Abstract: Methods, systems, and devices for data management are described. A verifier node may generate a common reference string (CRS) using a random value. The verifier node may transmit a message including the CRS to a prover node. The prover node may execute a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) using the CRS and transmit, to the verifier node, a commitment of an output of the ZKP. The commitment of the output may be configured to hide the output from the verifier node until the output is revealed to the verifier node. The verifier node may transmit the random value. The prover node may determine whether the CRS is generated using the random value from the verifier node and either abort the cryptographic operation or reveal the commitment. The verifier node may verify that the output is a valid ZKP if the prover node reveals the commitment.

Abstract: Methods, systems, and devices for data management are described. A verifier node may generate a common reference string (CRS) using a random value. The verifier node may transmit a message including the CRS to a prover node. The prover node may execute a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) using the CRS and transmit, to the verifier node, a commitment of an output of the ZKP. The commitment of the output may be configured to hide the output from the verifier node until the output is revealed to the verifier node. The verifier node may transmit the random value. The prover node may determine whether the CRS is generated using the random value from the verifier node and either abort the cryptographic operation or reveal the commitment. The verifier node may verify that the output is a valid ZKP if the prover node reveals the commitment.

Abstract: Methods, systems, and devices for data management are described. A server may receive a plurality of parts of a secret from a computing device, where the plurality of parts may be individually encrypted and individually associated with respective public parts. The server may transmit a random challenge to the computing device. The computing device may transmit, to the server, a subset of parts in a decrypted state. The server may determine, using the subset of decrypted parts and a corresponding subset of respective public parts, that the subset of decrypted parts corresponds to a polynomial function with a degree corresponding to a quantity of parts in the subset of decrypted parts. The server may verify that the individually encrypted plurality of parts corresponds to a secret based on determining that the subset of decrypted parts corresponds to the polynomial function.

Abstract: Methods, systems, and devices for data management are described. A verifier node may generate a common reference string (CRS) using a random value. The verifier node may transmit a message including the CRS to a prover node. The prover node may execute a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) using the CRS and transmit, to the verifier node, a commitment of an output of the ZKP. The commitment of the output may be configured to hide the output from the verifier node until the output is revealed to the verifier node. The verifier node may transmit the random value. The prover node may determine whether the CRS is generated using the random value from the verifier node and either abort the cryptographic operation or reveal the commitment. The verifier node may verify that the output is a valid ZKP if the prover node reveals the commitment.

Abstract: Methods, systems, and devices for data management are described. A server may receive a plurality of parts of a secret from a computing device, where the plurality of parts may be individually encrypted and individually associated with respective public parts. The server may transmit a random challenge to the computing device. The computing device may transmit, to the server, a subset of parts in a decrypted state. The server may determine, using the subset of decrypted parts and a corresponding subset of respective public parts, that the subset of decrypted parts corresponds to a polynomial function with a degree corresponding to a quantity of parts in the subset of decrypted parts. The server may verify that the individually encrypted plurality of parts corresponds to a secret based on determining that the subset of decrypted parts corresponds to the polynomial function.