Abstract: In an embodiment, an apparatus includes: a sensor to sense real world information; a digitizer coupled to the sensor to digitize the real world information into digitized information; a signal processor coupled to the digitizer to process the digitized information into an image; a discriminator coupled to the signal processor to determine, based at least in part on the image, whether the real world information comprises an anomaly, where the discriminator is trained via a generative adversarial network; and a controller coupled to the discriminator.

Abstract: In one embodiment, an apparatus includes: a sensor to sense real world information; a digitizer coupled to the sensor to digitize the real world information into digitized information; a signal processor coupled to the digitizer to process the digitized information into a spectrogram; a neural engine coupled to the signal processor, the neural engine comprising an autoencoder to compress the spectrogram into a compressed spectrogram; and a wireless circuit coupled to the neural engine to send the compressed spectrogram to a remote destination, to enable the remote destination to process the compressed spectrogram.

Abstract: In an embodiment, an apparatus includes: a sensor to sense real world information; a digitizer coupled to the sensor to digitize the real world information into digitized information; a signal processor coupled to the digitizer to process the digitized information into an image; a discriminator coupled to the signal processor to determine, based at least in part on the image, whether the real world information comprises an anomaly, where the discriminator is trained via a generative adversarial network; and a controller coupled to the discriminator.

Abstract: In an embodiment, an apparatus includes: a sensor to sense real world information; a digitizer coupled to the sensor to digitize the real world information into digitized information; a signal processor coupled to the digitizer to process the digitized information into an image; a discriminator coupled to the signal processor to determine, based at least in part on the image, whether the real world information comprises an anomaly, where the discriminator is trained via a generative adversarial network; and a controller coupled to the discriminator.

Abstract: Systems and methods are disclosed for side-channel attack mitigation for secure devices including cryptographic circuits using block ciphers that are not based upon feedback. For disclosed embodiments, an integrated circuit includes a cryptographic circuit and a controller. The cryptographic circuit performs cryptographic operations in a block cipher AES mode without feedback. The controller outputs control signals to the cryptographic circuit that cause the cryptographic circuit to perform the cryptographic operations on sequential data blocks with an internally permuted order to mitigate block cipher side-channel attacks. The internally permuted order can be generated using one or more random number generators, one or more pre-configured permutated orders, or other techniques.

Abstract: Embodiments include cryptographic circuits having isolated operation with respect to embedded sensor operations to mitigate side-channel attacks. A cryptographic circuit, a sensor, and an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) circuit are integrated into an integrated circuit along with a cryptographic circuit. A sensed signal is output with the sensor, and the sensed signal is converted to digital data using the ADC circuit. Further, cryptographic data is generated using one or more secret keys and the cryptographic circuit. The generation of the cryptographic data has isolated operation with respect to the operation of the sensor and the ADC circuit. The isolated operation mitigates side-channel attacks. The isolated operation can be achieved using power supply, clock, and/or reset circuits for the cryptographic circuit that are electrically isolated from similar circuits for the sensor and ADC circuit. The isolated operation can also be achieved using time-division multiplex operations.

Abstract: In an embodiment, an apparatus includes: a sensor to sense real world information; a digitizer coupled to the sensor to digitize the real world information into digitized information; a signal processor coupled to the digitizer to process the digitized information into an image; a discriminator coupled to the signal processor to determine, based at least in part on the image, whether the real world information comprises an anomaly, where the discriminator is trained via a generative adversarial network; and a controller coupled to the discriminator.

Abstract: In an embodiment, an apparatus includes: a sensor to sense real world information; a digitizer coupled to the sensor to digitize the real world information into digitized information; a signal processor coupled to the digitizer to process the digitized information into an image; a discriminator coupled to the signal processor to determine, based at least in part on the image, whether the real world information comprises an anomaly, where the discriminator is trained via a generative adversarial network; and a controller coupled to the discriminator.

Abstract: In an embodiment, an apparatus includes: a sensor to sense real world information; a digitizer coupled to the sensor to digitize the real world information into digitized information; a signal processor coupled to the digitizer to process the digitized information into an image; a discriminator coupled to the signal processor to determine, based at least in part on the image, whether the real world information comprises an anomaly, where the discriminator is trained via a generative adversarial network; and a controller coupled to the discriminator.

Abstract: A system and method of implementing a convolutional neural network in the spectral domain is disclosed. Rather than performing convolution operations in the spatial domain, the inputs to the convolutional layer and the filter kernels are zero-padded and converted into the spectral domain. Once in the spectral domain, element wise multiplications are performed. The inverse Fourier Transform of the final output is then taken to return to the spatial domain. In certain embodiments, all filter kernels are learned in the spatial domain and are converted to the spectral domain at inference time in the convolutional neural network. In some embodiments a dimensionality reduction operation is applied in the spectral domain. In some embodiments, the conjugate symmetric filter kernels are learned directly in the spectral domain. In other embodiments, the learned spectral kernels apply various forms of dimensionality reduction such as puncturing, low-pass, high-pass, band-pass filtering operations.

Abstract: A system and method of implementing a neural network with a non-linear activation function is disclosed. A Universal Coordinate Rotation Digital Computer (CORDIC) is used to implement the activation function. Advantageously, the CORDIC is also used during training for back propagation. Using a CORDIC, activation functions such as hyperbolic tangent and sigmoid may be implemented without the use of a multiplier. Further, the derivatives of these functions, which are needed for back propagation, can also be implemented using the CORDIC.

Abstract: Embodiments include cryptographic circuits having isolated operation with respect to embedded sensor operations to mitigate side-channel attacks. A cryptographic circuit, a sensor, and an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) circuit are integrated into an integrated circuit along with a cryptographic circuit. A sensed signal is output with the sensor, and the sensed signal is converted to digital data using the ADC circuit. Further, cryptographic data is generated using one or more secret keys and the cryptographic circuit. The generation of the cryptographic data has isolated operation with respect to the operation of the sensor and the ADC circuit. The isolated operation mitigates side-channel attacks. The isolated operation can be achieved using power supply, clock, and/or reset circuits for the cryptographic circuit that are electrically isolated from similar circuits for the sensor and ADC circuit. The isolated operation can also be achieved using time-division multiplex operations.

Abstract: Embodiments include cryptographic circuits having isolated operation with respect to embedded sensor operations to mitigate side-channel attacks. A cryptographic circuit, a sensor, and an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) circuit are integrated into an integrated circuit along with a cryptographic circuit. A sensed signal is output with the sensor, and the sensed signal is converted to digital data using the ADC circuit. Further, cryptographic data is generated using one or more secret keys and the cryptographic circuit. The generation of the cryptographic data has isolated operation with respect to the operation of the sensor and the ADC circuit. The isolated operation mitigates side-channel attacks. The isolated operation can be achieved using power supply, clock, and/or reset circuits for the cryptographic circuit that are electrically isolated from similar circuits for the sensor and ADC circuit. The isolated operation can also be achieved using time-division multiplex operations.

Abstract: Embodiments include cryptographic circuits having isolated operation with respect to embedded sensor operations to mitigate side-channel attacks. A cryptographic circuit, a sensor, and an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) circuit are integrated into an integrated circuit along with a cryptographic circuit. A sensed signal is output with the sensor, and the sensed signal is converted to digital data using the ADC circuit. Further, cryptographic data is generated using one or more secret keys and the cryptographic circuit. The generation of the cryptographic data has isolated operation with respect to the operation of the sensor and the ADC circuit. The isolated operation mitigates side-channel attacks. The isolated operation can be achieved using power supply, clock, and/or reset circuits for the cryptographic circuit that are electrically isolated from similar circuits for the sensor and ADC circuit. The isolated operation can also be achieved using time-division multiplex operations.

Abstract: Systems and methods are disclosed for side-channel attack mitigation for secure devices including cryptographic circuits using block ciphers that are not based upon feedback. For disclosed embodiments, an integrated circuit includes a cryptographic circuit and a controller. The cryptographic circuit performs cryptographic operations in a block cipher AES mode without feedback. The controller outputs control signals to the cryptographic circuit that cause the cryptographic circuit to perform the cryptographic operations on sequential data blocks with an internally permuted order to mitigate block cipher side-channel attacks. The internally permuted order can be generated using one or more random number generators, one or more pre-configured permutated orders, or other techniques.

Abstract: An integrated circuit includes a tamper sensor that has plurality of state circuits. Each of the plurality of state circuits has a respective output that provides a respective logic state. When operating properly, the respective logic state is toggled in response to a clock signal. The respective logic state fails to toggle in response to a respective fault injection. The tamper sensor has an output that provides a fault signal in response to a difference in the respective logic state of the plurality of state circuits. Additionally, the integrated circuit includes a protected circuit, as well as a tamper response circuit. The tamper response circuit is connected to the tamper sensor and to the protected circuit. The tamper response circuit executes a protection operation to secure the protected circuit in response to the fault signal.

Abstract: An integrated circuit includes an energy detection circuit, a switching circuit, and a tamper response circuit. The integrated circuit has an input for receiving a radio frequency (RF) signal, a first output for providing a demodulated signal, and a second output for selectively providing a detect signal. The detect signal is provided in response to detecting that an energy of an internal signal exceeds a first threshold when the integrated circuit is in a secure mode. The switching circuit is used to alternatively switch the input of the energy detection circuit to an RF input terminal in a normal mode and to an internal antenna in a secure mode. The tamper response circuit disables a function of the integrated circuit in response to an activation of the detect signal in the secure mode.

Abstract: A method of providing access to a resource in an integrated circuit (IC) includes determining whether an attempt is made to access the resource. The method also includes obtaining a random number, and setting a frequency of a clock signal to a new value based on a value of the random number. The method further includes authenticating cryptographically a command for accessing the resource using the new value of the frequency of the clock signal.

Abstract: A method of providing access to a resource in an integrated circuit (IC) includes determining whether an attempt is made to access the resource. The method also includes determining whether a count of attempts to access the resource equals a maximum count. The method further includes authenticating cryptographically a command for accessing the resource if the count of attempts to access the resource is less than the maximum count.

Abstract: An integrated circuit includes an energy detection circuit, a switching circuit, and a tamper response circuit. The integrated circuit has an input for receiving a radio frequency (RF) signal, a first output for providing a demodulated signal, and a second output for selectively providing a detect signal. The detect signal is provided in response to detecting that an energy of an internal signal exceeds a first threshold when the integrated circuit is in a secure mode. The switching circuit is used to alternatively switch the input of the energy detection circuit to an RF input terminal in a normal mode and to an internal antenna in a secure mode. The tamper response circuit disables a function of the integrated circuit in response to an activation of the detect signal in the secure mode.