Abstract: A system for generating symmetric cryptographic keys for communications between hosts. Hosts use associated devices to generate secret keys. Each key is generated based on a static seed and a dynamic seed. The dynamic seed is created from sensor data or auxiliary data. The secret key allows host machines to encrypt, or decrypt, plaintext messages sent to, or received from, other host machines.

Abstract: A system for generating symmetric cryptographic keys for communications between hosts. Hosts use associated devices to generate secret keys. Each key is generated based on a static seed and a dynamic seed. The dynamic seed is created from sensor data or auxiliary data. The secret key allows host machines to encrypt, or decrypt, plaintext messages sent to, or received from, other host machines.

Abstract: A system for generating symmetric cryptographic keys for communications between hosts. Hosts use associated devices to generate secret keys. Each key is generated based on a static seed and a dynamic seed. The dynamic seed is created from sensor data or auxiliary data. The secret key allows host machines to encrypt, or decrypt, plaintext messages sent to, or received from, other host machines.

Abstract: A system for generating symmetric cryptographic keys for communications between hosts. Hosts use associated devices to generate secret keys. Each key is generated based on a static seed and a dynamic seed. The dynamic seed is created from sensor data or auxiliary data. The secret key allows host machines to encrypt, or decrypt, plaintext messages sent to, or received from, other host machines.

Abstract: Software control flow integrity is provided by embedding identifying bit patterns at computed control flow instruction sources and destinations. The sources and destinations of computed control flow instructions are determined with reference to a control flow graph. The identifying bit patterns are compared during software execution, and a match between a source and a respective destination ensures control flow consistent with the control flow graph. Security measures are implemented when the comparison results in a mismatch, indicating that control flow has deviated from the anticipated course.

Abstract: Software memory access control is provided by associating instruction areas with memory areas such that instruction areas are not permitted to access memory areas with which they are not associated. Checks may be inserted in the instruction areas to ensure that data provided by a memory group is provided by an associated memory area. Additionally, control flow integrity for the instruction areas may be provided by embedding identifying bit patterns within computed control flow instructions contained in the instruction groups. In this way, control flow of the instruction areas may be provided, thus preventing diversion of control flow and minimizing required checks.

Abstract: Software memory access control is provided by associating instruction areas with memory areas such that instruction areas are not permitted to access memory areas with which they are not associated. Checks may be inserted in the instruction areas to ensure that data provided by a memory group is provided by an associated memory area. Additionally, control flow integrity for the instruction areas may be provided by embedding identifying bit patterns within computed control flow instructions contained in the instruction groups. In this way, control flow of the instruction areas may be provided, thus preventing diversion of control flow and minimizing required checks.

Abstract: Software control flow integrity is provided by embedding identifying bit patterns at computed control flow instruction sources and destinations. The sources and destinations of computed control flow instructions are determined with reference to a control flow graph. The identifying bit patterns are compared during software execution, and a match between a source and a respective destination ensures control flow consistent with the control flow graph. Security measures are implemented when the comparison results in a mismatch, indicating that control flow has deviated from the anticipated course.