Abstract: Systems and methods are provided for pricing, selling, and/or otherwise distributing electronic content using auction mechanisms. A randomized auction mechanism is used to determine both the number of goods that are sold and the selling price. The auction mechanism automatically adapts to the bid distribution to yield revenue that is competitive with that which could be obtained if the vendor were able to determine the optimal fixed price for the goods. In one embodiment a set of bids is randomly or quasi-randomly partitioned into two or more groups. An optimal threshold is determined for each group, and this threshold is then used to select winning bids from one or more of the other groups. In another embodiment, each bid is compared to a competing bid that is randomly or quasi-randomly selected from the set of bids. If the bid is less than the randomly-selected competing bid, the bid is rejected. Otherwise, the bid is accepted and the bidder buys the auctioned item at the price of the randomly-selected bid.

Abstract: Systems and methods are provided for pricing, selling, and/or otherwise distributing electronic content using auction mechanisms. A randomized auction mechanism is used to determine both the number of goods that are sold and the selling price. The auction mechanism automatically adapts to the bid distribution to yield revenue that is competitive with that which could be obtained if the vendor were able to determine the optimal fixed price for the goods. In one embodiment a set of bids is randomly or quasi-randomly partitioned into two or more groups. An optimal threshold is determined for each group, and this threshold is then used to select winning bids from one or more of the other groups. In another embodiment, each bid is compared to a competing bid that is randomly or quasi-randomly selected from the set of bids. If the bid is less than the randomly-selected competing bid, the bid is rejected. Otherwise, the bid is accepted and the bidder buys the auctioned item at the price of the randomly-selected bid.

Abstract: A seller may sell advertisements, such as banner ads, to a buyer pursuant to a request made by the buyer to the seller. Each request has a value. The seller may accept the request from the buyer to provide a banner ad for the buyer at a later time. A request, once accepted, may be revoked at a cost which may be a fixed fraction of the request value. The cost may be referred to as a buyback cost. The buyback cost represents the cost of revoking a request that had been accepted. Additionally, matroid set systems and knapsack systems may use buyback techniques.

Abstract: Some of the embodiments provided herein disclose receiving a plurality of bids, each bid being submitted by a bidder, and each bid having a bid value; assigning a weighting factor to each bid, the weighting factor being based, at least in part, on the bid value; selecting a first bid from the plurality of bids, the first bid having been submitted by a first bidder; selecting a second bid from the plurality of bids, the second bid being selected in a manner that is dependent, at least in part, on the weighting factor assigned to the second bid; performing a comparison of the value of the first bid with the value of the second bid; using the results of the comparison to determine whether to vend a copy of the digital file to the first bidder; and sending a copy of the digital file to the first bidder.

Abstract: A seller may sell advertisements, such as banner ads, to a buyer pursuant to a request made by the buyer to the seller. Each request has a value. The seller may accept the request from the buyer to provide a banner ad for the buyer at a later time. A request, once accepted, may be revoked at a cost which may be a fixed fraction of the request value. The cost may be referred to as a buyback cost. The buyback cost represents the cost of revoking a request that had been accepted. Additionally, matroid set systems and knapsack systems may use buyback techniques.

Abstract: Conversion rates and tracking data may be considered in conjunction with a paid search market. A generalized second price (GSP) auction may be extended by incorporating conversion rates and tracking data in the payment rule. Such an extension is referred to as a generalized acquisition-aware second price (GASP) auction. A simplified version of GASP, referred to as simplified generalized acquisition-aware second price or SGASP, does not use conversion tracking for each advertiser.

Abstract: Systems and methods are provided for pricing, selling, and/or otherwise distributing electronic content using auction mechanisms. A randomized auction mechanism is used to determine both the number of goods that are sold and the selling price. The auction mechanism automatically adapts to the bid distribution to yield revenue that is competitive with that which could be obtained if the vendor were able to determine the optimal fixed price for the goods. In one embodiment a set of bids is randomly or quasi-randomly partitioned into two or more groups. An optimal threshold is determined for each group, and this threshold is then used to select winning bids from one or more of the other groups. In another embodiment, each bid is compared to a competing bid that is randomly or quasi-randomly selected from the set of bids. If the bid is less than the randomly-selected competing bid, the bid is rejected. Otherwise, the bid is accepted and the bidder buys the auctioned item at the price of the randomly-selected bid.