Abstract: An information processing apparatus includes a secure area configured to execute a program in secret, and a security chip. The secure area conceals information related to the program, and requests the security chip to provide a blind signature with respect to the concealed information obtained by the concealing. The security chip calculates the blind signature and returns the blind signature to the secure area. The secure area acquires a signature with respect to the information related to the program from the blind signature.

Abstract: In a remote authorization control system including a resource access device, a resource management device, and an authentication device, the resource access device downloads an access control list from the authentication device onto a secure region in the resource access device. The resource access device downloads resources from the resource management device onto the secure region. The resource access device determines whether a user is allowed to use the resources based on the access control list when a resource use request is received from the user, and the resources access device allows the user to use the resources when the resources are usable.

Abstract: A share generating device obtains N seeds s0, . . . , sN?1, obtains a function value y=g(x, e)?Fm of plaintext x?Fm and a function value e, and obtains information containing a member yi and N?1 seeds sd, where d?{0, . . . , N?1} and d?i, as a share SSi of the plaintext x in secret sharing and outputs the share SSi. It is to be noted that the function value y is expressed by members y0?Fm(0), . . . , yN?1?Fm(N?1) which satisfy m=m(0)+ . . . +m(N?1).

Abstract: A program execution system includes a data holding apparatus, a program providing apparatus, and a data processing apparatus that performs computing in a secure region. The data holding apparatus transmits encrypted data, encrypted with a first common key, to the data processing apparatus, and the program providing apparatus transmits an encrypted program, encrypted with a second common key, to the data processing apparatus. In the secure region, the data processing apparatus acquires data by decrypting the encrypted data with the first common key, acquires a program by decrypting the encrypted program with the second common key, executes the program for the data, and encrypts a result of the execution with a public key of the data holding apparatus or the first common key. The data holding apparatus acquires the result of the execution by decrypting the encrypted result of the execution with a secret key or the first common key.

Abstract: An authentication-control system including one or more computers, the authentication-control system includes: a registration unit that, in response to a notification of registration of a software resource after a change, registers in a storage unit a person who has made the change as a right holder of the software resource after the change, together with a right holder of the software resource before the change; an inquiry control unit that, in response to a permission request for use or editing of the software resource, controls an inquiry as to permission or rejection to right holders registered in the storage unit regarding the software resource; and a response unit that makes a response indicating permission for the permission request when permission is obtained from all the right holders. As result, it is possible to appropriately control authorization for access to a software resource changed in a distribution process.

Abstract: A share [x]i of plaintext x in accordance with Shamir's secret sharing scheme is expressed by N shares [x0]i, . . . , [xN?1]i, and each share generating device Ai obtains a function value ri=Pm(i(?))(si) of a seed si, obtains a first calculated value ?i=?(i, i(?))[xi(?)]i+ri using a Lagrange coefficient ?(i, i(?)), a share [xi(?)]i, and the function value ri, and outputs the first calculated value ?i to a share generating device Ai(?). Each share generating device Ai accepts a second calculated value ?i(+), obtains a third calculated value zi=?(i, i(+))[xi]i+?i(+) using a Lagrange coefficient ?(i, i(+)), a share [xi]i, and the second calculated value ?i(+), and obtains information containing the seed si and the third calculated value zi as a share SSi of the plaintext x in secret sharing and outputs the share SSi.

Abstract: An assembled battery includes: a plurality of batteries, each with a container that contains an electric charger/discharger and an electrolytic solution and a gas discharge unit on its one surface, wherein the plurality of batteries are stacked so that the one surface of each battery is aligned to be flush with the one surface of the other batteries; a metal first flow path member is placed opposite the surface with the gas discharge unit, and configures a first flow path unit for gas discharged from the gas discharge units of the batteries; a second flow path member that forms a second flow path unit with a smaller flow path cross-sectional area; a connector that couples the first and the second flow path unit via an opening in the first flow path member; and a guide member that partitions a space inside the connector. This configuration allows for efficient gas discharge.

Abstract: A secondary battery module includes a plurality of battery blocks each obtained by stacking a plurality of battery cells. The secondary battery module includes a holding member adapted to hold the plurality of battery blocks and including a pair of opposed end plates, a pair of opposed side plates, and a section plate arranged between the adjacent battery blocks to partition the battery blocks; and an inter-block bus bar provided across the section plate and adapted to electrically connect the adjacent battery blocks. The inter-block bus bar has a fuse portion.

Abstract: A secondary battery module includes a plurality of battery blocks each obtained by stacking a plurality of battery cells. The secondary battery module includes a holding member adapted to hold the plurality of battery blocks and including a pair of opposed end plates, a pair of opposed side plates, and a section plate arranged between the adjacent battery blocks to partition the battery blocks; and an inter-block bus bar provided across the section plate and adapted to electrically connect the adjacent battery blocks. The inter-block bus bar has a fuse portion.

Abstract: A Fisher's exact test calculation apparatus includes: a condition storage 1 that has stored therein a condition for determining whether a result of Fisher's exact test corresponding to input is significant or not, the input being frequencies in a summary table; and a calculation unit 2 that obtains the result of Fisher's exact test corresponding to the frequencies in the summary table by inputting the frequencies in the summary table to the condition read from the condition storage 1.

Abstract: A secret computation system is a secret computation system for performing computation while keeping data concealed, and comprises a cyphertext generation device that generates cyphertext by encrypting the data, a secret computation device that generates encrypted basic statistics by performing secret computation of predetermined basic statistics using the cyphertext while keeping the cyphertext concealed, and a computation device that generates decrypted basic statistics by decrypting the encrypted basic statistics and performs predetermined computation using the decrypted basic statistics.

Abstract: The present invention provides a technique for performing confidential sort at a faster speed than in the prior art. A confidential sort system comprises first to Mth apparatuses. The first to Mth apparatuses obtain inverse substitution [[?0?1]] of L-bit stable sort of {?k0}. The first to Mth apparatuses perform, on i=1, . . . , N?1, a process of converting [[?i-1?1]] to hybrid substitution to obtain {?i-1?1}, a process of inversely substituting {?ki} with {?i-1?1} to obtain {?i-1?ki}, a process of obtaining inverse substitution [[??i?1]] of L-bit stable sort of [[?i-1?ki]], a process of synthesizing {?i-1?1} with [[??i?1]] to obtain [[?i?1]]:=[[?i-1?1??i?1]], and a process of converting [[?N-1?1]] to hybrid substitution to obtain {?N-1?1}. The first to Mth apparatuses inversely substitute [[?v]] with {?N-1?1} and output [[?N-1?v]].

Abstract: Pi and P+ have stored a+?{a0, a1, a2} and b+?{b0, b1, b2} therein, and Pi and P? have stored a??A? and b??B? therein. Here, P+?P(i+1)mod 3, P?=P(i?1)mod 3, and a and b are arbitrary values and satisfy a=a0+a1+a2 and b=b0+b1+b2, where A? is a complement of a+ in {a0, a1, a2} and B? is a complement of b+ in {b0, b1, b2}. Pi and P+ share r+, Pi and P? share r?, and Pi calculates c+=(a++a?)(b++b?)?a?b?+r+?r?. Pi sends c+ to P+.

Abstract: A share generating device obtains N seeds s0, . . . , sN?1, obtains a function value y=g(x, e) ? Fm of plaintext x ? Fm and a function value e, and obtains information containing a member yi and N?1 seeds sd, where d ? {0, . . . , N?1} and d?i, as a share SSi of the plaintext x in secret sharing and outputs the share SSi. It is to be noted that the function value y is expressed by members y0 ? Fm(0), . . . , yN?1 ? Fm(N?1) which satisfy m=m(0)+ . . . +m(N?1).

Abstract: A share generating device obtains N seeds s0, . . . , sN?1, obtains a function value y=g(x, e)?Fm of plaintext x?Fm and a function value e, and obtains information containing a member yi and N?1 seeds sd, where d?{0, . . . , N?1} and d?i, as a share SSi of the plaintext x in secret sharing and outputs the share SSi. It is to be noted that the function value y is expressed by members y0?Fm(0), . . . , yN?1?Fm(N?1), which satisfy m=m(0)+ . . . +m(N?1).

Abstract: A secure computation device obtains a first concealed verification value [z]i=[w??]i with secure computation by using concealed authentication information [w]i which is preliminarily stored and concealed authentication information [?]i which is inputted, obtains a concealed extension field random number [rm]i?[F?] which is a secret sharing value of an extension field random number rm, obtains a second concealed verification value [ym]i in which ym is concealed with secure computation by using the first concealed verification value [z]i, and obtains a third concealed verification value [rmym]i with secure computation by using the concealed extension field random number [rm]i and the second concealed verification value [ym]i and outputs the third concealed verification value [rmym]i.

Abstract: Fisher's exact test is efficiently computed through secure computation. It is assumed that a, b, c and d are frequencies of a 2×2 contingency table, [a], [b], [c] and [d] are secure texts of the respective frequencies a, b, c and d, and N is an upper bound satisfying a+b+c+dN. A reference frequency computation part computes a secure text ([a0], [b0], [c0], [d0]) of a combination of reference frequencies (a0, b0, c0, d0) which are integers satisfying a0+b0=a+b, c0+d0=c+d, a0+c0=a+c, and b0+d0=b+d. A number-of-patterns determination part determines integers h0 and h1 satisfying h0?h1. A pattern computation part computes [ai]=[a0]+i, [bi]=[b0]?i, [ci]=[c0]?i and [di]=[d0]+i for i=h0, . . . , h1, and obtains a set S={([ai], [bi], [ci], [di])}i of secure texts of combinations of frequencies (ai, bi, ci, di).

Abstract: Please substitute the new Abstract submitted herewith for the original Abstract: A secondary battery module includes a plurality of battery blocks each obtained by stacking a plurality of battery cells. The secondary battery module includes a holding member adapted to hold the plurality of battery blocks and including a pair of opposed end plates, a pair of opposed side plates, and a section plate arranged between the adjacent battery blocks to partition the battery blocks; and an inter-block bus bar provided across the section plate and adapted to electrically connect the adjacent battery blocks. The inter-block bus bar has a fuse portion.

Abstract: A share generating device obtains N seeds s0, . . . , sN?1, obtains a function value y=g(x, e) ? Fm of plaintext x ? Fm and a function value e, and obtains information containing a member yi and N?1 seeds sd, where d ? {0, . . . , N?1} and d?i, as a share SSi of the plaintext x in secret sharing and outputs the share SSi. It is to be noted that the function value y is expressed by members y0 ? Fm(0), . . . , yN?1 ? Fm(N?1), which satisfy m=m(0)+ . . . +m(N?1).

Abstract: A secure computation device obtains a first concealed verification value [z]i=[w??]i with secure computation by using concealed authentication information [w]i which is preliminarily stored and concealed authentication information [?]i which is inputted, obtains a concealed extension field random number [rm]i [F?] which is a secret sharing value of an extension field random number rm, obtains a second concealed verification value [ym]i in which ym is concealed with secure computation by using the first concealed verification value [z]i, and obtains a third concealed verification value [rmym]i with secure computation by using the concealed extension field random number [rm]i and the second concealed verification value [ym]i and outputs the third concealed verification value [rmym]i.