Abstract: Techniques for secure data synchronization are described. In one or more implementations, a determination is made as to whether enterprise data is stored locally on a first device corresponding to an enterprise device. Based on a determination that the second device is a non-enterprise device, a determination is made as to whether a permission associated with the first device indicates that the first device is permitted to propagate the enterprise data to non-enterprise devices. If the first device lacks permission to propagate the enterprise data to non-enterprise devices, the enterprise data is prevented from being propagated to the second device.

Abstract: Techniques for secure data synchronization are described. In one or more implementations, a determination is made as to whether enterprise data is stored locally on a first device corresponding to an enterprise device. Based on a determination that the second device is a non-enterprise device, a determination is made as to whether a permission associated with the first device indicates that the first device is permitted to propagate the enterprise data to non-enterprise devices. If the first device lacks permission to propagate the enterprise data to non-enterprise devices, the enterprise data is prevented from being propagated to the second device.

Abstract: Techniques for secure data synchronization are described. In one or more implementations, a determination is made as to whether enterprise data is stored locally on a first device corresponding to an enterprise device. Based on a determination that the second device is a non-enterprise device, a determination is made as to whether a permission associated with the first device indicates that the first device is permitted to propagate the enterprise data to non-enterprise devices. If the first device lacks permission to propagate the enterprise data to non-enterprise devices, the enterprise data is prevented from being propagated to the second device.

Abstract: Techniques for providing security policy for device data are described. In implementations, data on a device is stored in an encrypted form. To protect the encrypted data from being decrypted by an unauthorized entity, techniques enable a decryption key to be occluded if an attempt to gain unauthorized access to device data is detected. In implementations, a decryption key can be occluded in a variety of ways, such as by deleting the decryption key, overwriting the encryption key in memory, encrypting the encryption key, and so on. Embodiments enable an occluded decryption key to be recovered via a recovery experience. For example, a recovery experience can include an authentication procedure that requests a recovery password. If a correct recovery password is provided, the occluded decryption key can be provided.

Abstract: Techniques for secure data synchronization are described. In one or more implementations, a determination is made as to whether enterprise data is stored locally on a first device corresponding to an enterprise device. Based on a determination that the second device is a non-enterprise device, a determination is made as to whether a permission associated with the first device indicates that the first device is permitted to propagate the enterprise data to non-enterprise devices. If the first device lacks permission to propagate the enterprise data to non-enterprise devices, the enterprise data is prevented from being propagated to the second device.

Abstract: An application on a device can communicate with organization services. The application accesses a protection system on the device, which encrypts data obtained by the application from an organization service using an encryption key, and includes with the data an indication of a decryption key usable to decrypt the encrypted data. The protection system maintains a record of the encryption and decryption keys associated with the organization. The data can be stored in various locations on at least the device, and can be read by various applications on at least the device. If the organization determines that data of the organization stored on a device is to no longer be accessible on the device (e.g., is to be revoked from the device), a command is communicated to the device to revoke data associated with the organization. In response to this command, the protection system deletes the decryption key.

Abstract: Aspects of the subject matter described herein relate to clusters. In aspects, an image is created to install software onto nodes of the cluster. A root secret of the cluster is injected into the image. After installing the software of the image onto a node of the cluster, the node may boot into a secure mode, detect that individualization is needed for the node to join a cluster, create an identity for authenticating with other nodes of the cluster, chain the identity via the root secret, and then securely erase the root secret from the node prior to assuming node duties. Among other things, this allows a single image to be used for installing software on all nodes of a cluster without the compromise of a single node compromising the entire cluster.

Abstract: Techniques for secure data synchronization are described. In one or more implementations, techniques may be employed to conserve high cost data storage by storing larger portions of encrypted data in low cost storage, while storing relatively smaller encryption keys in higher cost storage. A device that is granted access to the encryption keys can retrieve the encrypted data from the low cost storage and use the encryption keys to decrypt the encrypted data.

Abstract: Techniques for providing security policy for device data are described. In implementations, data on a device is stored in an encrypted form. To protect the encrypted data from being decrypted by an unauthorized entity, techniques enable a decryption key to be occluded if an attempt to gain unauthorized access to device data is detected. In implementations, a decryption key can be occluded in a variety of ways, such as by deleting the decryption key, overwriting the encryption key in memory, encrypting the encryption key, and so on. Embodiments enable an occluded decryption key to be recovered via a recovery experience. For example, a recovery experience can include an authentication procedure that requests a recovery password. If a correct recovery password is provided, the occluded decryption key can be provided.

Abstract: Techniques for providing security policy for device data are described. In implementations, data on a device is stored in an encrypted form. To protect the encrypted data from being decrypted by an unauthorized entity, techniques enable a decryption key to be occluded if an attempt to gain unauthorized access to device data is detected. In implementations, a decryption key can be occluded in a variety of ways, such as by deleting the decryption key, overwriting the encryption key in memory, encrypting the encryption key, and so on. Embodiments enable an occluded decryption key to be recovered via a recovery experience. For example, a recovery experience can include an authentication procedure that requests a recovery password. If a correct recovery password is provided, the occluded decryption key can be provided.

Abstract: Aspects of the subject matter described herein relate to clusters. In aspects, an image is created to install software onto nodes of the cluster. A root secret of the cluster is injected into the image. After installing the software of the image onto a node of the cluster, the node may boot into a secure mode, detect that individualization is needed for the node to join a cluster, create an identity for authenticating with other nodes of the cluster, chain the identity via the root secret, and then securely erase the root secret from the node prior to assuming node duties. Among other things, this allows a single image to be used for installing software on all nodes of a cluster without the compromise of a single node compromising the entire cluster.

Abstract: An application on a device can communicate with organization services. The application accesses a protection system on the device, which encrypts data obtained by the application from an organization service using an encryption key, and includes with the data an indication of a decryption key usable to decrypt the encrypted data. The protection system maintains a record of the encryption and decryption keys associated with the organization. The data can be stored in various locations on at least the device, and can be read by various applications on at least the device. If the organization determines that data of the organization stored on a device is to no longer be accessible on the device (e.g., is to be revoked from the device), a command is communicated to the device to revoke data associated with the organization. In response to this command, the protection system deletes the decryption key.

Abstract: An application on a device can communicate with organization services. The application accesses a protection system on the device, which encrypts data obtained by the application from an organization service using an encryption key, and includes with the data an indication of a decryption key usable to decrypt the encrypted data. The protection system maintains a record of the encryption and decryption keys associated with the organization. The data can be stored in various locations on at least the device, and can be read by various applications on at least the device. If the organization determines that data of the organization stored on a device is to no longer be accessible on the device (e.g., is to be revoked from the device), a command is communicated to the device to revoke data associated with the organization. In response to this command, the protection system deletes the decryption key.

Abstract: Techniques for providing security policy for device data are described. In implementations, data on a device is stored in an encrypted form. To protect the encrypted data from being decrypted by an unauthorized entity, techniques enable a decryption key to be occluded if an attempt to gain unauthorized access to device data is detected. In implementations, a decryption key can be occluded in a variety of ways, such as by deleting the decryption key, overwriting the encryption key in memory, encrypting the encryption key, and so on. Embodiments enable an occluded decryption key to be recovered via a recovery experience. For example, a recovery experience can include an authentication procedure that requests a recovery password. If a correct recovery password is provided, the occluded decryption key can be provided.

Abstract: Techniques for secure data synchronization are described. In one or more implementations, techniques may be employed to conserve high cost data storage by storing larger portions of encrypted data in low cost storage, while storing relatively smaller encryption keys in higher cost storage. A device that is granted access to the encryption keys can retrieve the encrypted data from the low cost storage and use the encryption keys to decrypt the encrypted data.