Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: A processor for supporting secure memory intent is disclosed. The processor of the disclosure includes a memory execution unit to access memory and a processor core coupled to the memory execution unit. The processor core is to receive a request to access a convertible page of the memory. In response to the request, the processor core to determine an intent for the convertible page in view of a page table entry (PTE) corresponding to the convertible page. The intent indicates whether the convertible page is to be accessed as at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page.

Abstract: Example methods and systems are directed to reducing latency in providing trusted execution environments (TEEs). Initializing a TEE includes multiple steps before the TEE starts executing. Besides workload-specific initialization, workload-independent initialization is performed, such as adding memory to the TEE. In function-as-a-service (FaaS) environments, a large portion of the TEE is workload-independent, and thus can be performed prior to receiving the workload. Certain steps performed during TEE initialization are identical for certain classes of workloads. Thus, the common parts of the TEE initialization sequence may be performed before the TEE is requested. When a TEE is requested for a workload in the class and the parts to specialize the TEE for its particular purpose are known, the final steps to initialize the TEE are performed.

Abstract: Secure memory allocation technologies are described. A processor includes a processor core and a memory controller that is coupled between the processor core and main memory. The main memory comprises a protected region including secured pages. The processor, in response to a content copy instruction, is to initialize a target page in the protected region of an application address space. The processor, in response to the content copy instruction, is also to select content of a source page in the protected region to be copied. The processor, in response to the content copy instruction, is also to copy the selected content to the target page in the protected region of the application address space.

Abstract: A processor for supporting secure memory intent is disclosed. The processor of the disclosure includes a memory execution unit to access memory and a processor core coupled to the memory execution unit. The processor core is to receive a request to access a convertible page of the memory. In response to the request, the processor core to determine an intent for the convertible page in view of a page table entry (PTE) corresponding to the convertible page. The intent indicates whether the convertible page is to be accessed as at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: Secure memory repartitioning technologies are described. Embodiments of the disclosure may include a processing device including a processor core and a memory controller coupled between the processor core and a memory device. The memory device includes a memory range including a section of convertible pages that are convertible to secure pages or non-secure pages. The processor core is to receive a non-secure access request to a page in the memory device, responsive to a determination, based on one or more secure state bits in one or more secure state bit arrays, that the page is a secure page, insert an abort page address into a translation lookaside buffer, and responsive to a determination, based on the one or more secure state bits in the one or more secure state bit arrays, that the page is a non-secure page, insert the page into the translation lookaside buffer.

Abstract: A processor for supporting secure memory intent is disclosed. The processor of the disclosure includes a memory execution unit to access memory and a processor core coupled to the memory execution unit. The processor core is to receive a request to access a convertible page of the memory. In response to the request, the processor core to determine an intent for the convertible page in view of a page table entry (PTE) corresponding to the convertible page. The intent indicates whether the convertible page is to be accessed as at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: A processor includes a cryptographic engine to control access, using an secure region key identifier (ID), to one or more memory range of memory allocable for flexible conversion to secure pages of architecturally-protected memory regions, and a processor core. The processor core is to, responsive to receipt of a request to access the memory, perform a walk of page tables and extended page tables to translate a linear address of the request to a physical address of the memory. The processor core is further to determine that the physical address corresponds to an secure page within the one or more memory range of the memory, that a first key ID located within the physical address does not match the secure region key ID, and issue a page fault and deny access to the secure page in the memory.

Abstract: Example methods and systems are directed to reducing latency in providing trusted execution environments (TEES). Initializing a TEE includes multiple steps before the TEE starts executing. Besides workload-specific initialization, workload-independent initialization is performed, such as adding memory to the TEE. In function-as-a-service (FaaS) environments, a large portion of the TEE is workload-independent, and thus can be performed prior to receiving the workload. Certain steps performed during TEE initialization are identical for certain classes of workloads. Thus, the common parts of the TEE initialization sequence may be performed before the TEE is requested. When a TEE is requested for a workload in the class and the parts to specialize the TEE for its particular purpose are known, the final steps to initialize the TEE are performed.

Abstract: A processor includes a cryptographic engine to control access, using an secure region key identifier (ID), to one or more memory range of memory allocable for flexible conversion to secure pages of architecturally-protected memory regions, and a processor core. The processor core is to, responsive to receipt of a request to access the memory, perform a walk of page tables and extended page tables to translate a linear address of the request to a physical address of the memory. The processor core is further to determine that the physical address corresponds to an secure page within the one or more memory range of the memory, that a first key ID located within the physical address does not match the secure region key ID, and issue a page fault and deny access to the secure page in the memory.

Abstract: A processor for supporting secure memory intent is disclosed. The processor of the disclosure includes a memory execution unit to access memory and a processor core coupled to the memory execution unit. The processor core is to receive a request to access a convertible page of the memory. In response to the request, the processor core to determine an intent for the convertible page in view of a page table entry (PTE) corresponding to the convertible page. The intent indicates whether the convertible page is to be accessed as at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page.

Abstract: Secure memory allocation technologies are described. A processor includes a processor core and a memory controller that is coupled between the processor core and main memory. The main memory comprises a protected region including secured pages. The processor, in response to a content copy instruction, is to initialize a target page in the protected region of an application address space. The processor, in response to the content copy instruction, is also to select content of a source page in the protected region to be copied. The processor, in response to the content copy instruction, is also to copy the selected content to the target page in the protected region of the application address space.

Abstract: Secure memory repartitioning technologies are described. Embodiments of the disclosure may include a processing device including a processor core and a memory controller coupled between the processor core and a memory device. The memory device includes a memory range including a section of convertible pages that are convertible to secure pages or non-secure pages. The processor core is to receive a non-secure access request to a page in the memory device, responsive to a determination, based on one or more secure state bits in one or more secure state bit arrays, that the page is a secure page, insert an abort page address into a translation lookaside buffer, and responsive to a determination, based on the one or more secure state bits in the one or more secure state bit arrays, that the page is a non-secure page, insert the page into the translation lookaside buffer.

Abstract: Apparatuses, methods and storage medium associated with application execution enclave memory page cache management, are disclosed herein. In embodiments, an apparatus may include a processor with processor supports for application execution enclaves; memory organized into a plurality of host physical memory pages; and a virtual machine monitor to be operated by the processor to manage operation of virtual machines. Management of operation of the virtual machines may include facilitation of mapping of virtual machine-physical memory pages of the virtual machines to the host physical memory pages, including maintenance of an unallocated subset of the host physical memory pages to receive increased security protection for selective allocation to the virtual machines, for virtualization and selective allocation to application execution enclaves of applications of the virtual machines. Other embodiments may be described and/or claimed.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: Secure memory repartitioning technologies are described. Embodiments of the disclosure may include a processing device including a processing core and a memory controller coupled between the processor core and a memory device. The memory device includes a memory range including a section of convertible pages that are convertible to secure pages or non-secure pages. The processor core is to receive a non-secure access request to a page in the memory device, responsive to a determination, based on one or more secure state bits in one or more secure state bit arrays, that the page is a secure page, insert an abort page address into a translation lookaside buffer, and responsive to a determination, based on the one or more secure state bits in the one or more secure state bit arrays, that the page is a non-secure page, insert the page into the translation lookaside buffer.

Abstract: Technologies for software attack detection include a computing device with a processor and a memory external to the processor. The processor originates a memory transaction with an associated secure enclave status bit that indicates whether the memory transaction originated in a secure execution mode, such as from a secure enclave. The processor computes an error-correcting code (ECC) based as a function of memory transaction data and the secure enclave status bit, and performs the memory transaction based on the ECC and the memory transaction data using the memory of the computing device. The processor may store the ECC and the memory transaction data to memory. The processor may load a stored ECC and data from the memory and compare the computed ECC to the stored ECC to detect memory transactions with an invalid secure enclave status bit. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Secure memory allocation technologies are described. A processor includes a processor core and a memory controller that is coupled between the processor core and main memory. The main memory comprises a protected region including secured pages. The processor, in response to a content copy instruction, is to initialize a target page in the protected region of an application address space. The processor, in response to the content copy instruction, is also to select content of a source page in the protected region to be copied. The processor, in response to the content copy instruction, is also to copy the selected content to the target page in the protected region of the application address space.