Abstract: Circuits are protected from timing attacks by adding a random delay to mask any relation between contents of processed information packages and the processing time required between in- and output signals of protected circuits. This random delay has to be performed preferably inside the protected volume and can be realized by one or more random delay buffers that are realized by means of e.g. random shift-registers. Further protection may be provided by situating the circuits in a single chip housing, such that the signals thereof interfere with each other and it is difficult to obtain information therefrom. A physical barrier may be provided in order to prevent or at least limit physical access to for example at least one TPM chip arranged inside of the barrier. The physical barrier comprises an impedance, i.e. in form of a capacitor with capacity C and or resistor R and or inductivity L, for example formed by two of the reflector layers of the barrier with an absorbing material in between. Any impedance (i.

Abstract: A protected circuit is provided comprising multiple essentially identical circuits, such as TPM (Trusted Platform Module) hosted in a common chip-housing, such that the signals thereof interfere with each other and it is difficult to obtain information therefrom. Additional protection may be achieved by adding a random delay to mask any relation between contents of processed information packages and the processing time required between in- and output signals of protected circuits. A physical barrier may be provided in order to prevent or at least limit physical access to for example at least one TPM chip arranged inside of the barrier. The physical barrier may comprises an impedance, i.e. in form of a capacitor with capacity C and or resistor R and or inductivity L, for example formed by two of the reflector layers with an absorbing material in between. Any impedance (i.e. capacity C and/or resistance R and/or inductivity L) change can be detected and any impedance (i.e.

Abstract: A method and apparatus are provided for protecting a wireless network from malicious code transmitted from a user terminal. Traffic from user terminals which flows over the air-interface is filtered and evaluated according to a set of rules imposed by the network, or specified by the user, or both. If the evaluation indicates that the traffic is offensive, further traffic from the offending user is blocked, and optionally, the offense is reported. As a consequence, a user can be protected from unwanted traffic that has been destined to terminate on his mobile, and protected from having his own mobile make undesired transmissions.