Abstract: A cache service provides applications in a containerized, multi-tenant cloud-computing system low-latency access to secrets. The cache service may operate as a cluster-level service or a sidecar service. The cache service may store copies of secrets (which are located in one or more absolute stores) in a cache storage. The cache service and the cache storage may be closer to the applications than the one or more absolute stores are to the applications. The cache service may aggregate secrets associated with multiple entities in a single cache storage. The cache service may support isolation between secrets such that secrets of a first entity are isolated from secrets of a second entity. The cache service may enforce granulated access controls such that it can apply different access controls to secrets of a first entity than to secrets of a second entity.

Abstract: A cache service provides applications in a containerized, multi-tenant cloud-computing system low-latency access to secrets. The cache service may operate as a cluster-level service or a sidecar service. The cache service may store copies of secrets (which are located in one or more absolute stores) in a cache storage. The cache service and the cache storage may be closer to the applications than the one or more absolute stores are to the applications. The cache service may aggregate secrets associated with multiple entities in a single cache storage. The cache service may support isolation between secrets such that secrets of a first entity are isolated from secrets of a second entity. The cache service may enforce granulated access controls such that it can apply different access controls to secrets of a first entity than to secrets of a second entity.

Abstract: A payload is generated by a build computing system. The payload includes payload identifying metadata and deployment target identifier metadata, as well as an application container that includes a set of signed binaries. The payload can be approved for deployment, and a token can be generated for the payload. The token may include a set of claims that include payload identifying information. A payload validation system validates the payload for deployment to a target environment using the payload identifying information.

Abstract: A cache service provides applications in a containerized, multi-tenant cloud-computing system low-latency access to secrets. The cache service may operate as a cluster-level service or a sidecar service. The cache service may store copies of secrets (which are located in one or more absolute stores) in a cache storage. The cache service and the cache storage may be closer to the applications than the one or more absolute stores are to the applications. The cache service may aggregate secrets associated with multiple entities in a single cache storage. The cache service may support isolation between secrets such that secrets of a first entity are isolated from secrets of a second entity. The cache service may enforce granulated access controls such that it can apply different access controls to secrets of a first entity than to secrets of a second entity.

Abstract: Examples of the present disclosure describe systems and methods relating to the offline protection of secrets. A secret may be encrypted using a public key provided by the client. The client may have obtained the public key from a cryptographic hardware device, wherein the private key of the cryptographic key pair may be bound to the cryptographic hardware device. The encrypted secret may be transmitted by a service to the client using a secured or an unsecured transmission method. In some examples, the service may transmit a subsequent encrypted secret, which may invalidate a previously encrypted secret. In order to authenticate with the service, the client may select an encrypted secret for decryption. The client may access the private key stored by the cryptographic device and decrypt the encrypted secret with the private key. The client may then use the decrypted secret to authenticate with the service.

Abstract: A payload is generated by a build computing system. The payload includes payload identifying metadata and deployment target identifier metadata, as well as an application container that includes a set of signed binaries. The payload can be approved for deployment, and a token can be generated for the payload. The token may include a set of claims that include payload identifying information. A payload validation system validates the payload for deployment to a target environment using the payload identifying information.

Abstract: Examples of the present disclosure describe systems and methods relating to the offline protection of secrets. A secret may be encrypted using a public key provided by the client. The client may have obtained the public key from a cryptographic hardware device, wherein the private key of the cryptographic key pair may be bound to the cryptographic hardware device. The encrypted secret may be transmitted by a service to the client using a secured or an unsecured transmission method. In some examples, the service may transmit a subsequent encrypted secret, which may invalidate a previously encrypted secret. In order to authenticate with the service, the client may select an encrypted secret for decryption. The client may access the private key stored by the cryptographic device and decrypt the encrypted secret with the private key. The client may then use the decrypted secret to authenticate with the service.

Abstract: Examples of the present disclosure describe systems and methods relating to the offline protection of secrets. A secret may be encrypted using a public key provided by the client. The client may have obtained the public key from a cryptographic hardware device, wherein the private key of the cryptographic key pair may be bound to the cryptographic hardware device. The encrypted secret may be transmitted by a service to the client using a secured or an unsecured transmission method. In some examples, the service may transmit a subsequent encrypted secret, which may invalidate a previously encrypted secret. In order to authenticate with the service, the client may select an encrypted secret for decryption. The client may access the private key stored by the cryptographic device and decrypt the encrypted secret with the private key. The client may then use the decrypted secret to authenticate with the service.

Abstract: Examples of the present disclosure describe systems and methods relating to the offline protection of secrets. A secret may be encrypted using a public key provided by the client. The client may have obtained the public key from a cryptographic hardware device, wherein the private key of the cryptographic key pair may be bound to the cryptographic hardware device. The encrypted secret may be transmitted by a service to the client using a secured or an unsecured transmission method. In some examples, the service may transmit a subsequent encrypted secret, which may invalidate a previously encrypted secret. In order to authenticate with the service, the client may select an encrypted secret for decryption. The client may access the private key stored by the cryptographic device and decrypt the encrypted secret with the private key. The client may then use the decrypted secret to authenticate with the service.

Abstract: Described herein are techniques for regulating access to a remote resource using two-factor authentication based on information regarding a host machine of a portable storage drive that stores an operating system that is booted by the host machine. The information regarding the host machine of a portable storage drive may be used as a second factor in a two-factor authentication. Such information regarding the host machine may include, in some embodiments, information retrieved from a secure storage of the host machine, such as from a cryptoprocessor of the host machine. The information may include an identifier for the host machine or may be a user credential pre-provisioned to the host machine to be used in two-factor authentication.

Abstract: Described herein are techniques for regulating access to a portable storage drive, that stores an operating system securely, using information regarding a host machine. In accordance with some of the techniques described herein, when a portable storage drive that stores an operating system securely is to be accessed by a host machine, information regarding the host machine, such as information regarding the hardware of the host machine, may be retrieved and evaluated to determine whether to grant access to the host machine. When the host machine is granted access, the host machine may access secured data stored on the portable storage drive in any suitable manner. In some cases, accessing the secured data may include decrypting the secured data and transferring decrypted data to another storage of the host machine. The decrypted information may include an operating system that is booted by the host machine.

Abstract: Described herein are techniques for regulating access to a portable storage drive, that stores an operating system securely, using information regarding a host machine. In accordance with some of the techniques described herein, when a portable storage drive that stores an operating system securely is to be accessed by a host machine, information regarding the host machine, such as information regarding the hardware of the host machine, may be retrieved and evaluated to determine whether to grant access to the host machine. When the host machine is granted access, the host machine may access secured data stored on the portable storage drive in any suitable manner. In some cases, accessing the secured data may include decrypting the secured data and transferring decrypted data to another storage of the host machine. The decrypted information may include an operating system that is booted by the host machine.

Abstract: Described herein are techniques for regulating access to a remote resource using two-factor authentication based on information regarding a host machine of a portable storage drive that stores an operating system that is booted by the host machine. The information regarding the host machine of a portable storage drive may be used as a second factor in a two-factor authentication. Such information regarding the host machine may include, in some embodiments, information retrieved from a secure storage of the host machine, such as from a cryptoprocessor of the host machine. The information may include an identifier for the host machine or may be a user credential pre-provisioned to the host machine to be used in two-factor authentication.