Abstract: An abnormal traffic analysis apparatus includes receiving means for receiving traffic from a device via any of a plurality of communication paths in which different communication methods are used, multiple communication management means for identifying a communication path through which the traffic is transmitted, analysis method determination means for determining an analysis algorithm for detecting abnormality of the traffic according to the communication path identified by the multiple communication management means, analysis means for analyzing whether or not the traffic is abnormal traffic by using the analysis algorithm determined by the analysis method determination means, and analysis result recording means for recording a result of analysis performed by the analysis means.

Abstract: An abnormal traffic analysis apparatus includes receiving means for receiving traffic from a device, analysis means for analyzing whether or not traffic received from the device is abnormal traffic, analysis result recording means for recording a result of analysis performed by the analysis means, and device management means for managing movement of the device between edges. If it is determined by the device management means that a device that is a target of analysis performed by the analysis means moves to an edge, the receiving means creates information for continuing analysis of traffic received from the device and transmits the information to an apparatus for analyzing traffic that is included in the edge to which the device moves.

Abstract: A secure computation device obtains a first concealed verification value [z]i=[w??]i with secure computation by using concealed authentication information [w]i which is preliminarily stored and concealed authentication information [?]i which is inputted, obtains a concealed extension field random number [rm]i?[F?] which is a secret sharing value of an extension field random number rm, obtains a second concealed verification value [ym]i in which ym is concealed with secure computation by using the first concealed verification value [z]i, and obtains a third concealed verification value [rmym]i with secure computation by using the concealed extension field random number [rm]i and the second concealed verification value [ym]i and outputs the third concealed verification value [rmym]i.

Abstract: A secure equijoin technique of generating one table from two tables while curbing the volume of communications traffic is provided. The technique includes: a first permutation generating means 110 that generates a permutation <?> from an element sequence which is generated from the first column of a table L and the first column of a table R; a first column generating means 120 that generates, for j=2, . . . , a, by using the permutation <?>, a prefix sum, and an inverse permutation <??1>, the j-th column of a table J from an element sequence which is generated from the to j-th column of the table L; a join-result element sequence generating means 130 that generates a join-result element sequence from an element sequence ([[1]], . . . , [[1]], [[0]], . . . , [[0]], [[?1]], . . . , [[?1]]) by using the permutation <?>, the prefix sum, and the inverse permutation <??1>; a second column generating means 140 that generates, for j=a+1, . . .

Abstract: An abnormal traffic analysis apparatus includes receiving means for receiving traffic from a device, analysis means for analyzing whether or not traffic received from the device is abnormal traffic, analysis result recording means for recording a result of analysis performed by the analysis means, and device management means for managing movement of the device between edges. If it is determined by the device management means that a device that is a target of analysis performed by the analysis means moves to an edge, the receiving means creates information for continuing analysis of traffic received from the device and transmits the information to an apparatus for analyzing traffic that is included in the edge to which the device moves.

Abstract: A secure computation device obtains a first concealed verification value [z]i=[w??]i with secure computation by using concealed authentication information [w]i which is preliminarily stored and concealed authentication information [?]i which is inputted, obtains a concealed extension field random number [rm]i [F?] which is a secret sharing value of an extension field random number rm, obtains a second concealed verification value [ym]i in which ym is concealed with secure computation by using the first concealed verification value [z]i, and obtains a third concealed verification value [rmym]i with secure computation by using the concealed extension field random number [rm]i and the second concealed verification value [ym]i and outputs the third concealed verification value [rmym]i.

Abstract: An abnormal traffic analysis apparatus includes receiving means for receiving traffic from a device via any of a plurality of communication paths in which different communication methods are used, multiple communication management means for identifying a communication path through which the traffic is transmitted, analysis method determination means for determining an analysis algorithm for detecting abnormality of the traffic according to the communication path identified by the multiple communication management means, analysis means for analyzing whether or not the traffic is abnormal traffic by using the analysis algorithm determined by the analysis method determination means, and analysis result recording means for recording a result of analysis performed by the analysis means.

Abstract: A secure equijoin technique of generating one table from two tables while curbing the volume of communications traffic is provided. The technique includes: a first permutation generating means 110 that generates a permutation <?> from an element sequence which is generated from the first column of a table L and the first column of a table R; a first column generating means 120 that generates, for j=2, . . . , a, by using the permutation <?>, a prefix sum, and an inverse permutation <??1>, the j-th column of a table J from an element sequence which is generated from the to j-th column of the table L; a join-result element sequence generating means 130 that generates a join-result element sequence from an element sequence ([[1]], . . . , [[1]], [[0]], . . . , [[0]], [[?1]], . . . , [[?1]]) by using the permutation <?>, the prefix sum, and the inverse permutation <??1 >; a second column generating means 140 that generates, for j=a+1, . . .

Abstract: Data processing is performed while personal information is kept concealed. A registrant terminal splits a registration input password and allocates the split pieces to secure computation servers. The secure computation servers verify whether the password matches. The registrant terminal splits target data and allocates the data shared values to the secure computation servers. The secure computation servers store the data shared values. A user terminal splits a utilization input password and allocates the split pieces to the secure computation servers. The secure computation servers verify whether the password matches. The user terminal sends a data processing request to the secure computation servers. The secure computation servers execute secure computation of the data shared values to generate processing result shared values. The user terminal recovers the processing result from the processing result shared values.

Abstract: Data processing is performed while personal information is kept concealed. A registrant terminal splits a registration input password and allocates the split pieces to secure computation servers. The secure computation servers verify whether the password matches. The registrant terminal splits target data and allocates the data shared values to the secure computation servers. The secure computation servers store the data shared values. A user terminal splits a utilization input password and allocates the split pieces to the secure computation servers. The secure computation servers verify whether the password matches. The user terminal sends a data processing request to the secure computation servers. The secure computation servers execute secure computation of the data shared values to generate processing result shared values. The user terminal recovers the processing result from the processing result shared values.