Abstract: Methods, including methods conducted with a computer system and/or over a telecommunications network, are provided for transforming an auctioned item of unknown value and buyer into an auctioned item of known value and buyer. The methods comprise sealed bid, second-best price auctions that diminish the effects of information asymmetry while aligning the interests of buyers and sellers by reducing common auction risks of the winner's curse, buyer's remorse, bid shading, shill bidding, bid sniping, and/or collusion. Bidders submit sealed bids for the auctioned item. At a successful auction's conclusion, a highest bidder is established as the item's buyer and a second-best price is established as the value. This second-best price is the second highest sealed bid obtained, or a reserve price that the highest bidder accepts as the value for the auctioned item when the highest sealed bid is the only sealed bid at least equal to the reserve price.

Abstract: Methods, including methods conducted with a computer system and/or over a telecommunications network, are provided for transforming an auctioned item of unknown value and buyer into an auctioned item of known value and buyer. The methods comprise sealed bid, second-best price auctions that diminish the effects of information asymmetry while aligning the interests of buyers and sellers by reducing common auction risks of the winner's curse, buyer's remorse, bid shading, shill bidding, bid sniping, and/or collusion. Bidders submit sealed bids for the auctioned item. At a successful auction's conclusion, a highest bidder is established as the item's buyer and a second-best price is established as the value. This second-best price is the second highest sealed bid obtained, or a reserve price that the highest bidder accepts as the value for the auctioned item when the highest sealed bid is the only sealed bid at least equal to the reserve price.