Abstract: A chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons detection system is disclosed that comprises an array of spatially-disparate hazardous material sensors that all feed into a centralized system control center. This enables the embodiment to receive and coordinate in one place all of the hazardous material sensors spread over a wide area, and, therefore, enables an alarm to be quickly issued in the event of a real attack. To accurately reduce false alarms, the illustrative embodiment requires that at least N of M neighboring stations report an alarm for the same hazardous material within an interval of time, and that the values of at least one of N and M change and are based on at least one environmental factor.

Abstract: A chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons detection system is disclosed that comprises an array of spatially-disparate hazardous material sensors that all feed into a centralized system control center. This enables the embodiment to receive and coordinate in one place all of the hazardous material sensors spread over a wide area, and, therefore, enables an alarm to be quickly issued in the event of a real attack. To accurately reduce false alarms, the illustrative embodiment requires that at least N of M neighboring stations report an alarm for the same hazardous material within an interval of time, and that the values of at least one of N and M change and are based on at least one environmental factor.

Abstract: The illustrative embodiment of the present invention is a system and a method for the detection and limited identification of biological agents. The system is small, light weight, requires little power to operate and uses few consumables. The system can be configured for use in either stationary or mobile applications. The system incorporates elements that enable it to obtain an air sample, extract particulates from the air sample, exposes the particulates to electromagnetic radiation, and monitor for fluorescent emissions. To the extent that fluorescent emissions are detected and exceed a predetermined value, an alarm is triggered.

Abstract: A chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapon detection system is disclosed that heightens its acuity and alertness when it senses that a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon attack is more likely. For example, it is well understood that a chemical gas attack is likely to be less effective when it is raining than when it is clear because the rain will suppress and dilute the chemical agent. Therefore, the likelihood of a chemical gas attack is higher when it is clear. In light of this and similar knowledge, the illustrative embodiment checks for evidence of an attack more frequently and with great acuity than when the ambient environmental (e.g., meteorological, etc.) characteristics (e.g., whether is it precipitating or not, whether it is sunny or not, etc) suggest that an attack is more likely. This enables the embodiment to conserve consumables that are used in detecting attacks for when the attacks are more likely.

Abstract: A chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons detection system is disclosed that comprises an array of spatially-disparate hazardous material sensors that all feed into a centralized system control center. This enables the embodiment to receive and coordinate in one place all of the hazardous material sensors spread over a wide area, and, therefore, enables an alarm to be quickly issued in the event of a real attack. To accurately reduce false alarms, the illustrative embodiment requires that at least N of M neighboring stations report an alarm for the same hazardous material within an interval of time, and that the values of at least one of N and M change and are based on at least one environmental factor.

Abstract: A chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapon detection system is disclosed that incorporates a mechanism to reduce the probability that a false alarm will be issued. In particular, the mechanism causes an alarm to be triggered when the amount of a hazardous material reaches a threshold, but changes the threshold based, at least in part, on environmental (e.g., meteorological, etc.) characteristics (e.g., whether is it precipitating or not, whether it is sunny or not, etc) that effect the efficacy of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon. Given that there are environmental factors that make an attack less effective, and given that terrorists are aware of this, the illustrative embodiment is less likely to issue an alarm when the environmental factors suggest that an attack is less effective, and, therefore, less likely. The illustrative embodiment accomplishes this by changing the threshold needed to issue an alarm based on one or more the environmental factors.

Abstract: A chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons detection system is disclosed that comprises an array of spatially-disparate hazardous material sensors that all feed into a centralized system control center. This enables the embodiment to receive and coordinate in one place all of the hazardous material sensors spread over a wide area, and, therefore, enables an alarm to be quickly issued in the event of a real attack. The illustrative embodiment also incorporates a mechanism to reduce the probability that a false alarm will be issued. In particular, the illustrative embodiment requires that at least 2 stations report an alarm for the same hazardous material within an interval of time. This prevents a false alarm from one hazardous material detection station from issuing a false system-wide alarm. This is based on the assumption that a real attack is more likely to be detected by stations that are near each other than by stations that have no proximity.

Abstract: A chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapon detection system is disclosed that comprises an array of spatially-disparate hazardous material sensors and an array of spatially-disparate video cameras. The telemetry from the sensors and the video feed from the cameras are all fed back to a centralized system control center. When the illustrative embodiment suspects that an attack has occurred, it switches the feed from the video cameras in the vicinity of where the attack is believed to occur to a monitor. This enables the personnel who monitor the illustrative embodiment to further verify the attack.