in a network environment can receive a neighbor discovery (ND) message from an originating node in the network environment that are both implementing a neighbor discovery protocol. Trustworthiness of the originating node can be verified by identifying a level of trust of the originating node based on attestation information for the originating node included in the ND message received at the recipient node. Connectivity with the recipient node through the network environment can be managed based on the level of trust of the originating node identified from the attestation information included in the ND message.

Abstract: In one illustrative example, a network node configured for packet flow verification may receive a packet from a host (e.g. a wireless mobile device operating in a wireless network) and obtain, from a header of the packet, data indicative of one or more traversed network node or service function identities. The identities may correspond to one or more traversed network nodes or service functions through which the packet has traversed in a non-steered communication having an unspecified path. Each received data indicative of a traversed network node or service function identity may be network node-added data, provided as part of in-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (iOAM) data.