Abstract: An end surface of each first side wall, an end surface of each first middle wall, and an end surface of each first end wall are joined to an adjacent second structure by diffusion bonding, an end surface of each second side wall, an end surface of each second middle wall, and an end surface of each second end wall are joined to an adjacent first structure or a lid structure by diffusion bonding, a thickness of each first side wall is greater than or equal to a thickness of each first middle wall, and a thickness of each second side wall is greater than or equal to a thickness of each second middle wall.

Abstract: A secret parallel processing device reducing communication amount includes: a randomization unit that obtains a non-randomized input sequence and outputs a randomized sequence obtained by joining the non-randomized sequence and a dummy record sequence formed of a disclosed value and subjecting the joined sequences to random replacement processing and concealed random replacement data obtained by concealing used random replacement data; a calculation unit that obtains the non-randomized sequence, the randomized sequence, and the dummy record sequence, applies a predetermined function to the sequences, and generates an output checksum for each sequence by using calculation procedure data used in the processing of applying the function; and a correctness verification unit that obtains the output checksum for each sequence and the concealed random replacement data, assesses the output checksum for each sequence, and outputs a final test result determining whether the predetermined function has been correctly appl

Abstract: A vector generation unit generates a vector x so that xn[i]?xn[j] if kn[i]=k[j] at i?j. A set generation unit generates a set Bn,j so that individual elements correspond to combinations of the N?1 pieces of elements, which are individually selected from sets M0, . . . , MN?1 other than a set Mn, and xn[j] and the elements for all of the combinations are included. A matrix generation unit generates a matrix Tn? so that the matrix Tn? includes rows identical to Tn[j] in the number equal to the number of elements of the set Bn,j. A key generation unit generates a vector kn? so that elements of the matrix Tn? which correspond to a row identical to Tn[j] correspond to combinations of kn[j] and elements of the set Bn,j and further, the elements of the set Bn,j are different from each other when there are a plurality of rows identical to Tn[j].

Abstract: A combination of secure texts of values “a”, “b” and “c” having a relationship c=ab is efficiently generated. A secure text generation part 12 generates secure texts [xi] of xi satisfying xi=f(ki), and secure texts [yi] of yi satisfying yi=g(ki), for i=0, . . . , m. A fragment generation part 13 generates ?i decrypted from [xi]?[ai] and ?i decrypted from [yi]?[bi], for i=1, . . . , m, and calculates [ci]+?i[bi]+?i[ai]+?i?i and generates secure texts [z1], . . . , [zm]; and A random number synthesizing part 14 generates a secure text [z0] using different values k0, . . . , km and secure texts [z1], . . . , [zm].

Abstract: Secret calculation including secret sorting is performed at high speed. Permutation data generation step S10 generates permutation data <?i> and <??i> so as to generate permutation data <?L>. Random ID column generation step S12 generates a random ID column [r?i] so as to generate a random ID column [r?L]. Secret random permutation step S14 performs secret random permutation of a set composed of a random ID column [r?i?1], a key column [k?i], and the random ID column [r?i] with the permutation data <?i>. Flag creation step S16 sets a flag [fj,h] by using a key [kj]=([kj,0], . . . , [kj,L?1]). Order table creation step S18 creates an order table [s?] by using the flag [fj,h]. Sort permutation generation step S20 generates sort permutation ???1L by using the random ID column [r?i], the order table [s?], a post-permutation key column [?ik?i], and a post-permutation random ID column [?ir?i].

Abstract: A second set including a plurality of elements a5(1), . . . , a5(N) or a concealed text of the second set is obtained, where the second set is obtained by setting a replication source element a(f(h)) included in a first set to an element a(f(h))?a(f(h?1)) and setting elements other than the replication source in the first set to zero with respect to h=2, . . . , M. An additive inverse of a replication source element a(f(h?1)) of which the order is before the replication source element a(f(h)) and is the closest to the replication source element a(f(h)) is ?a(f(h?1)). The second set or the concealed text of the second set is used to obtain a third set or a concealed text of the third set. The third set is a set including a first element b(1)=a5(1) and i=2, . . . , Nth element b(i)=b(i?1)+a5(i).

Abstract: A secret share value of object data on which secure computation is to be performed is stored in a secure computation device, and a query which requests secure computation or secret share value of the query is input to the secure computation device. The secure computation device performs consistency verification of the secret share value of the object data and consistency verification of the query or the secret share value of the query, obtains a secret share value of a calculation result by performing secure computation in accordance with the query or the secret share value of the query which passed the consistency verification by using the secret share value of the object data which passed the consistency verification, and outputs the secret share value of the calculation result.

Abstract: A secret quotient transfer device that can reduce the communication cost. On the assumption that u denotes a natural number and represents a boundary value, m denotes an integer that satisfies a relation m?2u, i denotes an integer from 0 to m?1, a plain text a is an integer that is equal to or greater than 0 and smaller than an arbitrary modulo p, the integers a and 0 are congruent modulo 2u, and the plain text a is expressed as a sum of m sub-shares x0, . . . , xm-1, the secret quotient transfer device computes a quotient q of the division of a total sum aZ of the sub-shares by p according to q=?(i<m)xi mod 2u.

Abstract: Secret calculation including secret random permutation is performed at high speed. In unit permutation, random permutation devices p0, . . . , pk-1 perform permutation of additive secret sharing values «a»?i of a plain text a with sub shares ??i of permutation data ?. In resharing, the random permutation device p0 generates additive secret sharing values «a»?i+1pk by using random numbers r1, . . . , rk-1 which are respectively shared with random permutation devices pj (j=1, . . . , k?1) so as to transmit the additive secret sharing values «a»?i+1pk to the random permutation device pk and each of the random permutation devices pj generates additive secret sharing values «a»?i+1pj by using random numbers rj.

Abstract: A secret sharing value of a value represented by a “first target bit string” is used to obtain a secret sharing value of a value represented by a “first check bit string” obtained by setting a value of the most significant bit of the “first target bit string” to a value of a “first check bit” that is lower than the most significant bit. Here, the “first target bit string” corresponds to a null value when the most significant bit is 1 and corresponds to a real number when the most significant bit is 0. Next, the secret sharing value of the value represented by the “first check bit string” is used to obtain secret sharing values of bit values of the least significant bit to “first check bit” of the “first check bit string”.

Abstract: Even when an intermediate server exists, a plurality of servers simultaneously authenticates a user securely. A user apparatus disperses a password. The user apparatus obtains a ciphertext, which is obtained by encrypting a dispersed value. The intermediate server transmits the ciphertext to an authentication server. The authentication server decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the dispersed value. The authentication server determines a verification value. The authentication server obtains a ciphertext. The intermediate server decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the verification value. The intermediate server verifies whether a sum total of the verification values is equal to 0 or not. The authentication server determines a verification value. The authentication server obtains a ciphertext. The authentication server decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the verification value. The authentication server verifies whether a sum total of the verification values is equal to 0 or not.

Abstract: An end surface of each first side wall, an end surface of each first middle wall, and an end surface of each first end wall are joined to an adjacent second structure by diffusion bonding, an end surface of each second side wall, an end surface of each second middle wall, and an end surface of each second end wall are joined to an adjacent first structure or a lid structure by diffusion bonding, a thickness of each first side wall is greater than or equal to a thickness of each first middle wall, and a thickness of each second side wall is greater than or equal to a thickness of each second middle wall.

Abstract: An efficient share recovery technique for Shamir's secret sharing is provided. n share recovery apparatuses p1, . . . , pn-1 generate a share [r]i of a secretly shared value shared through Shamir's secret sharing, which becomes a random number r when restored. k share recovery apparatuses ?0, . . . , ?k?1 calculate a share [b]i by subtracting the share [r]i from a share [a]i. The share recovery apparatus ?k receives the shares [b]0, . . . , [b]k?1 from the share recovery apparatuses ?0, . . . , ?k?1. The share recovery apparatus ?k recovers shares [b]k, . . . , [b]k+m-1 using the shares [b]0, . . . , [b]k?1. m?1 share recovery apparatuses ?k+1, . . . , ?k+m-1 receive a share [b]j from the share recovery apparatus ?k. m share recovery apparatuses ?k, . . . , ?k+m-1 calculate the share [a]j by adding the share [r]j to the share [b]j.

Abstract: An inconsistency in shares is detected with a small volume of communications traffic. n inconsistency detecting devices generate random numbers si and make the random numbers si public. The n inconsistency detecting devices generate a common random number s which is the sum total of the random numbers s0, . . . , sn?1. The n inconsistency detecting devices calculate shares [c]i. The n inconsistency detecting devices generate shares [r]i, each of which would become a random number r by reconstruction. The n inconsistency detecting devices calculate shares [d]i, each of which would become a judgment value d by reconstruction. One inconsistency detecting device receives shares [d]1, . . . , [d]n?1 from n?1 inconsistency detecting devices. The one inconsistency detecting device restores n?k shares [d]?k, . . . , [d]?n?1 from k shares [d]0, . . . , [d]k?1. The one inconsistency detecting device judges, for j=k, . . . , n?1, whether or not a share [d]j and a share [d]?j coincide with each other.

Abstract: Each of at least three arithmetic units includes: a random number generator determining shared value [r] obtained by performing secret sharing of random number r; a randomizator using shared value [a0], . . . , [aM?1] obtained by performing secret sharing of value a0, . . . , aM?1 and shared value [r] to generate randomized shared value <a0>, . . . , <aM?1> with shared values [a0], . . . , [aM?1] and [a0r], . . . , [aM?1r] as a pair; a secret computator determining concealed function value [F([a0], . . . , [aM?1])] by executing function F including at least one secret operation while including randomized shared value <fi> of an operation target and an operation result depending on contents of secret operation into checksum C:=<f0>, . . . , <f??1>; and a correctness prover verifying correctness of function value [F([a0], . . .

Abstract: Determination as to whether a nondecreasing sequence exists or not is efficiently made. A sorting part sorts elements of a set Pi in ascending order to generate vectors ti,i+1 and A merging part generates vectors t0,m and b0,m by repeating the process of merging vectors (ti,j, bi,j) and (ti,k, bi,k) to generate (ti,k, bi,k). A stable-sorting part generates a vector e by coupling and stably sorting vectors bi,j and ti,k. A searching part searches for sets of (?, x, y) in which e[?] is bi j[x] and e[?+1] is ti,k[y] and generates a set ? including all x and a set Y including all y. An extracting part sorts ti,j[x] (x?X) in ascending order to generate a vector ti,k and sorts bj,k[y] (y?Y) in ascending order to generate a vector bi,k. If the length of a vector t0,m is 0, a determining part outputs a result of determination that indicates the absence of a nondecreasing sequence.

Abstract: The positions in a text in which partial character strings in a pattern appear are efficiently detected. A partial-character-string position detecting device 1 takes inputs of a secret text [t] of a text t, a secrete text <p> of a pattern p, a secret text <c> of a vector c, and a secret text <E> of a matrix E and outputs a secret text <H> of a matrix H. A first matrix generating part 20 generates a secret text <F> of a matrix F, in which F[i][j]=E[i][j+i mod n+1] (where it is assumed that E[i][n]=c[i]). A second matrix generating part 30 generates a secret text <F?> of a matrix F?, in which F[i][j]=1 is set if c[i]=0 or if c[i]=1 and F[k][j]=1 for every k that is successively c[k]=1, otherwise F[i][j]=0 is set, where k=i, . . . , n?1. A third matrix generating part 40 computes <H[i][j]>=<F[i][j?i mod n+1]><c[i]>> to generate the secrete text <H>.

Abstract: A reactor includes: a reaction-side flow passage through which a fluid as a reaction object flows; and a catalyst structure provided in the reaction-side flow passage. The catalyst structure includes: a body part formed in a raised and depressed plate shape to partition the reaction-side flow passage into a plurality of flow passages disposed side by side in a direction perpendicular to a flow direction of the fluid; a catalyst carried on the body part to promote a reaction of the fluid; and one or more communication holes (grooves) to make the plurality of flow passages partitioned by the body part communicate with each other.

Abstract: A reactor includes a reaction-side flow passage through which a reaction fluid being a fluid constituting a reaction object flows; a temperature controller (heat-medium side flow passage) configured to heat or cool the reaction fluid from outside the reaction-side flow passage; and a catalyst configured to promote a reaction of the reaction fluid, the catalyst provided in the reaction-side flow passage so that a contact area with the reaction fluid is larger on a downstream side than on an upstream side in the reaction-side flow passage.

Abstract: A secret sharing system transforms shares in ramp secret sharing to shares in homomorphic secret sharing. On a data distribution apparatus, a division part divides information a into N shares fa(n) using an arbitrary ramp secret sharing scheme S1. On each of distributed data transform apparatuses, a random number selecting part generates a random number vector ri whose elements are L random numbers ri1. A first random number division part divides the random number vector into N shares fri(n) using a ramp secret sharing scheme S1. A second random number division part divides each of the L random numbers ri1 into N shares gri,1(n) using an arbitrary secret sharing scheme S2. A disturbance part generates a share Ui by using a share fa(i) and shares fr?(i). A reconstruction part reconstructs L pieces of disturbance information c1 from shares U? by using the ramp secret sharing scheme S1.