Abstract: A method for execution by a computing device includes determining a set of actor parties required to authorize a change of protection status of a stored resource from a protected status to an unprotected status. A minimum quorum is determined for each of the set of actor parties. A plurality of authorizations to change the protection status of the resource to the unprotected status are received from a plurality of requestors via the network. A plurality of subsets of the plurality of requestors corresponding to the set of actor parties are identified. The protection status of the resource is set to the unprotected status in response to determining, for every one of the set of actor parties, that a number of requestors in a corresponding one of the plurality of subsets is greater than or equal to the minimum quorum for the one of the set of actor parties.

Abstract: A method for execution by a computing device includes determining a set of actor parties required to authorize a change of protection status of a stored resource from a protected status to an unprotected status. A minimum quorum is determined for each of the set of actor parties. A plurality of authorizations to change the protection status of the resource to the unprotected status are received from a plurality of requestors via the network. A plurality of subsets of the plurality of requestors corresponding to the set of actor parties are identified. The protection status of the resource is set to the unprotected status in response to determining, for every one of the set of actor parties, that a number of requestors in a corresponding one of the plurality of subsets is greater than or equal to the minimum quorum for the one of the set of actor parties.

Abstract: Methods and apparatus for isolating the introduction of software defects in a dispersed storage network (DSN) are disclosed. In various embodiments, a search strategy is employed whereby after identifying a test failure in a current version of the memory software code, a sequence of interim versions of the code between the current version of the memory software code and a previous successfully tested version of the code is determined. A first version of the memory software code is selected from the sequence of interim versions (e.g., from the middle of or approximately in the middle of the sequence) and tested. When testing of the first version does not result in a test failure, a second version of the memory software code is tested, the second version selected from a sub-sequence of the sequence of interim versions between the first version of the code and the current version of the code.

Abstract: A computing device including a processor, memory, and instructions, interfaces with a key management system (KMS) that provides encryption keys using an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF). The device obtains, based on a type of encryption key being requested, a public key of a public-private key pair. The device creates an Oblivious Key Access Request (OKAR), including a blinded value associated with a requested encryption key. The OKAR is transmitted to the KMS, and a response is received. The response includes a blinded OPRF output, which yields an OPRF output as a result of being subjected to an unblinding operation. The OPRF output is validated using the public key, either directly or via a challenge, and in response to a positive validation, the OPRF output is used as a final key, or an intermediary key used to derive the final key.

Abstract: A method begins by determining, by an authenticated device of a dispersed storage network (DSN), whether an access request from a requesting device is affiliated with an anonymous user or an authenticated user. When the requesting device is affiliated with the anonymous user, the method continues by determining, by the authenticated device, status of the anonymous user where the status of the anonymous user includes one of minimal threat, non-minimal threat, and significant threat. The method continues by processing, by the authenticated device, the access request in accordance with the status of the anonymous user.

Abstract: A method for execution by one or more processing modules of one or more computing devices of a dispersed storage network (DSN), the method begins by identifying, for data stored within a DSN memory, one or more encryption keys used to encrypt data stored within the DSN memory. The method continues by identifying, for data stored within a portion of the DSN memory requiring sanitization, a master key of the one or more encryption keys that encrypts all of the data stored within the portion to be sanitized. The method continues by determining, if the master key is not used to encrypt data stored outside of the portion to be sanitized. The method continues, if the master key is not used to encrypt data stored outside of the portion to be sanitized, by sanitizing the data stored within a portion of the DSN memory by erasing the master key.

Abstract: A computing device includes an interface configured to interface and communicate with a communication system, a memory that stores operational instructions, and processing circuitry operably coupled to the interface and to the memory that is configured to execute the operational instructions to perform various operations. The computing device generates a sub-key identifier based on a data ID, which is based on unique ID value(s) associated with an encrypted data object, and a requester secret. The computing device processes the sub-key identifier in accordance with an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) blinding operation to generate a blinded input and an Oblivious Key Access Request (OKAR). The computing device transmits the OKAR to another computing device (e.g., Key Management System (KMS) service) and receives a blinded sub-key therefrom. The computing device processes the blinded sub-key in accordance with an OPRF unblinding operation to generate the key and accesses secure data thereby.

Abstract: A computing device includes an interface configured to interface and communicate with a communication system, a memory that stores operational instructions, and processing circuitry operably coupled to the interface and to the memory that is configured to execute the operational instructions to perform various operations. The computing device processes an input value (e.g., associated with a key) based on a blinding key (e.g., homomorphic encryption) to generate a blinded value and generates an Oblivious Key Access Request (OKAR). The computing device transmits the OKAR to another computing device (e.g., associated with a Key Management System (KMS) service) and receives a blinded key therefrom that is based on a Partially-Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (P-OPRF). The computing device processes the blinded key based on the blinding key (e.g., homomorphic decryption) to generate the key (e.g., associated with the input value). In some examples, the computing device accesses secure information based on the key.

Abstract: A method for execution by a computing device includes determining a set of actor parties required to authorize a change of protection status of a stored resource from a protected status to an unprotected status. A minimum quorum is determined for each of the set of actor parties. A plurality of authorizations to change the protection status of the resource to the unprotected status are received from a plurality of requestors via the network. A plurality of subsets of the plurality of requestors corresponding to the set of actor parties are identified. The protection status of the resource is set to the unprotected status in response to determining, for every one of the set of actor parties, that a number of requestors in a corresponding one of the plurality of subsets is greater than or equal to the minimum quorum for the one of the set of actor parties.

Abstract: A method for execution by a computing device includes determining a set of actor parties required to authorize a change of protection status of a stored resource from a protected status to an unprotected status. A minimum quorum is determined for each of the set of actor parties. A plurality of authorizations to change the protection status of the resource to the unprotected status are received from a plurality of requestors via the network. A plurality of subsets of the plurality of requestors corresponding to the set of actor parties are identified. The protection status of the resource is set to the unprotected status in response to determining, for every one of the set of actor parties, that a number of requestors in a corresponding one of the plurality of subsets is greater than or equal to the minimum quorum for the one of the set of actor parties.

Abstract: A computing device includes an interface configured to interface and communicate with a communication system, a memory that stores operational instructions, and processing circuitry operably coupled to the interface and to the memory that is configured to execute the operational instructions to perform various operations. The computing device processes an input value associated with a key based on a blinding key in accordance with an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) blinding operation to generate a blinded value and transmits it to another computing device (e.g., that is associated with a Key Management System (KMS) service). The computing device then receives a blinded key that is based on processing of the blinded value based on an OPRF using an OPRF secret. The computing device processes the blinded key based on the blinding key in accordance with the OPRF unblinding operation to generate the key (e.g., to be used for secure information access).

Abstract: A computing device is configured to divide an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) key to generate a plurality of N partial keys, distribute a respective one of the plurality of N partial keys to a corresponding plurality of N Key Management System (KMS) units. The computing device receives from a threshold number T of KMS units, a plurality T partial blinded keys, wherein the plurality T partial blinded keys are based on processing of a value of a blinded key received by a respective KMS unit and a corresponding stored partial key of the N partial keys, combines the plurality T of partial blinded keys into the blinded key, processes the blinded key based on the blinding key in accordance with an OPRF unblinding operation to generate a key and accesses secure information based on the key.

Abstract: Systems and Methods for encrypting and decrypting data in a dispersed storage network are disclosed. A data object may be encrypted using a data object specific encryption key, a container specific encryption key, a tenant account specific encryption key, or a time based encryption key. This specific, or more generally, secondary encryption key can be derived from a master or primary encryption key. Encryption key metadata pertaining to the master encryption key and the specific encryption key is also created and stored in the DSN. When reading an encrypted data object, the master encryption key can be retrieved and, along with the encryption key metadata, used to derive the specific encryption key. The specific encryption key can then be used to decrypt the encrypted data object to recover the data object.

Abstract: A dispersed storage network (DSN) includes a DSN memory, which in turn employs multiple distributed storage (DS) units to store encrypted secret material that can be decrypted using an unlock key. The unlock key is stored external to the DS unit, in some cases using multiple data slices dispersed throughout the DSN. To obtain the unlock key, the DS unit transmits authentication credentials to another device included in the DSN, but external to the DS unit. The other device authenticates the DS unit using the authentication credentials, and sends the unlock key to the DS unit. The DS unit uses the unlock key in normal decryption operations. In response to a security event, the DS unit transitions to a secure mode by erasing any material decrypted using the unlock key, the unlock key, and the DS unit's authentication credentials.

Abstract: A computing device including a processor, memory, and instructions, interfaces with a key management system (KMS) that provides encryption keys using an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF). The device obtains, based on a type of encryption key being requested, a public key of a public-private key pair. The device creates an Oblivious Key Access Request (OKAR), including a blinded value associated with a requested encryption key. The OKAR is transmitted to the KMS, and a response is received. The response includes a blinded OPRF output, which yields an OPRF output as a result of being subjected to an unblinding operation. The OPRF output is validated using the public key, either directly or via a challenge, and in response to a positive validation, the OPRF output is used as a final key, or an intermediary key used to derive the final key.

Abstract: A method begins by determining an encryption change regarding one or more sets of encrypted encoded data slices stored in storage units of a dispersed storage network (DSN). The method continues by updating an encryption file to include information regarding one or more of level of encryption, new encryption keys, new encryption key identifiers, and previous encryption file information. The method continues by dispersed storage error encoding the updated encryption file to produce a set of encoded encryption file slices (EEFSs) and outputting the set of EEFSs to a set of storage units of the DSN. The method continues by retrieving EEFSs from the set of storage units, recovering the updated encryption file from the EEFSs. The method continues by re-encrypting the encrypted encoded data slice based on the new encryption key to produce a re-encrypted encoded data slice and storing the re-encrypted encoded data slice in the storage units.

Abstract: A computing device is configured to divide an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) key to generate a plurality of N partial keys, distribute a respective one of the plurality of N partial keys to a corresponding plurality of N Key Management System (KMS) units. The computing device receives from a threshold number T of KMS units, a plurality T partial blinded keys, wherein the plurality T partial blinded keys are based on processing of a value of a blinded key received by a respective KMS unit and a corresponding stored partial key of the N partial keys, combines the plurality T of partial blinded keys into the blinded key, processes the blinded key based on the blinding key in accordance with an OPRF unblinding operation to generate a key and accesses secure information based on the key.

Abstract: A method for execution by one or more processing modules of one or more computing devices of a dispersed storage network (DSN), the method begins by identifying, for data stored within a DSN memory, one or more encryption keys used to encrypt data stored within the DSN memory. The method continues by identifying, for data stored within a portion of the DSN memory requiring sanitization, a master key of the one or more encryption keys that encrypts all of the data stored within the portion to be sanitized. The method continues by determining, if the master key is not used to encrypt data stored outside of the portion to be sanitized. The method continues, if the master key is not used to encrypt data stored outside of the portion to be sanitized, by sanitizing the data stored within a portion of the DSN memory by erasing the master key.

Abstract: A computing device includes an interface configured to interface and communicate with a communication system, a memory that stores operational instructions, and processing circuitry operably coupled to the interface and to the memory that is configured to execute the operational instructions to perform various operations. The computing device generates a sub-key identifier based on a data ID, which is based on unique ID value(s) associated with an encrypted data object, and a requester secret. The computing device processes the sub-key identifier in accordance with an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) blinding operation to generate a blinded input and an Oblivious Key Access Request (OKAR). The computing device transmits the OKAR to another computing device (e.g., Key Management System (KMS) service) and receives a blinded sub-key therefrom. The computing device processes the blinded sub-key in accordance with an OPRF unblinding operation to generate the key and accesses secure data thereby.

Abstract: A computing device includes an interface configured to interface and communicate with a communication system, a memory that stores operational instructions, and processing circuitry operably coupled to the interface and to the memory that is configured to execute the operational instructions to perform various operations. The computing device processes an input value (e.g., associated with a key) based on a blinding key (e.g., homomorphic encryption) to generate a blinded value and generates an Oblivious Key Access Request (OKAR). The computing device transmits the OKAR to another computing device (e.g., associated with a Key Management System (KMS) service) and receives a blinded key therefrom that is based on a Partially-Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (P-OPRF). The computing device processes the blinded key based on the blinding key (e.g., homomorphic decryption) to generate the key (e.g., associated with the input value). In some examples, the computing device accesses secure information based on the key.