Abstract: Environment type validation can provide a tamper-resistant validation of the computing environment within which the environment type validation is being performed. Such information can then be utilized to perform policy management, which can include omitting verifications in order to facilitate the sharing of policy, such as application licenses, from a host computing environment into a container virtual computing environment. The environment type validation can perform multiple checks, including verification of the encryption infrastructure of the computing environment, verification of code integrity mechanisms of that computing environment, checks for the presence of functionality evidencing a hypervisor, checks for the presence or absence of predetermined system drivers, or other like operating system components or functionality, checks for the activation or deactivation of resource management stacks, and checks for the presence or absence of predetermined values in firmware.

Abstract: Computing systems, devices, and methods of dynamic image composition for container deployment are disclosed herein. One example technique includes receiving a request for accessing a file from a container process. In response to receiving the request, the technique includes querying a mapping table corresponding to the container process to locate an entry corresponding to a file identifier of the requested file. The entry also includes data identifying a file location on the storage device from which the requested file is accessible. The technique further includes retrieving a copy of the requested file according to the file location identified by the data in the located entry in the mapping table and providing the retrieved copy of the requested file to the container process, thereby allowing the container process to access the requested file.

Abstract: Techniques of deferred container deployment are disclosed herein. In one embodiment, a method includes receiving, at a computing device, a container image corresponding to the container. The container image includes a first set of files identified by symbolic links individually directed to a file in the host filesystem on the computing device and a second set of files identified by hard links. The method also includes in response to receiving the container image, at the computing device, storing the received container image in a folder of the host filesystem on the computing device without resolving the symbolic links of the first set of the files until runtime of the requested container.

Abstract: Memory is partitioned and isolated in container-based memory enclaves. The container-based memory enclaves have attestable security guarantees. During provisioning of the container-based memory enclaves from a container image, a purported link in the container to a memory address of the enclave is modified to verifiably link to an actual memory address of the host, such as partitioned memory enclave. In some instances, enclave attestation reports can be validated without transmitting corresponding attestation requests to remote attestation services, based on previous attestation of one or more previous container attestation reports from a similar container and without requiring end-to-end attestation between the container and remote attestation service for each new attestation request.

Abstract: Computing systems, devices, and methods of dynamic image composition for container deployment are disclosed herein. One example technique includes receiving a request for accessing a file from a container process. In response to receiving the request, the technique includes querying a mapping table corresponding to the container process to locate an entry corresponding to a file identifier of the requested file. The entry also includes data identifying a file location on the storage device from which the requested file is accessible. The technique further includes retrieving a copy of the requested file according to the file location identified by the data in the located entry in the mapping table and providing the retrieved copy of the requested file to the container process, thereby allowing the container process to access the requested file.

Abstract: One example technique includes receiving a request for accessing a file from a container process. In response to receiving the request, the technique includes querying a mapping table corresponding to the container process to locate an entry corresponding to a file identifier of the requested file. The entry also includes data identifying a file location on the storage device from which the requested file is accessible. The technique further includes retrieving a copy of the requested file according to the file location identified by the data in the located entry in the mapping table and providing the retrieved copy of the requested file to the container process, thereby allowing the container process to access the requested file.

Abstract: Environment type validation can provide a tamper-resistant validation of the computing environment within which the environment type validation is being performed. Such information can then be utilized to perform policy management, which can include omitting verifications in order to facilitate the sharing of policy, such as application licenses, from a host computing environment into a container virtual computing environment. The environment type validation can perform multiple checks, including verification of the encryption infrastructure of the computing environment, verification of code integrity mechanisms of that computing environment, checks for the presence of functionality evidencing a hypervisor, checks for the presence or absence of predetermined system drivers, or other like operating system components or functionality, checks for the activation or deactivation of resource management stacks, and checks for the presence or absence of predetermined values in firmware.

Abstract: A layered composite boot device, and a corresponding layered composite file system, can be implemented by a boot manager. Requests directed to the layered composite boot device and file system, can be serviced from a primary device and file system that are encapsulated by the layered composite boot device and file system. The primary device and file system can correspond to a virtualized file system within a container environment, thereby enabling changes within the container environment to affect early stages of operating system booting in the container environment. Should such requests not be serviceable from the primary layers, the composite device and file system can comprise secondary layers that can correspond to a container host connection and the host file system, providing fallback to existing data if changes within the container environment were not made, thereby enabling booting to proceed in a traditional manner.

Abstract: Enacting a compliance action using an assessment that considers a mix of coldpatches and hotpatches includes identifying a policy defining the compliance condition based on patching status of a software component. A patching state of the software component is determined, including identifying evidence of coldpatched binary file(s) and hotpatch binary file(s) applicable to the software component, and using the evidence to determine whether or not the hotpatch binary file(s) have been applied to a memory image into which an instance of the software component is loaded. Based on the policy and on the patching state of the software component, a compliance action is enacted for the compliance condition. The compliance action includes generating a health report or a health attestation, initiating a patching action, initiating an execution control action, and the like.

Abstract: Distribution and management of services in virtual environments is described herein. In one or more implementations, a service distribution and management model is implemented in which system services and applications are seamlessly distributed across multiple containers which each implement a different runtime environment. In one or more implementations, a system for distributing access to services in a host operating system of a computing device includes a host operating system configured to implement a host runtime environment, and one or more services implemented by the host operating system. The system further includes a service control manager configured to enable communication between a client stub of a service implemented in a client runtime environment and a service provider of the service that is implemented in a service runtime environment that is separate from the first client runtime environment.

Abstract: Distribution and management of services in virtual environments is described herein. In one or more implementations, a service distribution and management model is implemented in which system services and applications are seamlessly distributed across multiple containers which each implement a different runtime environment. In one or more implementations, a system for distributing access to services in a host operating system of a computing device includes a host operating system configured to implement a host runtime environment, and one or more services implemented by the host operating system. The system further includes a service control manager configured to enable communication between a client stub of a service implemented in a client runtime environment and a service provider of the service that is implemented in a service runtime environment that is separate from the first client runtime environment.

Abstract: Environment type validation can provide a tamper-resistant validation of the computing environment within which the environment type validation is being performed. Such information can then be utilized to perform policy management, which can include omitting verifications in order to facilitate the sharing of policy, such as application licenses, from a host computing environment into a container virtual computing environment. The environment type validation can perform multiple checks, including verification of the encryption infrastructure of the computing environment, verification of code integrity mechanisms of that computing environment, checks for the presence of functionality evidencing a hypervisor, checks for the presence or absence of predetermined system drivers, or other like operating system components or functionality, checks for the activation or deactivation of resource management stacks, and checks for the presence or absence of predetermined values in firmware.

Abstract: A layered composite boot device, and a corresponding layered composite file system, can be implemented by a boot manager. Requests directed to the layered composite boot device and file system, can be serviced from a primary device and file system that are encapsulated by the layered composite boot device and file system. The primary device and file system can correspond to a virtualized file system within a container environment, thereby enabling changes within the container environment to affect early stages of operating system booting in the container environment. Should such requests not be serviceable from the primary layers, the composite device and file system can comprise secondary layers that can correspond to a container host connection and the host file system, providing fallback to existing data if changes within the container environment were not made, thereby enabling booting to proceed in a traditional manner.

Abstract: Memory is partitioned and isolated in container-based memory enclaves. The container-based memory enclaves have attestable security guarantees. During provisioning of the container-based memory enclaves from a container image, a purported link in the container to a memory address of the enclave is modified to verifiably link to an actual memory address of the host, such as partitioned memory enclave. In some instances, enclave attestation reports can be validated without transmitting corresponding attestation requests to remote attestation services, based on previous attestation of one or more previous container attestation reports from a similar container and without requiring end-to-end attestation between the container and remote attestation service for each new attestation request.

Abstract: Distribution and management of services in virtual environments is described herein. In one or more implementations, a service distribution and management model is implemented in which system services and applications are seamlessly distributed across multiple containers which each implement a different runtime environment. In one or more implementations, a system for distributing access to services in a host operating system of a computing device includes a host operating system configured to implement a host runtime environment, and one or more services implemented by the host operating system. The system further includes a service control manager configured to enable communication between a client stub of a service implemented in a client runtime environment and a service provider of the service that is implemented in a service runtime environment that is separate from the first client runtime environment.

Abstract: Memory is partitioned and isolated in container-based memory enclaves. The container-based memory enclaves have attestable security guarantees. During provisioning of the container-based memory enclaves from a container image, a purported link in the container to a memory address of the enclave is modified to verifiably link to an actual memory address of the host, such as partitioned memory enclave. In some instances, enclave attestation reports can be validated without transmitting corresponding attestation requests to remote attestation services, based on previous attestation of one or more previous container attestation reports from a similar container and without requiring end-to-end attestation between the container and remote attestation service for each new attestation request.

Abstract: Enacting a compliance action using an assessment that considers a mix of coldpatches and hotpatches includes identifying a policy defining the compliance condition based on patching status of a software component. A patching state of the software component is determined, including identifying evidence of coldpatched binary file(s) and hotpatch binary file(s) applicable to the software component, and using the evidence to determine whether or not the hotpatch binary file(s) have been applied to a memory image into which an instance of the software component is loaded. Based on the policy and on the patching state of the software component, a compliance action is enacted for the compliance condition. The compliance action includes generating a health report or a health attestation, initiating a patching action, initiating an execution control action, and the like.

Abstract: Techniques for secure sharing of data in computing systems are disclosed herein. In one embodiment, a method includes when exchanging data between the host operating system and the guest operating system, encrypting, at a trusted platform module (TPM) of the host, data to be exchanged with a first key to generate encrypted data. The method also includes transmitting the encrypted data from the host operating system to the guest operating system and decrypting, at the guest operating system, the transmitted encrypted data using a second key previously exchanged between the TPM of the host and a virtual TPM of the guest operating system.

Abstract: A fine-grain selectable partially privileged container virtual computing environment provides a vehicle by which processes that are directed to modifying specific aspects of a host computing environment can be delivered to, and executed upon, the host computing environment while simultaneously maintaining the advantageous and desirable protections and isolations between the remaining aspects of the host computing environment and the partially privileged container computing environment. Such partial privilege is provided based upon directly or indirectly delineated actions that are allowed to be undertaken on the host computing environment by processes executing within the partially privileged container virtual computing environment and actions which are not allowed.

Abstract: Technologies are described for selective persistence of data utilized by software containers. A configuration policy is defined that includes data that specifies one or more data stores for which data is not to be persisted following accesses to a software container and one or more data stores for which data is to be persisted following accesses to the software container. When the software container is first accessed, the data stores identified in the configuration policy are attached to the software container. Upon a subsequent access to the container, such as at the conclusion of a user session or upon destruction of the container, the data in the attached data stores is persisted or deleted based upon the configuration policy. When the software container is once again accessed, the data store containing the persisted data can be re-attached to the software container.