Abstract: A system and method of reducing the power consumption of a connected Bluetooth LE peripheral device is disclosed. Rather than responding to every packet transmitted from the central device, the peripheral device judiciously responds, sending a response in those situations where a response is required by the central device. In this way, the peripheral device is able to conserve battery life by not responding to most of the empty packets that are transmitted by the central device. The peripheral device also includes mechanisms to ensure that the connection is not terminated by the central device due to a lack of response from the peripheral device.

Abstract: A system and method for transferring Bluetooth synchronization from a first Bluetooth device to a second Bluetooth device is disclosed. The first Bluetooth device may already be connected to a remote Bluetooth device. The method includes synchronizing time between the first Bluetooth device and a second Bluetooth device. After time has been synchronized, all relevant information concerning the connection is transmitted to the second Bluetooth. This may be done using an out of band network, such as UART, SPI, Ethernet, or a different wireless network. Once the first Bluetooth device has emptied its transmit queue, it may transfer communication responsibility to the second Bluetooth device.

Abstract: A system and method for efficiently modifying the parameters of a Periodic Advertisement (PA) or Periodic Advertisement with Response (PAwR) train are disclosed. Rather than forcing all of the listening devices to reacquire synchronization to the new PAwR train, the periodic advertiser transmits the parameters associated with the new or revised train in the periodic advertisements of the existing train. The listening devices receive the new parameters and update their timers accordingly such that they exit low power mode in time to receive the periodic advertisement on the new or revised train. In some embodiments, the periodic advertiser generates a new train, while in other embodiments, the periodic advertiser changes the parameters associated with the PA or PAwR train without creating a new train.

Abstract: A system and method for transferring Bluetooth synchronization from a first Bluetooth device to a second Bluetooth device is disclosed. The first Bluetooth device may already be connected to a remote Bluetooth device. The method includes synchronizing time between the first Bluetooth device and a second Bluetooth device. After time has been synchronized, all relevant information concerning the connection is transmitted to the second Bluetooth. This may be done using an out of band network, such as UART, SPI, Ethernet, or a different wireless network. Once the first Bluetooth device has emptied its transmit queue, it may transfer communication responsibility to the second Bluetooth device.

Abstract: Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.

Abstract: Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.

Abstract: Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.

Abstract: Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.

Abstract: Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.

Abstract: Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.