Patents by Inventor Fernando Ordóñez
Fernando Ordóñez has filed for patents to protect the following inventions. This listing includes patent applications that are pending as well as patents that have already been granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
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Publication number: 20130273514Abstract: Different solution methodologies for addressing problems or issues when directing security domain patrolling strategies according to attacker-defender Stackelberg security games. One type of solution provides for computing optimal strategy against quantal response in security games, and includes two algorithms, the GOSAQ and PASAQ algorithms. Another type of solution provides for a unified method for handling discrete and continuous uncertainty in Bayesian Stackelberg games, and introduces the HUNTER algorithm. Another solution type addresses multi-objective security games (MOSG), combining security games and multi-objective optimization. MOSGs have a set of Pareto optimal (non-dominated) solutions referred to herein as the Pareto frontier. The Pareto frontier can be generated by solving a sequence of constrained single-objective optimization problems (CSOP), where one objective is selected to be maximized while lower bounds are specified for the other objectives.Type: ApplicationFiled: March 15, 2013Publication date: October 17, 2013Applicant: University of Southern CaliforniaInventors: Milind Tambe, Fernando Ordóñez, Rong Yang, Zhengyu Yin, Matthew Brown, Bo An, Christopher Kiekintveld
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Patent number: 8364511Abstract: Efficient heuristic methods are described for approximating the optimal leader strategy for security domains where threats come from unknown adversaries. These problems can be modeled as Bayes-Stackelberg games. An embodiment of the heuristic method can include defining a patrolling or security domain problem as a mixed-integer quadratic program. The mixed-integer quadratic program can be converted to a mixed-integer linear program. For a single follower (e.g., robber or terrorist) scenario, the mixed-integer linear program can be solved, subject to appropriate constraints. For embodiments applicable to multiple follower situations, the relevant mixed-integer quadratic program and related mixed-integer linear program can be decomposed, e.g., by changing the response function for the follower from a pure strategy to a weighted combination over various pure follower strategies where the weights are probabilities of occurrence of each of the follower types.Type: GrantFiled: May 24, 2012Date of Patent: January 29, 2013Assignee: University of Southern CaliforniaInventors: Milind Tambe, Praveen Paruchuri, Fernando Ordóñez, Sarit Kraus, Jonathan Pearce, Janusz Marecki
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Publication number: 20120330727Abstract: Efficient heuristic methods are described for approximating the optimal leader strategy for security domains where threats come from unknown adversaries. These problems can be modeled as Bayes-Stackelberg games. An embodiment of the heuristic method can include defining a patrolling or security domain problem as a mixed-integer quadratic program. The mixed-integer quadratic program can be converted to a mixed-integer linear program. For a single follower (e.g., robber or terrorist) scenario, the mixed-integer linear program can be solved, subject to appropriate constraints. For embodiments applicable to multiple follower situations, the relevant mixed-integer quadratic program and related mixed-integer linear program can be decomposed, e.g., by changing the response function for the follower from a pure strategy to a weighted combination over various pure follower strategies where the weights are probabilities of occurrence of each of the follower types.Type: ApplicationFiled: May 24, 2012Publication date: December 27, 2012Applicant: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIAInventors: Milind Tambe, Praveen Paruchuri, Fernando Ordóñez, Sarit Kraus, Jonathan Pearce, Janusz Marecki
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Patent number: 8224681Abstract: Techniques are described for Stackelberg games, in which one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by other agents (the followers or adversaries) before they choose their own strategies, in which the leader is uncertain about the types of adversaries it may face. Such games are important in security domains, where, for example, a security agent (leader) must commit to a strategy of patrolling certain areas, and robbers (followers) have a chance to observe this strategy over time before choosing their own strategies of where to attack. An efficient exact algorithm is described for finding the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in these games. This algorithm, Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Solver or “DOBSS,” is based on a novel and compact mixed-integer linear programming formulation. The algorithm can be implemented in a method, software, and/or system including computer or processor functionality.Type: GrantFiled: October 17, 2008Date of Patent: July 17, 2012Assignee: University of Southern CaliforniaInventors: Milind Tambe, Praveen Paruchuri, Fernando Ordóñez, Sarit Kraus, Jonathan Pearce, Janusz Marecki
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Patent number: 8195490Abstract: Efficient heuristic methods are described for approximating the optimal leader strategy for security domains where threats come from unknown adversaries. These problems can be modeled as Bayes-Stackelberg games. An embodiment of the heuristic method can include defining a patrolling or security domain problem as a mixed-integer quadratic program. The mixed-integer quadratic program can be converted to a mixed-integer linear program. For a single follower (e.g., robber or terrorist) scenario, the mixed-integer linear program can be solved, subject to appropriate constraints. For embodiments applicable to multiple follower situations, the relevant mixed-integer quadratic program and related mixed-integer linear program can be decomposed, e.g., by changing the response function for the follower from a pure strategy to a weighted combination over various pure follower strategies where the weights are probabilities of occurrence of each of the follower types.Type: GrantFiled: October 15, 2008Date of Patent: June 5, 2012Assignee: University of Southern CaliforniaInventors: Milind Tambe, Praveen Paruchuri, Fernando Ordóñez, Sarit Kraus, Jonathan Pearce, Janusz Marecki
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Publication number: 20090119239Abstract: Efficient heuristic methods are described for approximating the optimal leader strategy for security domains where threats come from unknown adversaries. These problems can be modeled as Bayes-Stackelberg games. An embodiment of the heuristic method can include defining a patrolling or security domain problem as a mixed-integer quadratic program. The mixed-integer quadratic program can be converted to a mixed-integer linear program. For a single follower (e.g., robber or terrorist) scenario, the mixed-integer linear program can be solved, subject to appropriate constraints. For embodiments applicable to multiple follower situations, the relevant mixed-integer quadratic program and related mixed-integer linear program can be decomposed, e.g., by changing the response function for the follower from a pure strategy to a weighted combination over various pure follower strategies where the weights are probabilities of occurrence of each of the follower types.Type: ApplicationFiled: October 15, 2008Publication date: May 7, 2009Applicant: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIAInventors: Milind Tambe, Praveen Paruchuri, Fernando Ordonez, Sarit Kraus, Jonathan Pearce, Janusz Marecki
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Publication number: 20090099987Abstract: Techniques are described for Stackelberg games, in which one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by other agents (the followers or adversaries) before they choose their own strategies, in which the leader is uncertain about the types of adversaries it may face. Such games are important in security domains, where, for example, a security agent (leader) must commit to a strategy of patrolling certain areas, and robbers (followers) have a chance to observe this strategy over time before choosing their own strategies of where to attack. An efficient exact algorithm is described for finding the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in these games. This algorithm, Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Solver or “DOBSS,” is based on a novel and compact mixed-integer linear programming formulation. The algorithm can be implemented in a method, software, and/or system including computer or processor functionality.Type: ApplicationFiled: October 17, 2008Publication date: April 16, 2009Applicant: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIAInventors: Milind Tambe, Praveen Paruchuri, Fernando Ordonez, Sarit Kraus, Jonathan Pearce, Janusz Marecki