Abstract: Embodiments are directed to monitoring network traffic over a network. A monitoring engine may monitor flows of network packets in the network. The monitoring engine may determine an observation port that provided the network packets. The monitoring engine may determine primary network packets provided by an authoritative observation port based on which observation port provided the network packets and provide them to an analysis engine. The monitoring engine may discard a remainder of the network packets that may be associated with non-authoritative observation ports. The analysis engine may analyze the one or more primary network packets.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to monitoring network traffic using a network computer. The network computer provides anomaly information associated with anomalies that may be associated with monitored network traffic. An inference engine may determine the users associated with the anomalies based on the monitored network traffic. A communication channel associated with the users may be determined based on the anomalies and the monitored network traffic such that the communication channel may be separate from the monitored network traffic. The communication channel may be employed to provide investigative agents to the users. Investigative information may be collected from the investigative agents over the communication channel. The inference engine may provide a risk value that is associated with the anomalies based on the investigative information.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to monitoring network traffic over a network. A monitoring engine may monitor flows of network packets in the network. The monitoring engine may determine an observation port that provided the network packets. The monitoring engine may determine primary network packets provided by an authoritative observation port based on which observation port provided the network packets and provide them to an analysis engine. The monitoring engine may discard a remainder of the network packets that may be associated with non-authoritative observation ports. The analysis engine may analyze the one or more primary network packets.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to monitoring network traffic over a network. A monitoring engine may monitor flows of network packets in the network. The monitoring engine may determine an observation port that provided the network packets. The monitoring engine may determine primary network packets provided by an authoritative observation port based on which observation port provided the network packets and provide them to an analysis engine. The monitoring engine may discard a remainder of the network packets that may be associated with non-authoritative observation ports. The analysis engine may analyze the one or more primary network packets.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to monitoring network traffic using a network computer. The network computer provides anomaly information associated with anomalies that may be associated with monitored network traffic. An inference engine may determine the users associated with the anomalies based on the monitored network traffic. A communication channel associated with the users may be determined based on the anomalies and the monitored network traffic such that the communication channel may be separate from the monitored network traffic. The communication channel may be employed to provide investigative agents to the users. Investigative information may be collected from the investigative agents over the communication channel. The inference engine may provide a risk value that is associated with the anomalies based on the investigative information.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to sharing secure communication secrets with a network monitoring device (NMD). The NMD may passively monitor network packets communicated between client computers and server computers. If a secure communication session is established between a client computer and a server computer, a key provider may provide the NMD a session key that corresponds to the secure communication session. The NMD may buffer each network packet associated with the secure communication session until the NMD is provided a session key for the secure communication session. The NMD may use the session key to decrypt network packets communicated between the client computer and the server computer. The NMD may then proceed to analyze the secure communication session based on the contents of the decrypted network packets.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to monitoring communication between computers using network monitoring computers (NMCs). NMCs identify a secure communication session established between two of the computers based on an exchange of handshake information associated with the secure communication session. Key information that corresponds to the secure communication session may be obtained from a key provider such that the key information may be encrypted by the key provider. NMCs may decrypt the key information. NMCs may derive the session key based on the decrypted key information and the handshake information. NMCs may decrypt network packets included in the secure communication session. NMCs may be employed to inspect the one or more decrypted network packets to execute one or more rule-based policies.

Abstract: A method, apparatus, and system are directed toward managing network traffic over a plurality of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Level 2 switch ports. A network traffic is received over the plurality of OSI Level 2 switch ports. At least a part of the network traffic is categorized into a flow. The categorization may be based on a IP address, an OSI Level 4 port, a protocol type, a Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) number, or the like, associated with the network traffic. One of the plurality of OSI Level 2 switch ports is selected based on a load-balancing metric. The load-balancing metric may be a priority of the flow, a congestion characteristic, a prediction of a load usage for the flow, a combination thereof, or the like. A frame associated with the flow is sent over the selected one of the plurality of OSI Level 2 switch ports.

Abstract: Embodiments are direct to monitoring communication between computers may be using network monitoring computers (NMCs). Network packets that are communicated between the computers may be captured and stored in a data store. If the NMCs identify a secure communication session established between two computers, the NMCs may obtain key information that corresponds to the secure communication session that includes a session key that may be provided by a key provider. Correlation information associated with the secure communication session may be captured by the NMCs. The correlation information may include tuple information associated with the secure communication session. And, the key information and the correlation information may be stored in a key escrow. The key information may be indexed in the key escrow using the correlation information.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to monitoring communication between computers using network monitoring computers (NMCs). NMCs identify a secure communication session established between two of the computers based on an exchange of handshake information associated with the secure communication session. Key information that corresponds to the secure communication session may be obtained from a key provider such that the key information may be encrypted by the key provider. NMCs may decrypt the key information. NMCs may derive the session key based on the decrypted key information and the handshake information. NMCs may decrypt network packets included in the secure communication session. NMCs may be employed to inspect the one or more decrypted network packets to execute one or more rule-based policies.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to sharing secure communication secrets with a network monitoring device (NMD). The NMD may passively monitor network packets communicated between client computers and server computers. If a secure communication session is established between a client computer and a server computer, a key provider may provide the NMD a session key that corresponds to the secure communication session. The NMD may buffer each network packet associated with the secure communication session until the NMD is provided a session key for the secure communication session. The NMD may use the session key to decrypt network packets communicated between the client computer and the server computer. The NMD may then proceed to analyze the secure communication session based on the contents of the decrypted network packets.

Abstract: A method, system, and apparatus are directed towards enabling access to payload by a third -party sent over an SSL session. The third-party may be a proxy situated between a client and a server. SSL handshake messages are sent between the client and the server to establish the SSL connection. As the SSL handshake messages are routed through the proxy, the proxy may extract data. In addition, one of the client or the server may send another message within, or out-of-band to, the series of SSL handshake message directly to the proxy. The other SSL message may include secret data that the proxy may use to generate a session key the SSL connection. With the session key, the proxy may receive SSL messages over the SSL connection, modify and/or transpose the payload within the received SSL messages, and/or terminate the SSL connection at the proxy.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to monitoring flows of packets over a network. If a network monitoring computer (NMC) in a cluster of NMCs observes a new network flow, the NMC may perform a variety of actions to determine the NMC that is responsible for monitoring the new network flow. Network traffic associated with the new network flow may be buffered in a non-transitory processor readable media. The new network flow may be registered with the plurality of NMCs, providing an identifier that corresponds to one NMC. Registering may include, assigning the NMC a responsibility to monitor the new network flow. If the identifier corresponds to the NMC that observed the new network flow, the network traffic associated with the new network flow is processed using that NMC. If the identifier corresponds to another NMC, the buffered network traffic is forwarded to the other NMC.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to sharing secure communication secrets with a network monitoring device (NMD). The NMD may passively monitor network packets communicated between client computers and server computers. If a secure communication session is established between a client computer and a server computer, a key provider may provide the NMD a session key that corresponds to the secure communication session. The NMD may buffer each network packet associated with the secure communication session until the NMD is provided a session key for the secure communication session. The NMD may use the session key to decrypt network packets communicated between the client computer and the server computer. The NMD may then proceed to analyze the secure communication session based on the contents of the decrypted network packets.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to sharing secure communication secrets with a network monitoring device (NMD). The NMD may passively monitor network packets communicated between client computers and server computers. If a secure communication session is established between a client computer and a server computer, a key provider may provide the NMD a session key that corresponds to the secure communication session. The NMD may buffer each network packet associated with the secure communication session until the NMD is provided a session key for the secure communication session. The NMD may use the session key to decrypt network packets communicated between the client computer and the server computer. The NMD may then proceed to analyze the secure communication session based on the contents of the decrypted network packets.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to sharing secure communication secrets with a network monitoring device (NMD). The NMD may passively monitor network packets communicated between client computers and server computers. If a secure communication session is established between a client computer and a server computer, a key provider may provide the NMD a session key that corresponds to the secure communication session. The NMD may buffer each network packet associated with the secure communication session until the NMD is provided a session key for the secure communication session. The NMD may use the session key to decrypt network packets communicated between the client computer and the server computer. The NMD may then proceed to analyze the secure communication session based on the contents of the decrypted network packets.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed towards resynchronizing the processing of a monitored flow based on hole detection. A network monitoring device (NMD) may be employed to passively monitor flows of packets for a session between endpoints. The NMD may receive copies of the monitored flow and perform processes on the monitored flow. In some situations, some copies of packets may not be fully processed by the NMD, creating a hole in the processing. If a hole is detected in the monitored flow and the processing of the monitored flow is desynchronized, then the NMD may suspend processing until it is resynchronized or for a remainder of the session. If the processing is desynchronized, then the NMD may resynchronize the processing by resuming the processing of the monitored flow at a downstream position of the monitored flow based on the detected hole.

Abstract: The various embodiments provide selective real-time monitoring of one or more flows of packets over a network, real-time buffering of packets for the one or more monitored flows, real-time recording of packets for one or more monitored flows and its corresponding buffered packets based on initiation of at least one trigger, and real-time analysis of the one or more recorded flows of packets regarding at least the occurrence of the at least one trigger. One or more flows of packets may be selected for monitoring by an administrator or an automated process based on different factors. In at least one of the various embodiments, the one or more monitored flows of packets are tagged and threaded so that they are separately accessible in a ring buffer.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed to monitoring communication over a network using a network monitoring device (NMD) to discover devices, roles, applications, and application dependencies present on the monitored networks. A NMD may monitor network packets that may be flowing on monitored networks. Using OSI L2-to-L3 data the NMD may determine the devices that may be on the monitored networks. Also, the NMD may determine the network protocols that may be in use on the monitored networks. Further, the NMD may reassemble monitored network packets into transactions based on knowledge regarding the network protocols are in use on the monitored networks. The NMD may perform various tests to determine the applications that may be running on the discovered devices. Some of the tests used by the NMD may examine OSI L4-L7 data that may be included in the transactions.

Abstract: Embodiments are directed towards receiving packets communicated over at least one network, determining layer 3 header information for the received packets, normalizing the determined layer 3 header information for each received packet, employing a determined value based on the normalized layer 3 header information to detect each received packet that is a duplicate, disregarding duplicate packets, and enabling monitoring and analysis of at least selected flows that include packets that are determined to be non-duplicated. Also, if the determined layer 3 header information indicates that the received packet is fragmented, that packet is de-fragmented at least in accordance with a fragment offset. Additionally, normalization may include at least one of masking at least one value in the layer 3 header information, or rolling back changes in the layer 3 header information.