Abstract: Described herein is a secure integrated storage and analysis solution for personal genomic applications. The method guarantees data privacy whilst enabling access and ongoing analysis of genomic data when required. Described is a computer implemented homomorphic encryption method for securely producing natively encrypted sequencing data in a way that allows subsequent analysis on the encrypted data without requiring the file to be decrypted.

Abstract: The invention relates to a method for generating a session key between two communicating electronic devices not requiring any prerecorded information in one of the two devices and enabling the authentication of one of said devices. The method uses a close collaboration between a symmetrical algorithm and an asymmetrical algorithm.

Abstract: An aim of this invention is to eliminate the risks of aggression “DPA of the n order” attacks, for all n values, of cryptography electronic assemblies or systems with a secret or private key. The process according to this invention concerns a securing process for an electronic system using a cryptographic calculation procedure using a secret key. The process consists of masking intermediate results in input or output of at least one critical function for the said procedure.

Abstract: The invention relates to a method for generating a session key between two communicating electronic devices not requiring any prerecorded information in one of the two devices and enabling the authentication of one of said devices. The method uses a close collaboration between a symmetrical algorithm and an asymmetrical algorithm.

Abstract: The method according to this invention concerns a method for automatically generating cryptographic algorithms with optional supplementary data, said algorithms comprising two different zones: external algorithm secrecy zone, in external parts of the algorithm exposed to side-channel analysis, and an internal purely cryptographic zone that is not exposed to side-channel analysis, such that in the algorithm secrecy zone, the code of the algorithm is locally made of random (or pseudo-random) and independent sequences of instructions and/or table-lookups chosen from some fixed set of instructions and random constants, with some fixed prescribed probability distribution, and such that the internal cryptographic security zone can be any cryptographic algorithm or method that handles algorithmic security only and does not have to be protected against side-channel attacks.

Abstract: The invention concerns a method to secure an electronic assembly implementing any algorithm against attacks by error introduction. The method according to the invention consists in performing an additional calculation using a verification function on at least one intermediate result in order to obtain a calculation signature and in performing a least once more all or part of the calculation in order to recalculate said signature and compare them in order to detect a possible error.

Abstract: An aim of this invention is to eliminate the risks of aggression “DPA of the n order” attacks, for all n values, of cryptography electronic assemblies or systems with a secret or private key. The process according to this invention concerns a securing process for an electronic system using a cryptographic calculation procedure using a secret key. The process consists of masking intermediate results in input or output of at least one critical function for the said procedure.

Abstract: The invention concerns an automatic method to secure an electronic calculation assembly against attacks by error introduction or by radiation. The following are used: 1) Static information generated by the automatic process; 2) A dynamic part of the memory of the electronic system allocated by the automatic process; 3) Beacons and check points to mark out the code, introduced by the automatic process; 4) Beacon functions storing information in the dynamic memory; 5) History verification functions using the static information and the dynamic memory to check that no errors have been introduced.

Abstract: The invention concerns a method to secure an electronic assembly implementing any algorithm against attacks by error introduction. The method according to the invention consists in performing an additional calculation using a verification function on at least one intermediate result in order to obtain a calculation signature and in performing a least once more all or part of the calculation in order to recalculate said signature and compare them in order to detect a possible error.

Abstract: The method according to this invention concerns a method for automatically generating cryptographic algorithms with optional supplementary data, said algorithms comprising two different zones: external algorithm secrecy zone, in external parts of the algorithm exposed to side-channel analysis, and an internal purely cryptographic zone that is not exposed to side-channel analysis, such that in the algorithm secrecy zone, the code of the algorithm is locally made of random (or pseudo-random) and independent sequences of instructions and/or table-lookups chosen from some fixed set of instructions and random constants, with some fixed prescribed probability distribution, and such that the internal cryptographic security zone can be any cryptographic algorithm or method that handles algorithmic security only and does not have to be protected against side-channel attacks.

Abstract: The invention relates to security for computer systems and a method for protecting computer systems, particularly those employing an encryption for the protection of sensitive information. A cryptographic algorithm is implemented in the protected system using Boolean operations and arithmetic operations wherein at least one variable is separated into several parts, in a Boolean separation using a Boolean operation, and in an arithmetic separation using an arithmetic operation. In order to switch from one of the operations to the other, a predetermined number of Boolean and arithmetic operations is performed on the parts and at least one random number, so that for each of the values appearing during the operation, there is no correlation with the variable.

Abstract: The invention concerns an automatic method to secure an electronic calculation assembly against attacks by error introduction or by radiation. The following are used: 1) Static information generated by the automatic process; 2) A dynamic part of the memory of the electronic system allocated by the automatic process; 3) Beacons and check points to mark out the code, introduced by the automatic process; 4) Beacon functions storing information in the dynamic memory; 5) History verification functions using the static information and the dynamic memory to check that no errors have been introduced.

Abstract: The invention provides for a cryptographic method for digital signature. A set S1 of k polynomial functions Pk(x1, . . . , xn+v, y1, . . . , yk) are supplied as a public key, where k, v, and n are integers, x1, . . . , xn+v are n+v variables of a first type, and y1, . . . , yk are k variables of a second type, the set S1 being obtained by applying a secret key operation on a given set S2 of k polynomial functions P?k(a1, . . . , an+v, y1, . . . , yk), a1, . . . , an+v designating n+v variables including a set of n “oil” and v “vinegar” variables. A message to be signed is provided and submitted to a hash function to produce a series of k values b1, . . . , bk. These k values are substituted for the k variables y1, . . . . , yk of the set S2 to produce a set S3 of k polynomial functions P?k(a1, . . . , an+v), and v values a?n+1, . . . , a?n+1, are selected for the v “vinegar” variables. A set of equations P?k(a1, . . . , a?n+v)=0 is solved to obtain a solution for a?1, . . .

Abstract: The invention relates to a method for protecting one or more computer systems using the same secret key (Ks) cryptographic algorithm, characterized in that the way in which said calculation is performed depends, for each computer system and for each secret key, on secret data (Ds) stored in a secret area of the computer system or systems.

Abstract: The invention concerns a method for protecting an electronic system implementing a cryptographic calculation process involving a modular exponentiation of a quantity (x), said modular exponentiation using a secret exponent (d), characterized in that said secret exponent is broken down into a plurality of k unpredictable values (d1, d2, . . . , dk), the sum of which is equal to said secret exponent.

Abstract: The invention concerns a method for securing a computer system implementing a cryptographic algorithm using Boolean operations and arithmetic operations wherein at least one variable is separated into several parts, in a Boolean separation using a Boolean operation, and in an arithmetic separation using an arithmetic operation, characterized in that, in order to switch from one of these operations to the other, a predetermined number of Boolean and arithmetic operations is performed on said parts and at least one random number, so that for each of the values appearing during the calculation, there is no correlation with said variable.

Abstract: The invention relates to a secret-key cryptographic calculation process for protecting a computer system against physical attacks, wherein a) the standard cryptographic calculation process is separated into several distinct, parallel process parts using partial intermediate results distinct from those of the standard calculation, and b) the final value of the standard cryptographic calculation is reconstructed from the distinct partial intermediate results. The invention is particularly applicable to computer systems such as embedded systems such as a smart card.