Abstract: Systems and methods utilize one or more 3D cameras (e.g., ToF cameras) in industrial safety applications. The 3D camera generates a depth map that may be used by external hardware and software to classify objects in a workcell and generate control signals for machinery. To facilitate sensor-specific calibration and coordination among sensors in a workcell, the sensors may store calibration data in a boot file that is loaded upon start-up. During initialization, the calibration data is loaded and, as the sensor operates, corrections are made to sensed data (e.g., pixel depth values) using the calibration data.

Abstract: Systems and methods utilize one or more 3D cameras (e.g., ToF cameras) in industrial safety applications. The 3D camera generates a depth map that may be used by external hardware and software to classify objects in a workcell and generate control signals for machinery. To facilitate sensor-specific calibration and coordination among sensors in a workcell, the sensors may store calibration data in a boot file that is loaded upon start-up. During initialization, the calibration data is loaded and, as the sensor operates, corrections are made to sensed data (e.g., pixel depth values) using the calibration data.

Abstract: In various embodiments, systems and methods for acquiring depth images utilize an architecture suited to safety-rated applications, and may include more than sensor (such as time-of-flight sensors) operating along different optical paths and a comparison module for ensuring proper sensor operation. Error metrics may be associated with pixel-level depth values for purposes of allowing safe control based on imperfectly known depths.

Abstract: An image processing system includes at least two three-dimensional sensors and a controller. Each of the sensors being for illuminating a corresponding field of view of the sensor, and generating an output array of pixelwise values indicative of distances to illuminated objects in the field of view, each sensor being configured to generate illumination at least at two different frequencies so that objects in the corresponding field of view are illuminated at the two different frequencies. The controller is communicably connected to the at least two sensors to receive pixelwise data from each sensor embodying intensity and distance information from the illuminated objects. The controller is configured to disambiguate a distance to each of the illuminated objects, resolve error in the received pixelwise data due to periodic distance ambiguity, and determine corrected pixelwise values indicative of true distance via each sensor illumination at the at least two different frequencies.

Abstract: This Application regards a system for continuously monitoring a workcell during operation of industrial machinery. The system includes a safety system, a monitoring system, and a controller. The safety system includes a sensor and supporting software or hardware for acquiring image data associated with the workcell. The monitoring system is for detecting a parameter value associated with the safety system. And the controller is configured to determine whether the image data is valid based at least in part on the detected parameter value, and cause an alert to be issued responsive to determining that the image data is invalid.

Abstract: Systems and methods for continuously monitoring a workcell during operation of industrial machinery are disclosed. The system may comprise a safety system that includes at least one sensor and supporting software and/or hardware for acquiring image data associated with the workcell; a monitoring system for detecting a parameter value associated with the safety system; and a controller configured to determine a status of the safety system based at least in part on the detected parameter value and cause an alert to be issued if the status of the safety system does not satisfy a target objective.

Abstract: Crosstalk mitigation among cameras in neighboring monitored workcells is achieved by computationally defining a noninterference scheme that respects the independent monitoring and operation of each workcell. The scheme may involve communication between adjacent cells to adjudicate non-interfering camera operation or system-wide mapping of interference risks and mitigation thereof. Mitigation strategies can involve spread-spectrum techniques.

Abstract: Crosstalk mitigation among cameras in neighboring monitored workcells is achieved by computationally defining a noninterference scheme that respects the independent monitoring and operation of each workcell. The scheme may involve communication between adjacent cells to adjudicate non-interfering camera operation or system-wide mapping of interference risks and mitigation thereof. Mitigation strategies can involve time-division and/or frequency-division multiplexing.

Abstract: Control systems for industrial machinery (e.g., robots) or other devices such as medical devices utilize a safety processor (SP) designed for integration into safety applications and computational components that are not necessarily safety-rated. The SP monitors performance of the non-safety computational components, including latency checks and verification of identical outputs. One or more sensors send data to the non-safety computational components for sophisticated processing and analysis that the SP cannot not perform, but the results of this processing are sent to the SP, which then generates safety-rated signals to the machinery or device being controlled by the SP. As a result, the system may qualify for a safety rating despite the ability to perform complex operations beyond the scope of safety-rated components.

Abstract: Control systems for industrial machinery (e.g., robots) or other devices such as medical devices utilize a safety processor (SP) designed for integration into safety applications and computational components that are not necessarily safety-rated. The SP monitors performance of the non-safety computational components, including latency checks and verification of identical outputs. One or more sensors send data to the non-safety computational components for sophisticated processing and analysis that the SP cannot not perform, but the results of this processing are sent to the SP, which then generates safety-rated signals to the machinery or device being controlled by the SP. As a result, the system may qualify for a safety rating despite the ability to perform complex operations beyond the scope of safety-rated components.

Abstract: Crosstalk mitigation among cameras in neighboring monitored workcells is achieved by computationally defining a noninterference scheme that respects the independent monitoring and operation of each workcell. The scheme may involve communication between adjacent cells to adjudicate non-interfering camera operation or system-wide mapping of interference risks and mitigation thereof. Mitigation strategies can involve time-division and/or frequency-division multiplexing.

Abstract: Crosstalk mitigation among cameras in neighboring monitored workcells is achieved by computationally defining a noninterference scheme that respects the independent monitoring and operation of each workcell. The scheme may involve communication between adjacent cells to adjudicate non-interfering camera operation or system-wide mapping of interference risks and mitigation thereof. Mitigation strategies can involve time-division and/or frequency-division multiplexing.

Abstract: Control systems for industrial machinery (e.g., robots) or other devices such as medical devices utilize a safety processor (SP) designed for integration into safety applications and computational components that are not necessarily safety-rated. The SP monitors performance of the non-safety computational components, including latency checks and verification of identical outputs. One or more sensors send data to the non-safety computational components for sophisticated processing and analysis that the SP cannot not perform, but the results of this processing are sent to the SP, which then generates safety-rated signals to the machinery or device being controlled by the SP. As a result, the system may qualify for a safety rating despite the ability to perform complex operations beyond the scope of safety-rated components.

Abstract: Control systems for industrial machinery (e.g., robots) or other devices such as medical devices utilize a safety processor (SP) designed for integration into safety applications and computational components that are not necessarily safety-rated. The SP monitors performance of the non-safety computational components, including latency checks and verification of identical outputs. One or more sensors send data to the non-safety computational components for sophisticated processing and analysis that the SP cannot not perform, but the results of this processing are sent to the SP, which then generates safety-rated signals to the machinery or device being controlled by the SP. As a result, the system may qualify for a safety rating despite the ability to perform complex operations beyond the scope of safety-rated components.

Abstract: Crosstalk mitigation among cameras in neighboring monitored workcells is achieved by computationally defining a noninterference scheme that respects the independent monitoring and operation of each workcell. The scheme may involve communication between adjacent cells to adjudicate non-interfering camera operation or system-wide mapping of interference risks and mitigation thereof. Mitigation strategies can involve time-division and/or frequency-division multiplexing.

Abstract: Systems and methods utilize one or more 3D cameras (e.g., ToF cameras) in industrial safety applications. The 3D camera generates a depth map that may be used by external hardware and software to classify objects in a workcell and generate control signals for machinery. To facilitate sensor-specific calibration and coordination among sensors in a workcell, the sensors may store calibration data in a boot file that is loaded upon start-up. During initialization, the calibration data is loaded and, as the sensor operates, corrections are made to sensed data (e.g., pixel depth values) using the calibration data.

Abstract: Systems and methods for continuously monitoring a workcell during operation of industrial machinery are disclosed. The system may comprise a safety system that includes at least one sensor and supporting software and/or hardware for acquiring image data associated with the workcell; a monitoring system for detecting a parameter value associated with the safety system; and a controller configured to determine a status of the safety system based at least in part on the detected parameter value and cause an alert to be issued if the status of the safety system does not satisfy a target objective.

Abstract: In various embodiments, systems and methods for acquiring depth images utilize an architecture suited to safety-rated applications, and may include more than sensor (such as time-of-flight sensors) operating along different optical paths and a comparison module for ensuring proper sensor operation. Error metrics may be associated with pixel-level depth values for purposes of allowing safe control based on imperfectly known depths.

Abstract: In various embodiments, systems and methods for acquiring depth images utilize an architecture suited to safety-rated applications, and may include more than sensor (such as time-of-flight sensors) operating along different optical paths and a comparison module for ensuring proper sensor operation. Error metrics may be associated with pixel-level depth values for purposes of allowing safe control based on imperfectly known depths.

Abstract: Systems and methods for calibrating a sensor array for 3D depth sensing include the steps of providing multiple 3D sensors each for (i) illuminating a field of view of the sensor and (ii) generating an output array of pixelwise values indicative of distances to objects within the illuminated a field of view; sequentially causing each of the 3D sensors to generate an output array while other 3D sensors are illuminating their fields of view; and creating an interference matrix from the generated output arrays, the interference matrix indicating, for each of the 3D sensors, a degree of interference by other 3D sensors simultaneously active therewith.