Abstract: Provided herein are methods for manufacturing T cells. In certain embodiments, methods for manufacturing T cells which express a cell surface receptor that recognizes a specific antigenic moiety on the surface of a target cell are provided. Also provided herein are populations of engineered T cells produced by the methods described herein and pharmaceutical compositions thereof.

Abstract: The disclosure relates to compositions for altering the color of keratin fibers and methods of using the compositions. The compositions comprise (a) a bonding system comprising (i) at least one first bonding agent chosen from alpha-hydroxy acids comprising at least three hydrogen donor carboxyl groups and/or salts thereof; (ii) at least one second bonding agent chosen from glycine and/or salts thereof; and (iii) optionally, at least one third bonding agent chosen from amino sulfonic acids and/or salts thereof; (b) at least one fatty alcohol; (c) at least one fatty acid; (d) at least one alkyl polyglucoside; (e) at least one alkalizing agent; and (f) at least one solvent. The compositions can further comprise one or more oxidation dyes, couplers, oxidizing agents, or combinations thereof.

Abstract: An authentication device is provided that authenticates an electronic device based on the responses from distinct types of physically unclonable functions. The authentication device receives a device identifier associated with the electronic device. It then sends one or more challenges to the electronic device. In response, the authentication device receives one or more responses from the electronic device, the one or more responses including characteristic information generated from two or more distinct types of physically unclonable functions in the electronic device.

Abstract: One feature pertains to generating a unique identifier for an electronic device by combining static random access memory (SRAM) PUFs and circuit delay based PUFs (e.g., ring oscillator (RO) PUFs, arbiter PUFs, etc.). The circuit delay based PUFs may be used to conceal either a challenge to, and/or response from, the SRAM PUFs, thereby inhibiting an attacker from being able to clone a memory device's response.

Abstract: One feature pertains to a method for extracting a secret key during a secure boot flow of an integrated circuit. Specifically, the secure boot flow includes powering ON a first volatile memory circuit to generate a plurality of initial logical state values, deriving secret data based on the plurality of initial logical state values, storing the secret data in a secure volatile memory circuit that is secured by a secure execution environment (SEE), clearing the plurality of initial logical state values in the first volatile memory circuit, executing a cryptographic algorithm at the SEE to extract a secret key based on the secret data, and storing the secret key in the secure volatile memory circuit. The secure boot flow controls access to the first volatile memory circuit to secure the secret data and the plurality of initial logical state values from the insecure applications.

Abstract: A method includes coupling a first magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) element and a second MTJ element to a comparison circuit. The method also includes comparing, at the comparison circuit, a first resistance of the first MTJ element to a second resistance of the second MTJ element. The method further includes generating a first physical unclonable function (PUF) output bit based on a result of comparing the first resistance to the second resistance.

Abstract: A method is provided for using obtaining a reproducible device identifier from a physically unclonable function. An authentication device may receive a first physically unclonable function (PUF) dataset from the electronic device, the first PUF dataset including characteristic information generated from a physically unclonable function in the electronic device. The authentication device may then identify a pre-stored PUF dataset corresponding to the electronic device. Authentication of the electronic device may be performed by correlating the pre-stored PUF dataset and the first PUF dataset for the electronic device, wherein such correlation is based on a pattern or distribution correlation the pre-stored PUF dataset and the first PUF dataset. Because such correlation is performed on datasets, and not individual points, systematic variations can be recognized by the correlation operation leading to higher correlation than point-by-point comparisons.

Abstract: A method includes coupling a first magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) element and a second MTJ element to a comparison circuit. The method also includes comparing, at the comparison circuit, a first resistance of the first MTJ element to a second resistance of the second MTJ element. The method further includes generating a first physical unclonable function (PUF) output bit based on a result of comparing the first resistance to the second resistance.

Abstract: An authentication device is provided that authenticates an electronic device based on the responses from distinct types of physically unclonable functions. The authentication device receives a device identifier associated with the electronic device. It then sends one or more challenges to the electronic device. In response, the authentication device receives one or more responses from the electronic device, the one or more responses including characteristic information generated from two or more distinct types of physically unclonable functions in the electronic device.

Abstract: One feature pertains to a method for extracting a secret key during a secure boot flow of an integrated circuit. Specifically, the secure boot flow includes powering ON a first volatile memory circuit to generate a plurality of initial logical state values, deriving secret data based on the plurality of initial logical state values, storing the secret data in a secure volatile memory circuit that is secured by a secure execution environment (SEE), clearing the plurality of initial logical state values in the first volatile memory circuit, executing a cryptographic algorithm at the SEE to extract a secret key based on the secret data, and storing the secret key in the secure volatile memory circuit. The secure boot flow controls access to the first volatile memory circuit to secure the secret data and the plurality of initial logical state values from the insecure applications.

Abstract: A method is provided for using obtaining a reproducible device identifier from a physically unclonable function. An authentication device may receive a first physically unclonable function (PUF) dataset from the electronic device, the first PUF dataset including characteristic information generated from a physically unclonable function in the electronic device. The authentication device may then identify a pre-stored PUF dataset corresponding to the electronic device. Authentication of the electronic device may be performed by correlating the pre-stored PUF dataset and the first PUF dataset for the electronic device, wherein such correlation is based on a pattern or distribution correlation the pre-stored PUF dataset and the first PUF dataset. Because such correlation is performed on datasets, and not individual points, systematic variations can be recognized by the correlation operation leading to higher correlation than point-by-point comparisons.

Abstract: One feature pertains to generating a unique identifier for an electronic device by combining static random access memory (SRAM) PUFs and circuit delay based PUFs (e.g., ring oscillator (RO) PUFs, arbiter PUFs, etc.). The circuit delay based PUFs may be used to conceal either a challenge to, and/or response from, the SRAM PUFs, thereby inhibiting an attacker from being able to clone a memory device's response.

Abstract: The invention relates to a method of charging for services in a communications system consisting of two or more communications networks (KN1, KN2, KN3) of different network operators, and to network nodes (N3 to N5) and gateway nodes (GN1 to GN4) for such a communications network. For a connection whose establishment was initiated by a subscriber (A) of a first communications network (KN1) of the communications system, one or more services are provided by network nodes (N3 to N5) of a second communications network (KN2; KN3). Each of the network nodes (N3 to N5) of the second communications network (KN2) which provide services for the connection determines a charge (Waaa to Wccc) assigned to the service.