Abstract: Systems and methods for providing a Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) enforced blocklisting of harmful applications are described. In one embodiment, an Information Handling System (IHS) may include a processor and a BIOS coupled to the processor, the BIOS having program instructions that, upon execution, cause the IHS to download an Unsafe Application List (UAL) from an online source, and during a bootstrap process of the IHS, compare a plurality of Applications (Apps) installed on the IHS against a list of harmful applications included in a UAL. When a harmful application is found by the comparison, the instructions enforce one or more policies to restrict the harmful application from being executed on the IHS.

Abstract: Systems and methods for providing a Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) enforced blocklisting of harmful applications are described. In one embodiment, an Information Handling System (IHS) may include a processor and a BIOS coupled to the processor, the BIOS having program instructions that, upon execution, cause the IHS to download an Unsafe Application List (UAL) from an online source, and during a bootstrap process of the IHS, compare a plurality of Applications (Apps) installed on the IHS against a list of harmful applications included in a UAL. When a harmful application is found by the comparison, the instructions enforce one or more policies to restrict the harmful application from being executed on the IHS.

Abstract: A method for binding applications to a platform root of trust includes pre-provisioning application binding components in an information handling system. An application requesting OS access sends its access control list (ACL) and application metadata to the BIOS, which performs initial checks. The BIOS responds with platform metadata and a first nonce. The application communicates the metadata, the first nonce and a second nonce to a server. The server checks the nonces and metadata, creates a third nonce and an application binding object (ABO). The application checks the nonces and sends a binding certificate to the BIOS. The BIOS checks the nonces, creates a binding certificate, verifies the binding certificate and sends a binding session credential (BSC) to the application. The application binds the BSC with platform credentials.

Abstract: A method for binding applications to a platform root of trust includes pre-provisioning application binding components in an information handling system. An application requesting OS access sends its access control list (ACL)and application metadata to the BIOS, which performs initial checks. The BIOS responds with platform metadata and a first nonce. The application communicates the metadata, the first nonce and a second nonce to a server. The server checks the nonces and metadata, creates a third nonce and an application binding object (ABO). The application checks the nonces and sends a binding certificate to the BIOS. The BIOS checks the nonces, creates a binding certificate, verifies the binding certificate and sends a binding session credential (BSC) to the application. The application binds the BSC with platform credentials.

Abstract: According to one illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, a first IHS may include computer-executable instructions for performing at least one artificial intelligence (AI) service to optimize a performance of the first IHS. In response to determining that an AI workload of the AI service exceeds a specified threshold, the first IHS selects a second IHS to perform at least a portion of the AI workload, and transmits the at least one portion of the AI workload to the second IHS. When a processed AI workload is received from the second IHS, the first IHS applies one or more profile recommendations included in the processed AI workload.