Abstract: A user equipment (UE) includes a first subscriber identification module (SIM) and a second SIM. The UE is configured to establish a first cellular network connection based on, at least, the first SIM and a second cellular network connection based on, at least, the second SIM. The UE sends, by the first SIM, a first registration request to the network, wherein the first registration request comprises an identification indicating the multi-SIM device is a type of multi-SIM device, receives, by the first SIM, a first registration accept message indicating the first registration request has been accepted, wherein the first registration accept message comprises a first temporary identification for the first SIM and sends, by the second SIM, an access network message comprising one of the first temporary identification or a further temporary identification based on, at least, the first temporary identification.

Abstract: The present application relates to devices and components including apparatus, systems, and methods for security enhancement with respect to reselection of relay user equipment.

Abstract: A user equipment (UE) may attempt to access an edge data network. The UE generates a first credential based on a second credential that was generated for a procedure between the UE and a network. The UE then generates an identifier corresponding to the first credential and generates a message authentication code based on the first credential and a count, wherein the count is associated with an identifier of an edge network client running on the UE. The UE then transmits an application registration request, message to a server associated with an edge data network, the application registration request message including the count, the message authentication code, the identifier corresponding to the first credential, and a public land mobile network identifier (PLMN ID) of the network. The UE then receives an authentication accept message or an authentication reject message from the server associated with the edge data network.

Abstract: A user equipment (UE) may attempt to access an edge data network. The UE generates a first credential based on a second credential that was generated for a procedure between the UE and a network. The UE then generates an identifier corresponding to the first credential and generates a message authentication code based on the first credential and a count, wherein the count is associated with an identifier of an edge network client running on the UE. The UE then transmits an application registration request, message to a server associated with an edge data network, the application registration request message including the count, the message authentication code, the identifier corresponding to the first credential, and a public land mobile network identifier (PLMN ID) of the network. The UE then receives an authentication accept message or an authentication reject message from the server associated with the edge data network.

Abstract: Techniques for identity-based message integrity protection and verification between a user equipment (UE) and a wireless network entity, include use of signatures derived from identity-based keys. To protect against attacks from rogue network entities before activation of a security context with a network entity, the UE verifies integrity of messages by checking a signature using an identity-based public key PKID derived by the UE based on (i) an identity value (ID) of the network entity and (ii) a separate public key PKPKG of a private key generator (PKG) server. The network entity generates signatures for messages using an identity-based private key SKID obtained from the PKG server, which generates the identity-based private key SKID using (i) the ID value of the network entity and (ii) a private key SKPKG that is known only by the PKG server and corresponds to the public key PKPKG.

Abstract: The present application relates to devices and components including apparatus, systems, and methods for security enhancement with respect to reselection of relay user equipment.

Abstract: A user equipment (UE) includes a first subscriber identification module (SIM) and a second SIM. The UE is configured to establish a first cellular network connection based on, at least, the first SIM and a second cellular network connection based on, at least, the second SIM. The UE sends, by the first SIM, a first registration request to the network, wherein the first registration request comprises an identification indicating the multi-SIM device is a type of multi-SIM device, receives, by the first SIM, a first registration accept message indicating the first registration request has been accepted, wherein the first registration accept message comprises a first temporary identification for the first SIM and sends, by the second SIM, an access network message comprising one of the first temporary identification or a further temporary identification based on, at least, the first temporary identification.

Abstract: Techniques for identity-based message integrity protection and verification between a user equipment (UE) and a wireless network entity, include use of signatures derived from identity-based keys. To protect against attacks from rogue network entities before activation of a security context with a network entity, the UE verifies integrity of messages by checking a signature using an identity-based public key PKID derived by the UE based on (i) an identity value (ID) of the network entity and (ii) a separate public key PKPKG of a private key generator (PKG) server. The network entity generates signatures for messages using an identity-based private key SKID obtained from the PKG server, which generates the identity-based private key SKID using (i) the ID value of the network entity and (ii) a private key SKPKG that is known only by the PKG server and corresponds to the public key PKPKG.

Abstract: Techniques for identity-based message integrity protection and verification between a user equipment (UE) and a wireless network entity, include use of signatures derived from identity-based keys. To protect against attacks from rogue network entities before activation of a security context with a network entity, the UE verifies integrity of messages by checking a signature using an identity-based public key PKID derived by the UE based on (i) an identity value (ID) of the network entity and (ii) a separate public key PKPKG of a private key generator (PKG) server. The network entity generates signatures for messages using an identity-based private key SKID obtained from the PKG server, which generates the identity-based private key SKID using (i) the ID value of the network entity and (ii) a private key SKPKG that is known only by the PKG server and corresponds to the public key PKPKG.

Abstract: This disclosure relates to techniques for a wireless device to perform radio resource control procedures with improved security. The wireless device may establish a radio resource control connection with a cellular base station. A capability enquiry may be received from the cellular base station. The wireless device may determine how much capability information to provide in response to the capability enquiry based at least in part on whether access stratum security has been established, either in the current radio resource connection, or in a previous radio resource connection, between the wireless device and the cellular base station when the capability enquiry is received.

Abstract: Techniques for identity-based message integrity protection and verification between a user equipment (UE) and a wireless network entity, include use of signatures derived from identity-based keys. To protect against attacks from rogue network entities before activation of a security context with a network entity, the UE verifies integrity of messages by checking a signature using an identity-based public key PKID derived by the UE based on (i) an identity value (ID) of the network entity and (ii) a separate public key PKPKG of a private key generator (PKG) server. The network entity generates signatures for messages using an identity-based private key SKID obtained from the PKG server, which generates the identity-based private key SKID using (i) the ID value of the network entity and (ii) a private key SKPKG that is known only by the PKG server and corresponds to the public key PKPKG.