Abstract: A method is for operating a cryptographic device to reduce effects of power analysis and time attacks. The method may include executing a first set of cryptographic algorithm computations with a first crypto-processor of the cryptographic device. The first set of cryptographic algorithm computations may provide encryption of a first set of data to be protected with a first secret key stored in the cryptographic device. The method may further include executing a second set of cryptographic algorithm computations with a second crypto-processor of the cryptographic device for providing encryption of a second set of data different from the first set of data to be protected with a second different secret key.

Abstract: A method for protecting data against power analysis attacks includes at least a first phase of executing a cryptographic operation for ciphering data in corresponding enciphered data through a secret key. The method includes at least a second phase of executing an additional cryptographic operation for ciphering additional data in corresponding enciphered additional data. An execution of the first and second phases is undistinguishable by the data power analysis attacks. Secret parameters are randomly generated and processed by the at least one second phase. The secret parameters include an additional secret key ERK for ciphering the additional data in the corresponding enciphered additional data.

Abstract: An integrated circuit (IC) card may include non-volatile memory portions, where external data files are storable, and including volatile memory portions and a microprocessor. The IC card further may include a serial interface that stores the external data file as received into the volatile memory portions, and at least an internal register that is programmable through the serial interface. The internal register manages according to the programming a serial storing into the non-volatile portions of the external data file already stored into the volatile memory portions. The serial interface and the internal register may manage the respective programming in a parallel manner.

Abstract: An apparatus for storing initialization data in an IC Card, including a non-volatile memory, whereto the initialization data is addressed, and a plurality of pins including pins for connecting the apparatus and at least one I/O pin for receiving the initialization data, the apparatus includes an initialization card. The initialization Card includes a respective non-volatile memory unit, wherein the initialization data is stored, and the plurality of pins including the I/O pin and the pins for connecting the apparatus. The I/O pin of the initialization Card is connected to a respective I/O pin of the apparatus for receiving an initialization signal. A connection from at least a predetermined pin of the initialization Card to the at least one pin of the IC Card is provided for transmitting the initialization data from the initialization Card to the IC Card, upon reception of the initialization signal.

Abstract: An integrated circuit (IC) card may include non-volatile memory portions, where external data files are storable, and including volatile memory portions and a microprocessor. The IC card further may include a serial interface that stores the external data file as received into the volatile memory portions, and at least an internal register that is programmable through the serial interface. The internal register manages according to the programming a serial storing into the non-volatile portions of the external data file already stored into the volatile memory portions. The serial interface and the internal register may manage the respective programming in a parallel manner.

Abstract: A method is for operating a cryptographic device to reduce effects of power analysis and time attacks. The method may include executing a first set of cryptographic algorithm computations with a first crypto-processor of the cryptographic device. The first set of cryptographic algorithm computations may provide encryption of a first set of data to be protected with a first secret key stored in the cryptographic device. The method may further include executing a second set of cryptographic algorithm computations with a second crypto-processor of the cryptographic device for providing encryption of a second set of data different from the first set of data to be protected with a second different secret key.

Abstract: An apparatus for storing initialization data in an IC Card, including a non-volatile memory, whereto the initialization data is addressed, and a plurality of pins including pins for connecting the apparatus and at least one I/O pin for receiving the initialization data, the apparatus includes an initialization card. The initialization Card includes a respective non-volatile memory unit, wherein the initialization data is stored, and the plurality of pins including the I/O pin and the pins for connecting the apparatus. The I/O pin of the initialization Card is connected to a respective I/O pin of the apparatus for receiving an initialization signal. A connection from at least a predetermined pin of the initialization Card to the at least one pin of the IC Card is provided for transmitting the initialization data from the initialization Card to the IC Card, upon reception of the initialization signal.

Abstract: An IC Card includes a microchip having memory portions storing programs and a plurality of electrical contacts including a first set of electrical contacts connected to the microchip for supporting respective and predetermined functions, according to a predetermined ISO 7816 standard that reserves a second set of the electrical contacts for future use. At least one electrical contact of the second set is further connected to the microchip and is configured by one or more of the programs for supporting respective additional functions.

Abstract: A method for protecting data against power analysis attacks includes at least a first phase of executing a cryptographic operation for ciphering data in corresponding enciphered data through a secret key. The method includes at least a second phase of executing an additional cryptographic operation for ciphering additional data in corresponding enciphered additional data. An execution of the first and second phases is undistinguishable by the data power analysis attacks. Secret parameters are randomly generated and processed by the at least one second phase. The secret parameters include an additional secret key ERK for ciphering the additional data in the corresponding enciphered additional data.