Abstract: Methods and systems are provided for performing a secure transaction. Users register biometric and/or other identifying information. A registration code and an encryption key are generated from the biometric information and/or information obtained from a unpredictable physical process and are stored in a secure area of a device and also transmitted to a service provider. A transaction passcode generator may be computed based on the stored registration code. In at least one embodiment, a unique transaction passcode depends upon the transaction information, so that on the next step of that transaction, only that unique transaction passcode will be valid. In an embodiment, the passcode includes the transaction information. In at least one embodiment, if the transaction information has been altered relative to the transaction information stored in the device's secure area, then the transaction passcode sent during this step will be invalid and transaction may be aborted.

Abstract: A process of hiding one or more public keys inside of random noise is introduced, whose purpose is to protect the privacy of the public keys. In some embodiments, the random noise is produced by quantum randomness, using photonic emission with a light emitting diode. When the public key generation and random noise have the same probability distributions, and the key size is fixed, the security of the hiding can be made arbitrarily close to perfect secrecy, by increasing the noise size. The process of hiding can protect public keys that are vulnerable to Shor's algorithm or analogues of Shor's algorithm, executed by a quantum computer. The hiding process is practical in terms of infrastructure and cost, utilizing the existing TCP/IP infrastructure as a transmission medium, and a light emitting diode(s) in the random noise generator.

Abstract: Protecting the security of an entity by using passcodes is disclosed. A user's passcode device generates a passcode, where sometimes the device is called Alice. In an embodiment, the passcode is generated in response to receipt of user information. The passcode is received by another system (called Bob or the second party), which authenticates the passcode by at least generating a passcode from a passcode generator or nonce, and comparing the generated passcode with the received passcode. The passcode is temporary. At a later use a different passcode is generated from a different passcode generator. In these embodiments, there are asymmetric secrets stored on the passcode device (Alice's device) and by the administrator (Bob's device). This adds more security so that if the backend servers are breached, the adversary cannot generate valid passcodes. In some embodiments, the passcode depends on a nonce or the rounded time.

Abstract: A symmetric cryptography for encrypting and decrypting information is provided, that can be implemented efficiently in hardware or in software. The symmetric cryptography uses a key generator, so that the cryptography is not dependent on a single, static cryptography key. The key generator is a value or collection of values from which the key is generated. The key generator substantially increases the computational complexity of differential cryptanalysis and other cryptographic attacks. In an embodiment, the key generator is updated with one-way functions exhibiting the avalanche effect, which generates an unpredictable sequence of keys used during the encryption or decryption process. In an embodiment, a dynamic key is derived from a key generator with a one-way function. In an embodiment, a block cipher uses a different dynamic key to encrypt each block of plaintext, where each key is derived from a different key generator.

Abstract: A process of hiding a key or data inside of random noise is introduced, whose purpose is to protect the privacy of the key or data. In some embodiments, the random noise is produced by quantum randomness, using photonic emission with a light emitting diode. When the data or key generation and random noise have the same probability distributions, and the key size is fixed, the security of the hiding can be made arbitrarily close to perfect secrecy, by increasing the noise size. The hiding process is practical in terms of infrastructure and cost, utilizing the existing TCP/IP infrastructure as a transmission medium, and using light emitting diode(s) and a photodetector in the random noise generator. In some embodiments, symmetric cryptography encrypts the data before the encrypted data is hidden in random noise, which substantially amplifies the computational complexity.

Abstract: An apparatus for use with an electronic device having a microphone and a camera. The apparatus comprises a structure configured to detachably couple to the device, and a shutter supported by the structure and comprising a lens shutter configured to obscure a lens of the camera when in an engaged position. A generator is supported by the structure and configured to generate a force that acts on the microphone and renders the microphone unresponsive to voice sounds.

Abstract: Methods and systems described herein perform a secure transaction. A display presents images that are difficult for malware to recognize but a person can recognize. In at least one embodiment, a person communicates transaction information using visual images received from the service provider system. In at least one embodiment, a universal identifier is represented by images recognizable by a person, but difficult for malware to recognize. In some embodiments, methods and systems are provided for determining whether to grant access, by generating and displaying visual images on a screen that the user can recognize. In an embodiment, a person presses ones finger(s) on the screen to select images as a method for authenticating and protecting communication from malware. In at least one embodiment, quantum randomness helps unpredictably vary the image location, generate noise in the image, or change the shape or texture of the image.

Abstract: Protecting the security of an entity by using passcodes is disclosed. A user's passcode device generates a passcode. In an embodiment, the passcode is generated in response to receipt of user information. The passcode is received by another system, which authenticates the passcode by at least generating a passcode from a passcode generator, and comparing the generated passcode with the received passcode. The passcode is temporary. At a later use a different passcode is generated from a different passcode generator. In these embodiments, there are asymmetric secrets stored on the passcode device and by the administrator. This adds more security so that if the backend servers are breached, the adversary cannot generate valid passcodes. In some embodiments, the passcode depends on the rounded time.

Abstract: Machine and method of accessing information securely are disclosed. Two sets of user identifying data are acquired. A transformation is established by mapping of one set of data onto another set of data or onto itself. An invariant is generated from the transformation of the user identifying data. An authentication key is generated using the invariant. In an embodiment, the invariant is a relationship between two objects that remains static under transformations between the two objects. In an embodiment, the invariant is a cryptography key. In an embodiment, the transformation(s) help perform an authentication of the user and are executed by digital computer program instructions. In an embodiment, pattern transformation(s) are represented with colors, geometry, or frequencies.

Abstract: In one embodiment, a dynamic register machine that edits program instructions while the instructions are running on the machine is disclosed. In another embodiment, an execution node pair machine is disclosed that represents programs as collections of execution node pairs. In another embodiment, computer program instructions are represented as matrices, which are multiplied together to represent sequences of instructions applied to specific input data, which facilitate finding situations resulting in infinite loops having a periodic behavior. In an embodiment, infinite loops in a general computer program are detected, via the dynamic register machine, by exploring combinations of sequences of linked execution-node-pairs, thereby obtaining the results of executing sequence of computer program instructions is disclosed.

Abstract: An apparatus for use with an electronic device having a microphone and a camera. The apparatus comprises a structure configured to detachably couple to the device, and a shutter supported by the structure and comprising a lens shutter configured to obscure a lens of the camera when in an engaged position. A generator is supported by the structure and configured to generate a force that acts on the microphone and renders the microphone unresponsive to voice sounds.

Abstract: Based upon the principles of Turing incomputability, connectedness and novel properties of the Active Element Machine, a malware-resistant computing machine is constructed. This new computing machine is a non-Turing, non-register machine (non von-Neumann), called an active element machine (AEM). AEM programs are designed so that the purpose of the AEM computations are difficult to apprehend by an adversary and hijack with malware. These methods can also be used to help thwart reverse engineering of proprietary algorithms, hardware design and other areas of intellectual property. Using quantum randomness, the AEM can deterministically execute a universal Turing machine (universal digital computer program) with active element firing patterns that are Turing incomputable. In an embodiment, a more powerful computational procedure is created than Turing's computational procedure (equivalent to a digital computer procedure).

Abstract: An apparatus for use with an electronic device having a microphone and a camera. The apparatus comprises a structure configured to detachably couple to the device, and a shutter supported by the structure and comprising a lens shutter configured to obscure a lens of the camera when in an engaged position. A generator is supported by the structure and configured to generate a force that acts on the microphone and renders the microphone unresponsive to voice sounds.

Abstract: Based upon the principle of Turing incomputability, and novel properties of the Active Element Machine, a malware-resistant computing machine is constructed. This new computing machine is a non-Turing, non-register machine (non von-Neumann), called an Active Element Machine (AEM). AEM programs are designed so that the purpose of the computation is difficult to apprehend by an adversary and hijack with malware. These methods can help hinder reverse engineering of proprietary algorithms and hardware design. Using quantum randomness, the AEM can deterministically execute a universal digital computer program with active element firing patterns that are Turing incomputable. In some embodiments, a more powerful computational procedure is demonstrated than Turing's computational procedure (digital computer procedure). Current digital computer algorithms can be derived or designed with a Turing machine computational procedure.

Abstract: A computing machine is disclosed having a memory system for storing a collection of execution nodes, a head for reading a sequence of symbols in the execution nodes in the memory system, and writing a sequence of symbols in the memory system. The machine is configured to execute a computation with a collection of pairs of execution nodes. Each pair of execution nodes represents a machine instruction. One execution node in the pair represents input of the machine instruction represented by the execution nodes. Another execution node in the pair represents output of the machine instruction represented by the execution nodes. Each execution node has a state of the machine, a sequence of symbols and a number.

Abstract: Methods and systems described herein perform a secure transaction. A display presents images that are difficult for malware to recognize but a person can recognize. In at least one embodiment, a person communicates transaction information using visual images received from the service provider system. In at least one embodiment, a universal identifier is represented by images recognizable by a person, but difficult for malware to recognize. In some embodiments, methods and systems are provided for determining whether to grant access, by generating and displaying visual images on a screen that the user can recognize. In an embodiment, a person presses one's finger(s) on the screen to select images as a method for authenticating and protecting communication from malware. In at least one embodiment, quantum randomness helps unpredictably vary the image location, generate noise in the image, or change the shape or texture of the image.

Abstract: In an embodiment, a secure module is provided that provides access keys to an unsecured system. In an embodiment, the secure module may generate passcodes and supply the passcodes to the unsecured system. In an embodiment, the access keys are sent to the unsecured system after the receiving the passcode from the unsecured system. In an embodiment, after authenticating the passcode, the secure module does not store the passcode in its memory. In an embodiment, the unsecured module requires the access key to execute a set of instructions or another entity. In an embodiment, the unsecured system does not store access keys. In an embodiment, the unsecured system erases the access key once the unsecured system no longer requires the access key. In an embodiment, the unsecured system receives a new passcode to replace the stored passcode after using the stored passcode. In an embodiments, a registration code is generated using non-determinism. In an embodiments, a key is generated using non-determinism.

Abstract: Protecting the security of an entity by using passcodes is disclosed. A user's passcode device generates a passcode. In an embodiment, the passcode is generated in response to receipt of user information. The passcode is received by another system, which authenticates the passcode by at least generating a passcode from a passcode generator, and comparing the generated passcode with the received passcode. The passcode is temporary. At a later use a different passcode is generated from a different passcode generator. In these embodiments, there are asymmetric secrets stored on the passcode device and by the administrator. This adds more security so that if the backend servers are breached, the adversary cannot generate valid passcodes. In some embodiments, the passcode depends on the rounded time.

Abstract: An active element machine is a new kind of computing machine. When implemented in hardware, the active element machine can execute multiple instructions simultaneously, because every one of its computing elements is active. This greatly enhances the computing speed. By executing a meta program whose instructions change the connections in a dynamic active element machine, the active element machine can perform tasks that a digital computer are unable to compute. In an embodiment, instructions in a computer language are translated into instructions in a register machine language. The instructions in the register machine language are translated into active element machine instructions. In an embodiment, an active element machine may be programmed using instructions for a register machine. The active element machine is not limited to these embodiments.

Abstract: Methods and systems are provided for performing a secure transaction. Users register biometric and/or other identifying information. A registration code and an encryption key are generated from the biometric information and/or information obtained from a unpredictable physical process and are stored in a secure area of a device and also transmitted to a service provider. A transaction passcode generator may be computed based on the stored registration code. In at least one embodiment, a unique transaction passcode depends upon the transaction information, so that on the next step of that transaction, only that unique transaction passcode will be valid. In an embodiment, the passcode includes the transaction information. In at least one embodiment, if the transaction information has been altered relative to the transaction information stored in the device's secure area, then the transaction passcode sent during this step will be invalid and transaction may be aborted.