Abstract: A technique to remotely identify potential compromise of a service provider that performs homomorphic inferencing on a model. For a set of real data samples on which the inferencing is to take place, at least first and second permutations of a set of trigger samples are generated. Every set of samples (both trigger and real samples) are then sent for homomorphic inferencing on the model at least twice, and in a secret permutated way. To improve performance, a permutation is packaged with the real data samples prior to encryption using a general purpose data structure, a tile tensor, that allows users to store multi-dimensional arrays (tensors) of arbitrary shapes and sizes. In response to receiving one or more results from the HE-based model inferencing, a determination is made whether the service provider is compromised. Upon a determination that the service provider is compromised, a given mitigation action is taken.

Abstract: A technique for privacy-preserving homomorphic inferencing using a neural network having an activation function, such as a non-linear high-degree polynomial. The network is trained to learn input features of an input feature vector together with their associated inverses. During inferencing, an encrypted data point is received at the network. The data point comprises an input feature vector that has been extended with a set of one or more additional feature values, the set of one or more additional feature values having been generated by applying a normalized inverse function to respective one or more features in the feature vector. Homomorphic inferencing is performed on the encrypted data point using the machine learning model to generate an encrypted result, which is then returned. By applying the normalized inverse function, the high-degree polynomial can use any value of an input feature during inferencing, whether the value is within or outside of a particular input range.

Abstract: Mechanisms are provided for performing a tournament-league comparison process of a computer function. A request is received to execute the computer function on a vector data structure, where a result of the computer function is provided by executing the tournament-league comparison process. The vector data structure comprises a plurality of values where each value corresponds to a vector slot. At least one iteration of a tournament comparison operation is executed to generate a first intermediate ciphertext and indicator matrix, where the first intermediate ciphertext comprises fewer vector slots than the at least one input vector data structure. A plurality of iterations of a league comparison operation are executed based on the first intermediate ciphertext and one or more second intermediate ciphertexts generated at each iteration of the league comparison operation. A final iteration of the league comparison operation is executed that outputs a final result of the tournament-league comparison process.

Abstract: Mechanisms are provided for performing a tournament-league comparison process of a computer function. A request is received to execute the computer function on a vector data structure, where a result of the computer function is provided by executing the tournament-league comparison process. The vector data structure comprises a plurality of values where each value corresponds to a vector slot. At least one iteration of a tournament comparison operation is executed to generate a first intermediate ciphertext and indicator matrix, where the first intermediate ciphertext comprises fewer vector slots than the at least one input vector data structure. A plurality of iterations of a league comparison operation are executed based on the first intermediate ciphertext and one or more second intermediate ciphertexts generated at each iteration of the league comparison operation. A final iteration of the league comparison operation is executed that outputs a final result of the tournament-league comparison process.

Abstract: Mechanisms are provided for performing a fully homomorphic encryption operation. The mechanisms generate, for a data set in a backend data store, a tree data structure comprising a hierarchy of nodes and edges connecting the nodes in a parent-child relationship. In response to receiving an encrypted query from a client computing device, a search operation is executed using the tree data structure at least by executing a copy-and-recurse computing tool to identify a portion of the tree data structure to which to apply a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) operation. The copy-and-recurse computing tool copies a subset of nodes of the tree data structure and recurses the search operation into the copied subset of nodes. The FHE operation is executed on a portion of the data set, corresponding to the identified portion of the tree data structure, to generate results of the FHE operation which are then output.

Abstract: An example system includes a processor to mask a ciphertext using four random elements to generate masked ciphertexts. The processor can send the masked ciphertexts to a server device. The processor can receive masked plaintexts from the server device. The processor can unmask the masked plaintexts using the four random elements to generate unmasked plaintexts.

Abstract: A computer-implemented method for identifying a leaf in a tree is provided. A processor set receives a first point representing one or more values within a d-dimensional space for identifying the leaf in the tree. The processor set generates a parameter for identifying the leaf in the tree. The processor set identifies a node at highest depth of the tree. The processor set determines a first value of the parameter for generating a range. The processor set selects a subset of child nodes from the number of child nodes associated with the node at the highest depth of the tree based on the range. The processor sets the subset of child nodes as the node at the highest depth of the tree. The processor set traverses the tree by repeating the identifying step, the determining step, the selecting step, and setting steps until the leaf in the tree is identified.

Abstract: An example system includes a processor to compute a tensor of indicators indicating a presence of partial sums in an encrypted vector of indicators. The processor can also securely reorder an encrypted array based on the computed tensor of indicators to generate a reordered encrypted array.

Abstract: A system for homomorphically generating rotation keys for use in homomorphic computation in association with a client, and a server coupled to the client machine over a network. Client-side code executes in the client to derive a set of Learning With Errors (LWE) ciphertexts from a secret key polynomial, the secret key polynomial having a set of coefficients. Each LWE ciphertext is derived from a coefficient of the secret key polynomial and having a single coefficient. The client-side code transmits the set of LWE ciphertexts to the server. Server-side code receives the set of LWE ciphertexts and processes them into a ring variant (R-LWE) ciphertext homomorphically to generate the one or more rotation keys. The R-LWE ciphertext encrypts a polynomial having the set of coefficients of the secret key polynomial; a given rotation key corresponds to rotated coefficients of that polynomial. The generated rotation keys are useful for FHE computation.

Abstract: A technique for privacy-preserving homomorphic inferencing using a neural network having an activation function, such as a non-linear high-degree polynomial. The network is trained to learn input features of an input feature vector together with their associated inverses. During inferencing, an encrypted data point is received at the network. The data point comprises an input feature vector that has been extended with a set of one or more additional feature values, the set of one or more additional feature values having been generated by applying a normalized inverse function to respective one or more features in the feature vector. Homomorphic inferencing is performed on the encrypted data point using the machine learning model to generate an encrypted result, which is then returned. By applying the normalized inverse function, the high-degree polynomial can use any value of an input feature during inferencing, whether the value is within or outside of a particular input range.

Abstract: A computer-implemented method comprising: receiving a Boolean circuit embodied in a digital file and input variables associated with the Boolean circuit; analyzing a structure of the Boolean circuit to identify a pattern of Boolean operations comprising one or more chains of XOR operations over groups of four of the input variables; automatically evaluating each of the one or more chains of XOR operations over the groups of four input variables, using a defined logical gate XORT which replaces at least some required multiplication operations with complex conjugate operations; and automatically calculating any identified AND operations performed on adjacent XORed pairs in the Boolean circuit, using defined pseudo logical gates ANDP and XORP.

Abstract: Mechanisms are provided for fully homomorphic encryption enabled graph embedding. An encrypted graph data structure, having encrypted entities and predicates, is received and, for each encrypted entity, a corresponding set of entity ciphertexts is generated based on an initial embedding of entity features. For each encrypted predicate, a corresponding predicate ciphertext is generated based on an initial embedding of predicate features. A machine learning process is iteratively executed, on the sets of entity ciphertexts and the predicate ciphertexts, to update embeddings of the entity features of the encrypted entities and update embeddings of predicate features of the encrypted predicates, to generate a computer model for embedding entities and predicates. A final embedding is output based on the updated embeddings of the entity features and predicate features of the computer model.

Abstract: Mechanisms are provided for performing a fully homomorphic encryption operation. The mechanisms generate, for a data set in a backend data store, a tree data structure comprising a hierarchy of nodes and edges connecting the nodes in a parent-child relationship. In response to receiving an encrypted query from a client computing device, a search operation is executed using the tree data structure at least by executing a copy-and-recurse computing tool to identify a portion of the tree data structure to which to apply a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) operation. The copy-and-recurse computing tool copies a subset of nodes of the tree data structure and recurses the search operation into the copied subset of nodes. The FHE operation is executed on a portion of the data set, corresponding to the identified portion of the tree data structure, to generate results of the FHE operation which are then output.

Abstract: An example system can include a processor to receive a ciphertext including a fully homomorphic encrypted (FHE) time series from a client device. The processor can train an ARIMA model on the ciphertext using an estimated error and approximating polynomials. The processor can generate an encrypted report and send the encrypted report to the client device.

Abstract: An example system includes a processor to mask a ciphertext using four random elements to generate masked ciphertexts. The processor can send the masked ciphertexts to a server device. The processor can receive masked plaintexts from the server device. The processor can unmask the masked plaintexts using the four random elements to generate unmasked plaintexts.

Abstract: An example system includes a processor to receive a circuit with a number of Boolean variables to be simulated over real numbers. The processor can encode the circuit using a negation-based encoding in response to detecting a chain of AND operations in the circuit. The processor can also execute the AND operations in the encoded circuit by summing negated variables. The processor can further reduce positive integers in results of the summed negated variables to a value of one. The processor can also further negate the results with reduced positive integers to generate decoded results of the AND operations.

Abstract: One or more systems, devices, computer program products and/or computer-implemented methods of use provided herein relate to a process for privacy-enhanced machine learning and inference. A system can comprise a memory that stores computer executable components, and a processor that executes the computer executable components stored in the memory, wherein the computer executable components can comprise a processing component that generates an access rule that modifies access to first data of a graph database, wherein the first data comprises first party information identified as private, a sampling component that executes a random walk for sampling a first graph of the graph database while employing the access rule, wherein the first graph comprises the first data, and an inference component that, based on the sampling, generates a prediction in response to a query, wherein the inference component avoids directly exposing the first party information in the prediction.

Abstract: A technique to remotely identify potential compromise of a service provider that performs homomorphic inferencing on a model. For a set of real data samples on which the inferencing is to take place, at least first and second permutations of a set of trigger samples are generated. Every set of samples (both trigger and real samples) are then sent for homomorphic inferencing on the model at least twice, and in a secret permutated way. To improve performance, a permutation is packaged with the real data samples prior to encryption using a general purpose data structure, a tile tensor, that allows users to store multi-dimensional arrays (tensors) of arbitrary shapes and sizes. In response to receiving one or more results from the HE-based model inferencing, a determination is made whether the service provider is compromised. Upon a determination that the service provider is compromised, a given mitigation action is taken.

Abstract: Mechanisms are provided for fully homomorphic encryption enabled graph embedding. An encrypted graph data structure, having encrypted entities and predicates, is received and, for each encrypted entity, a corresponding set of entity ciphertexts is generated based on an initial embedding of entity features. For each encrypted predicate, a corresponding predicate ciphertext is generated based on an initial embedding of predicate features. A machine learning process is iteratively executed, on the sets of entity ciphertexts and the predicate ciphertexts, to update embeddings of the entity features of the encrypted entities and update embeddings of predicate features of the encrypted predicates, to generate a computer model for embedding entities and predicates. A final embedding is output based on the updated embeddings of the entity features and predicate features of the computer model.

Abstract: An example system includes a processor to compute a tensor of indicators indicating a presence of partial sums in an encrypted vector of indicators. The processor can also securely reorder an encrypted array based on the computed tensor of indicators to generate a reordered encrypted array.