Abstract: A display system may include a camera configured to capture an image of a calibration reference associated with an automobile, a display, and a controller in communication with the camera and the display. The controller may be configured to selectively adjust a color temperature of the display based on the image of the calibration reference.

Abstract: A display system may include a camera configured to capture an image of a calibration reference associated with an automobile, a display, and a controller in communication with the camera and the display. The controller may be configured to selectively adjust a color temperature of the display based on the image of the calibration reference.

Abstract: An SOC implements a security enclave processor (SEP). The SEP may include a processor and one or more security peripherals. The SEP may be isolated from the rest of the SOC (e.g. one or more central processing units (CPUs) in the SOC, or application processors (APs) in the SOC). Access to the SEP may be strictly controlled by hardware. For example, a mechanism in which the CPUs/APs can only access a mailbox location in the SEP is described. The CPU/AP may write a message to the mailbox, which the SEP may read and respond to. The SEP may include one or more of the following in some embodiments: secure key management using wrapping keys, SEP control of boot and/or power management, and separate trust zones in memory.

Abstract: A method and apparatus of a device that enables a user to participate in a secure instant messaging session by starting with a low security connection before switching to a high security connection is described. The device concurrently establishes a low security connection and a high security connection with a remote participant of the secure instant messaging session. The device sends a first message to the remote participant through the low security connection while the high security connection is being established. The device further determines whether the high security connection is established. If the high security connection is established, the device can send a second message to the remote participant through the high security connection. If the high security connection is not yet established, the device can send the second message to the remote participant through the low security connection.

Abstract: An SOC implements a security enclave processor (SEP). The SEP may include a processor and one or more security peripherals. The SEP may be isolated from the rest of the SOC (e.g. one or more central processing units (CPUs) in the SOC, or application processors (APs) in the SOC). Access to the SEP may be strictly controlled by hardware. For example, a mechanism in which the CPUs/APs can only access a mailbox location in the SEP is described. The CPU/AP may write a message to the mailbox, which the SEP may read and respond to. The SEP may include one or more of the following in some embodiments: secure key management using wrapping keys, SEP control of boot and/or power management, and separate trust zones in memory.

Abstract: An SOC implements a security enclave processor (SEP). The SEP may include a processor and one or more security peripherals. The SEP may be isolated from the rest of the SOC (e.g. one or more central processing units (CPUs) in the SOC, or application processors (APs) in the SOC). Access to the SEP may be strictly controlled by hardware. For example, a mechanism in which the CPUs/APs can only access a mailbox location in the SEP is described. The CPU/AP may write a message to the mailbox, which the SEP may read and respond to. The SEP may include one or more of the following in some embodiments: secure key management using wrapping keys, SEP control of boot and/or power management, and separate trust zones in memory.

Abstract: An SOC implements a security enclave processor (SEP). The SEP may include a processor and one or more security peripherals. The SEP may be isolated from the rest of the SOC (e.g. one or more central processing units (CPUs) in the SOC, or application processors (APs) in the SOC). Access to the SEP may be strictly controlled by hardware. For example, a mechanism in which the CPUs/APs can only access a mailbox location in the SEP is described. The CPU/AP may write a message to the mailbox, which the SEP may read and respond to. The SEP may include one or more of the following in some embodiments: secure key management using wrapping keys, SEP control of boot and/or power management, and separate trust zones in memory.

Abstract: In the computer client-server context, typically used in the Internet for communicating between a central server and user computers (clients), a method is provided for token passing which enhances security for client-server communications. The token passing is opaque, that is tokens as generated by the client and server are different and can be generated only by one or the other but can be verified by the other. This approach allows the server to remain stateless, since all state information is maintained at the client side. This operates to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa to defeat hacking attacks, that is, penetrations intended to obtain confidential information. The token as passed includes encrypted values including encrypted random numbers generated separately by the client and server, and authentication values based on the random numbers and other verification data generated using cryptographic techniques.

Abstract: In the computer client-server context, typically used in the Internet for communicating between a central server and user computers (clients), a method is provided for token passing which enhances security for client-server communications. The token passing is opaque, that is tokens as generated by the client and server are different and can be generated only by one or the other but can be verified by the other. This approach allows the server to remain stateless, since all state information is maintained at the client side. This operates to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa to defeat hacking attacks, that is, penetrations intended to obtain confidential information. The token as passed includes encrypted values including encrypted random numbers generated separately by the client and server, and authentication values based on the random numbers and other verification data generated using cryptographic techniques.