Abstract: A method by an AUSF of a home PLMN configured to communicate through an interface with electronic devices is provided. A first authentication request is received from a first PLMN that is authenticating an electronic device. A first security key used for integrity protection of messages delivered from the home PLMN to the electronic device is obtained. A second authentication request is received from a second PLMN that is authenticating the electronic device. A second security key used for integrity protection of the messages delivered from the home PLMN to the electronic device is obtained. A message protection request is received. Which of the first security key and the second security key is a latest security key is determined. The latest security key is used to protect a message associated with the message protection request.

Abstract: According to certain embodiments, a method by a user equipment (UE) for securing network steering information includes transmitting a registration request to a Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN). Upon successful authentication by an authentication server function (AUSF), a home network root key is generated. A protected message comprising Network Steering Information is received from a first network node. The protected message is protected using a configuration key (Kconf) and a first Message Authentication Code (MAC-1). The configuration key (Kconf) is determined from the home network root key, and the UE verifies the MAC-1. Based on the Kconf and the MAC-1, it is verified that the VPLMN did not alter Network Steering Information. An acknowledgement message, which is protected with a second Message Authentication Code (MAC-2), is transmitted to a Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN).

Abstract: According to certain embodiments, a method by a user equipment (UE) for securing network steering information includes transmitting a registration request to a Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN). Upon successful authentication by an authentication server function (AUSF), a home network root key is generated. A protected message comprising Network Steering Information is received from a first network node. The protected message is protected using a configuration key (Kconf) and a first Message Authentication Code (MAC-1). The configuration key (Kconf) is determined from the home network root key, and the UE verifies the MAC-1. Based on the Kconf and the MAC-1, it is verified that the VPLMN did not alter Network Steering Information. An acknowledgement message, which is protected with a second Message Authentication Code (MAC-2), is transmitted to a Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN).

Abstract: Network equipment (16A) is configured for use in a wireless communication network. The network equipment (16A) is configured to detect one or more conditions under which non-access stratum (NAS) keys (26A) that protect NAS communication between the network equipment (16A) and a wireless device (12) are to be refreshed. Responsive to detecting the one or more conditions, the network equipment (16A) is configured to derive, from a base key (24A) on which the NAS keys (26A) were derived, a new base key (24B) on which fresh NAS keys (26B) are to be derived. The network equipment (16A) is also configured to activate the new base key (24B).

Abstract: A method is provided to operate a CN node to determine UP security activation. A UP session establishment request is obtained for a wireless device. An indication is obtained that the UP session establishment request is associated with an emergency session and/or that null ciphering and/or null integrity protection are applied to a CP associated with a CP session for the wireless device. It is determined that a UP should be configured for the UP session without activating integrity and/or confidentiality protection for the UP based on the indication. A UP security policy is provided to a RAN node associated with the wireless device, wherein the UP security policy indicates to configure the UP for the UP session without activating integrity and/or confidentiality protection based on determining that a UP should be configured for the UP session without activating integrity and/or confidentiality protection.

Abstract: The present disclosure relates to methods and apparatus for flexible, security context management during AMF changes. One aspect of the disclosure is a mechanism for achieving backward security during AMF changes. Instead of passing the current NAS key to the target AMF, the source AMF derives a new NAS key, provides the new NAS key to the target AMF, and sends a key change indication to the UE, either directly or through some other network node. The UE can then derive the new NAS key from the old NAS key. In some embodiments, the AMF may provide a key generation parameter to the UE to use in deriving the new NAS key. In other embodiments, the target AMF may change one or more security algorithms.

Abstract: The present disclosure relates to methods and apparatus for flexible, security context management during AMF changes. One aspect of the disclosure is a mechanism for achieving backward security during AMF changes. Instead of passing the current NAS key to the target AMF, the source AMF derives a new NAS key, provides the new NAS key to the target AMF, and sends a key change indication to the UE, either directly or through some other network node. The UE can then derive the new NAS key from the old NAS key. In some embodiments, the AMF may provide a key generation parameter to the UE to use in deriving the new NAS key. In other embodiments, the target AMF may change one or more security algorithms.

Abstract: A method performed by an authentication server for provisioning a user equipment (1), UE. The method comprises: obtaining a message authentication code, MAC, based on a provisioning key specific to the UE to the UE and a privacy key of a home network (3) of the UE, wherein the provisioning key is a shared secret between the authentication server (14) and the UE and the privacy key comprises a public key of the home network; and transmitting the privacy key and the MAC to the UE. Methods performed by a de-concealing server and the UE, respectively are also disclosed as well as authentication servers, de-concealing servers and UEs. A computer program and a memory circuitry (13) are also disclosed.

Abstract: Core network equipment is configured for use in a core network of a wireless communication system. The core network equipment is configured to switch switching to using a new non-access stratum, NAS, security context between a user equipment and the core network equipment. The core network equipment is also configured to, during or in association with a handover procedure for handover of the user equipment, signal from the core network equipment that the new NAS security context between the user equipment and the core network equipment is to be used as a basis for an access stratum (AS) security context between the user equipment and radio access network equipment.

Abstract: A method by an AUSF of a home PLMN configured to communicate through an interface with electronic devices is provided. A first authentication request is received from a first PLMN that is authenticating an electronic device. A first security key used for integrity protection of messages delivered from the home PLMN to the electronic device is obtained. A second authentication request is received from a second PLMN that is authenticating the electronic device. A second security key used for integrity protection of the messages delivered from the home PLMN to the electronic device is obtained. A message protection request is received. Which of the first security key and the second security key is a latest security key is determined. The latest security key is used to protect a message associated with the message protection request.

Abstract: A method of operating an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) of a communications system that includes an access node (AN) configured to communicate through a wireless air interface with user equipments (UEs) and that has a Session Management Function (SMF), is provided. The method includes receiving an indication of a Max Data Radio Bearer Integrity Protection, DRB-IP, rate indicating a maximum computational capacity of the UE to process DRBs that have integrity protection during Packet Data Unit (PDU) sessions. A PDU session establishment request NAS message is received from the UE for establishing a PDU session. A PDU session create message is communicated toward the SMF. A SMF message is received that contains an indication of an allocated DRB-IP rate for DRBs that are to be integrity protected for a PDU session being established.

Abstract: A network node of a mobile communications network may need to generate at least one new Input Offset Value, IOV value, for use in protecting communications between the network node and a mobile station. The network node then associates a fresh counter value with the or each new IOV value; calculates a Message Authentication Code based on at least the at least one new IOV value, the fresh counter value associated with the or each new IOV value, and a constant indicating that the Message Authentication Code is calculated to protect the new IOV value; and transmits the at least one new IOV value, the fresh counter value associated with the or each new IOV value, and the calculated Message Authentication Code to the mobile station.

Abstract: A method of operating a Master gNodeB (MgNB) in a radio access network RAN is disclosed. An indication of a user plane security policy is received from a core network node, wherein the user plane security policy requires user plane integrity protection for a protocol data unit PDU session. Responsive to the user plane security policy requiring user plane integrity protection for the PDU session and responsive to determining that a secondary base station supporting the user plane security policy requiring user plane integrity protection is unavailable, a data radio bearer DRB of the PDU session is established directly between the MgNB and a user equipment UE. Related MgNBs are also discussed.

Abstract: Core network equipment (16) is configured for use in a core network of a wireless communication system. The core network equipment (16) is configured to switch switching to using a new non-access stratum, NAS, security context between a user equipment (14) and the core network equipment (16). The core network equipment (16) is also configured to, during or in association with a handover procedure for handover of the user equipment (14), signal from the core network equipment (16) that the new NAS security context between the user equipment (14) and the core network equipment (16) is to be used as a basis for an access stratum (AS) security context between the user equipment (14) and radio access network equipment (12).

Abstract: An authentication node (22) in a wireless communication system (10) authenticates a message received by a recipient radio node (16A) (e.g., a user equipment). The authentication node (22) in this regard determines a radio resource that carries the message received by the recipient radio node (16A). The authentication node (22) performs authentication of the message, by checking whether the message is bound to the determined radio resource. The authentication node (22) may, for example, compute an expected authentication or integrity code based on information identifying the determined radio resource and check whether the expected authentication or integrity code matches an authentication or integrity code associated with the message.

Abstract: In order to ensure that a Subscription Concealed Identifier, SUCI, is calculated in the Universal Subscriber Identity Module, USIM, part of a User Equipment, UE, when intended, when a SUCI-Calculation-Indicator is set to a value indicating that the SUCI should be calculated in the USIM, a network node sets proprietary information, which is not known to a Mobile Equipment, ME, part of the UE, as required for calculation of the SUCI. The USIM facilitates calculation of the SUCI in the ME part of the UE only when the SUCI-Calculation-Indicator is set to a value indicating that the SUCI should be calculated in the ME. When the SUCI-Calculation-Indicator is set to a value indicating that the SUCI should be calculated in the USIM, the ME part deletes any locally stored information required for calculation of the SUCI.

Abstract: A first communication node may provide first and second NAS connection identifications for respective first and second NAS connections between the first and a second communication node, with the first and second NAS connection identifications being different and the first and second NAS connections being different. A first NAS message may be communicated between the first and second communication nodes over the first NAS connection, including at performing integrity protection for the first NAS message using the first NAS connection identification and/or performing confidentiality protection for the first NAS message using the first NAS connection identification.

Abstract: Methods And Apparatus For Direct Communication Key Establishment Methods, apparatuses and system are disclosed for establishing a key for secure direct communication between a User Equipment device, UE, and a device. The system comprises a UE (20), a device (30) and a Direct Communication Element (40). The UE establishes a UE shared key with a Bootstrapping Server Function, BSF (50), using a Generic Bootstrapping Architecture, GBA, procedure. The device receives a transaction identifier associated with the UE shared key from the UE, and sends the transaction identifier to the Direct Communication Element. The Direct Communication Element receives the transaction identifier from the device, obtains a shared session key from the BSF, derives the UE delivery key, generates the direct communication key, encrypts the direct communication key with the UE delivery key, and sends the direct communication key and the encrypted direct communication key to the device.

Abstract: A network node of a mobile communications network may need to generate at least one new Input Offset Value, IOV value, for use in protecting communications between the network node and a mobile station. The network node then associates a fresh counter value with the or each new IOV value; calculates a Message Authentication Code based on at least the at least one new IOV value, the fresh counter value associated with the or each new IOV value, and a constant indicating that the Message Authentication Code is calculated to protect the new IOV value; and transmits the at least one new IOV value, the fresh counter value associated with the or each new IOV value, and the calculated Message Authentication Code to the mobile station.

Abstract: In some embodiments, a method in a wireless device comprises registering first and second connections with an AMF. The first and second connections share a first security context and connect via first and second access networks, respectively. The method further comprises establishing a second security context with the AMF, setting a flag to a first value based on the second security context having been taken into use on the first connection, and setting the flag to a second value based on the second security context having been taken into use on the second connection. The second value indicates that the second security context has been taken into use on both the first and second connections. The method further comprises retaining the first security context when the flag is set to the first value, and disposing of the first security context after setting the flag to the second value.