Abstract: A method may include receiving session control messages and counting the session control messages of a same type having a same transaction identifier (ID). The method may further include blocking the session control messages of the same type having the same transaction ID when the count exceeds a threshold number. The method may further include determining whether the blocked session control messages are associated with an anomalous event and, when the blocked session control messages are not associated with the anomalous event, increasing the threshold number.

Abstract: A method may include receiving session control messages and counting the session control messages of a same type having a same transaction identifier (ID). The method may further include blocking the session control messages of the same type having the same transaction ID when the count exceeds a threshold number. The method may further include determining whether the blocked session control messages are associated with an anomalous event and, when the blocked session control messages are not associated with the anomalous event, increasing the threshold number.

Abstract: A method may include receiving a first packet; determining, in a first processor, whether the first packet meets a criterion to be forwarded to a destination indicated in the first packet; receiving a second packet; determining whether the second packet is of a type for changing the criterion and sending the second packet to a second processor if the second packets is of the type for changing the criterion; receiving instructions, based on the second packet sent to the second processor, to change the criterion; and changing the criterion.

Abstract: A device verifies whether signaled pinholes in a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-based perimeter protection device are open, calculates a fine granularity pinhole opening delay of the SIP-based perimeter protection device, and calculates a fine granularity pinhole closing delay of the SIP-based perimeter protection device.

Abstract: A test method for Internet-Protocol packet networks that verifies the proper functioning of a dynamic pinhole filtering implementation as well as quantifying network vulnerability statistically, as pinholes are opened and closed is described.

Abstract: A test method for Internet-Protocol packet networks that verifies the proper functioning of a dynamic pinhole filtering implementation as well as quantifying network vulnerability statistically, as pinholes are opened and closed is described.

Abstract: A test method for Internet-Protocol packet networks that verifies the proper functioning of a dynamic pinhole filtering implementation as well as quantifying network vulnerability statistically, as pinholes are opened and closed is described.