Abstract: Embodiments disclosed allow authentication between two entities having agreed on the use of a common modulus N. The authentication includes generating a pseudorandom string value; generating a public key value based on the modulus N and the pseudorandom string value; generating a private key value corresponding to the public key value; receiving a verifier's public key value; generating a shared secret value based on the modulus N, the private key value and the verifier's public key value; calculating an authentication signature value using the shared secret value; and transmitting the authentication signature value for authentication. When the authentication signature is received, the public key value and the shared value are generated to calculate an authentication signature value. Thereafter, the authentication signature values are compared and authenticated.

Abstract: A small form-factor security device is provided that may be inserted in series with a telephone line to encrypt dual tone multi-frequency (DTMF) tones from a telephone to prevent unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. A receiving device decrypts the encrypted DTMF tones to receive the original information sent by the telephone. The security device acts as a second factor in a two-factor authentication scheme with a tele-services security server that authenticates the security device.

Abstract: Embodiments disclosed allow authentication between two entities having agreed on the use of a common modulus N. The authentication includes generating a pseudorandom string value; generating a public key value based on the modulus N and the pseudorandom string value; generating a private key value corresponding to the public key value; receiving a verifier's public key value; generating a shared secret value based on the modulus N, the private key value and the verifier's public key value; calculating an authentication signature value using the shared secret value; and transmitting the authentication signature value for authentication. When the authentication signature is received, the public key value and the shared value are generated to calculate an authentication signature value. Thereafter, the authentication signature values are compared and authenticated.

Abstract: A scheme is provided for determining the geographical location of an active IP device coupled to an IP network. A network path to the user device is obtained to identify a last hop device having a known first geographical location. A last leg distance between the last hop device and the user device is calculated. The last leg bandwidth, propagation time, and propagation speed are also characterized to more accurately determine the last leg distance. By combining the known first geographical location and the distance of the last hop device and user device, a geographical location for the user device is obtained. To improve the accuracy of the geographical location of the user device, multiple last hop devices with known geographical locations are employed to obtain multiple geographical areas for the user device. The intersection or overlap of these geographical areas indicates a refined geographical location of the user device.

Abstract: Apparatus and method are disclosed for digital authentication and verification. In one embodiment, authentication involves storing a cryptographic key and a look up table (LUT), generating an access code using the cryptographic key; generating multiple parallel BPSK symbols based upon the access code; converting the BPSK symbols into multiple tones encoded with the access code using the LUT; and outputting the multiple tones encoded with the access code for authentication. In another embodiment, verification involves receiving multiple tones encoded with an access code; generating multiple parallel BPSK symbols from the multiple tones; converting the BPSK symbols into an encoded interleaved bit stream of the access code; de-interleaving the encoded interleaved bit stream; and recovering the access code from the encoded de-interleaved bit stream.

Abstract: Another feature provides an efficient encryption method that safeguards the security of encrypted symbols. Each plaintext symbol is encrypted by using a separate pseudorandomly selected translation table. Rather than pre-storing every possible permutation of symbols as translation tables, the translation tables may be efficiently generated on-the-fly based on a pseudorandom number and a symbol shuffling algorithm. A receiving device may similarly generate reverse translation tables on-the-fly to decrypt received encrypted symbols.

Abstract: Embodiments describe a method and/or system whereby a secret key in a cryptographic system may be replaced without revealing the secret key. One embodiment comprises creating a first private key and corresponding first public key. A second private key associated with the first private key and a second public key corresponding to the second private key are also created. The second private key is output once such that it can be re-created and the second public key is output when outputting the first public key. The first private key is used for authentication. The method further comprises re-creating the second private key; and using the second private key for authentication. Another embodiment comprises creating a private key and corresponding public key with associated system parameter; outputting the system parameter when outputting the public key; and using the private key for authentication. The method may further comprise creating a new private key using the previous key and the system parameter.

Abstract: Another feature provides an efficient encryption method that safeguards the security of encrypted symbols. Each plaintext symbol is encrypted by using a separate pseudorandomly selected translation table. Rather than pre-storing every possible permutation of symbols as translation tables, the translation tables may be efficiently generated on-the-fly based on a pseudorandom number arid a symbol shuffling algorithm. A receiving device may similarly generate reverse translation tables on-the-fly to decrypt received encrypted symbols.

Abstract: Apparatus and method are disclosed for digital authentication and verification. In one embodiment, authentication involves storing a cryptographic key and a look up table (LUT), generating an access code using the cryptographic key; generating multiple parallel BPSK symbols based upon the access code; converting the BPSK symbols into multiple tones encoded with the access code using the LUT; and outputting the multiple tones encoded with the access code for authentication. In another embodiment, verification involves receiving multiple tones encoded with an access code; generating multiple parallel BPSK symbols from the multiple tones; converting the BPSK symbols into an encoded interleaved bit stream of the access code; de-interleaving the encoded interleaved bit stream; and recovering the access code from the encoded de-interleaved bit stream.

Abstract: Apparatus and method are disclosed for digital authentication and verification. In one embodiment, authentication involves storing a cryptographic key and a look up table (LUT), generating an access code using the cryptographic key; generating multiple parallel BPSK symbols based upon the access code; converting the BPSK symbols into multiple tones encoded with the access code using the LUT; and outputting the multiple tones encoded with the access code for authentication. In another embodiment, verification involves receiving multiple tones encoded with an access code; generating multiple parallel BPSK symbols from the multiple tones; converting the BPSK symbols into an encoded interleaved bit stream of the access code; de-interleaving the encoded interleaved bit stream; and recovering the access code from the encoded de-interleaved bit stream.

Abstract: Embodiments disclosed allow authentication between two entities having agreed on the use of a common modulus N. The authentication includes generating a pseudorandom string value; generating a public key value based on the modulus N and the pseudorandom string value; generating a private key value corresponding to the public key value; receiving a verifier's public key value; generating a shared secret value based on the modulus N, the private key value and the verifier's public key value; calculating an authentication signature value using the shared secret value; and transmitting the authentication signature value for authentication. When the authentication signature is received, the public key value and the shared value are generated to calculate an authentication signature value. Thereafter, the authentication signature values are compared and authenticated.