Abstract: Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks are mitigated by a CSRF mechanism executing at a computing entity. The CSRF mechanism is operative to analyze information associated with an HTTP request for a resource. The HTTP request typically originates as an HTTP redirect from another computing entity, such as an enterprise Web portal. Depending on the nature of the information associated with the HTTP request, the HTTP request may be rejected because the CSRF mechanism determines that the request is or is likely associated with a CSRF attack. To facilitate this determination, the approach leverages a new type of “referer” attribute, a trustedReferer, which indicates that the request originates from a server that has previously established a trust relationship with the site at which the CSRF mechanism executes. The trustedReferer attribute typically is set by the redirecting entity, and in an HTTP request header field dedicated for that attribute.

Abstract: A new management node associated with a new rack sends at least a public key of the new management node to a first management node associated with a first rack and a plurality of autonomous management nodes. The first management node sends the new management node an access token trusted by at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes and a set of public keys corresponding to at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes. The new management node can send its public key and the access token to at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes. In response, the new management node can establish a mutual trust relationship with at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes.

Abstract: A construct having a plurality of distributed resources can include a portion of a second rack having a plurality of computing devices controlled by a second management node. The second management node can determine it contains insufficient construct data such as user data, group data, resource data, or authorization policy data to execute an operation associated with the construct. The second management node can synchronize at least a portion of construct data with a first management node. The first management node can be associated with the construct and a mutual trust relationship can exist between the first management node and the second management node. The first management node and the second management node can comprise autonomous management nodes capable of functioning independent of the network.

Abstract: A new management node associated with a new rack sends at least a public key of the new management node to a first management node associated with a first rack and a plurality of autonomous management nodes. The first management node sends the new management node an access token trusted by at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes and a set of public keys corresponding to at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes. The new management node can send its public key and the access token to at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes. In response, the new management node can establish a mutual trust relationship with at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes.

Abstract: A new management node associated with a new rack sends at least a public key of the new management node to a first management node associated with a first rack and a plurality of autonomous management nodes. The first management node sends the new management node an access token trusted by at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes and a set of public keys corresponding to at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes. The new management node can send its public key and the access token to at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes. In response, the new management node can establish a mutual trust relationship with at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes.

Abstract: A first management node of a first rack can be registered to a shared file storage system by establishing a mutual trust relationship between the first management node and the shared file storage system. The first management node can access a plurality of respective public keys and a plurality of respective certificates of authority that are stored in the shared file storage system and associated with a plurality of respective registered management nodes. The first management node can store a public key and a certificate of authority in the shared file storage system. The first management node can form mutual trust relationships with other registered management nodes. The first management node can validate authenticity of messages received from registered management nodes of the plurality of registered management nodes using a respective public key and a respective certificate of authority associated with a respective registered management node sending a message.

Abstract: A new management node associated with a new rack sends at least a public key of the new management node to a first management node associated with a first rack and a plurality of autonomous management nodes. The first management node sends the new management node an access token trusted by at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes and a set of public keys corresponding to at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes. The new management node can send its public key and the access token to at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes. In response, the new management node can establish a mutual trust relationship with at least a portion of the plurality of autonomous management nodes.

Abstract: Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks are mitigated by a CSRF mechanism executing at a computing entity. The CSRF mechanism is operative to analyze information associated with an HTTP request for a resource. The HTTP request typically originates as an HTTP redirect from another computing entity, such as an enterprise Web portal. Depending on the nature of the information associated with the HTTP request, the HTTP request may be rejected because the CSRF mechanism determines that the request is or is likely associated with a CSRF attack. To facilitate this determination, the approach leverages a new type of “referer” attribute, a trustedReferer, which indicates that the request originates from a server that has previously established a trust relationship with the site at which the CSRF mechanism executes. The trustedReferer attribute typically is set by the redirecting entity, and in an HTTP request header field dedicated for that attribute.

Abstract: A first management node of a first rack can be registered to a shared file storage system by establishing a mutual trust relationship between the first management node and the shared file storage system. The first management node can access a plurality of respective public keys and a plurality of respective certificates of authority that are stored in the shared file storage system and associated with a plurality of respective registered management nodes. The first management node can store a public key and a certificate of authority in the shared file storage system. The first management node can form mutual trust relationships with other registered management nodes. The first management node can validate authenticity of messages received from registered management nodes of the plurality of registered management nodes using a respective public key and a respective certificate of authority associated with a respective registered management node sending a message.

Abstract: A construct having a plurality of distributed resources can include a portion of a second rack having a plurality of computing devices controlled by a second management node. The second management node can determine it contains insufficient construct data such as user data, group data, resource data, or authorization policy data to execute an operation associated with the construct. The second management node can synchronize at least a portion of construct data with a first management node. The first management node can be associated with the construct and a mutual trust relationship can exist between the first management node and the second management node. The first management node and the second management node can comprise autonomous management nodes capable of functioning independent of the network.

Abstract: A computer-implemented method for processing service requests in a distributed environment includes routing a type of service request to a first service provider in the distributed environment, the first service provider having a commitment level for handling the service request type, detecting a second service provider in the distributed environment capable of handing the service request type, determining a commitment level of the second service provider to handle the service request type, and responsive to the commitment level of the second provider exceeding the commitment level of the first provider, routing the service request type to the second service provider.

Abstract: A computer-implemented method for processing service requests in a distributed environment includes routing a type of service request to a first service provider in the distributed environment, the first service provider having a commitment level for handling the service request type, detecting a second service provider in the distributed environment capable of handing the service request type, determining a commitment level of the second service provider to handle the service request type, and responsive to the commitment level of the second provider exceeding the commitment level of the first provider, routing the service request type to the second service provider.