Abstract: A technique for verifying an origin of a digital object in a digital object architecture is described. The technique includes the steps of receiving, from a handle registry, handle information for a digital object that includes an attestation that references the handle identification value for the handle and origin identification information; verifying the authenticity of the attestation; after verifying the authenticity of the attestation, using the origin information in determining authorizations applicable to the digital object.

Abstract: A digital object architecture infrastructure includes a handle system that stores handle data and a proxy server that caches handle data for rapid access. A client connects to the proxy server to request access to the handle data. When the handle data does not have access restrictions and is currently cached, the proxy server returns the handle data to the client without accessing the handle system. When the handle data does not have access restrictions and is not cached, the proxy server obtains the handle data from the handle system, caches a copy of the handle data for future access, and provides the handle data to the client. The proxy server may cache encrypted handle data that is subject to access restrictions, cannot be decrypted by proxy server, and can be provided to a client determined to be allowed access. The client can then decrypt the encrypted handle data.

Abstract: One embodiment of the present application sets forth a computer-implemented method for establishing trust for handles used to identify digital objects in a digital object architecture (DOA) by associating a first attester identifier with a first attester from a trusted public key infrastructure (PKI), identifying a first digital object public key for a first digital object, generating, by the first attester, a first digital object identity attestation that associates the first digital object public key with a handle identifier for the first digital object, wherein the handle identifier is external to the trusted PKI, and generating a first attester identity attestation attesting that the first attester is authentic, where the first attester identity attestation includes the first attester identifier.

Abstract: For digital objects registered via the DOA infrastructure, attribute inheritance is enabled between related objects using naming conventions for the handle IDs or data models for handle data. Each child object of a parent object may automatically inherit at least one predetermined attribute of the parent object. When a retriever machine (local handle registry or client machine) obtains a handle ID for a digital object, the retriever machine may determine that the digital object is a child object of a parent object, determine a handle ID for the parent object, obtain the author attribute from the handle data of the parent object, and associate the author attribute of the parent object with the child object. The retriever machine may determine that the digital object is a child object of the parent object via naming conventions for handle IDs or via data models for the handle data.

Abstract: A technique for verifying an origin of a digital object in a digital object architecture is described. The technique includes the steps of receiving, from a handle registry, handle information for a digital object that includes an attestation that references the handle identification value for the handle and origin identification information; verifying the authenticity of the attestation; after verifying the authenticity of the attestation, using the origin information in determining authorizations applicable to the digital object.

Abstract: One embodiment of the present application sets forth a computer-implemented method for establishing trust for handles used to identify digital objects in a digital object architecture (DOA) by associating a first attester identifier with a first attester from a trusted public key infrastructure (PKI), identifying a first digital object public key for a first digital object, generating, by the first attester, a first digital object identity attestation that associates the first digital object public key with a handle identifier for the first digital object, wherein the handle identifier is external to the trusted PKI, and generating a first attester identity attestation attesting that the first attester is authentic, where the first attester identity attestation includes the first attester identifier.