Abstract: The invention relates to a process for monitoring vehicles on a road by a system comprising at least one radar sensor and a second sensor different from the radar sensor, wherein the second remote sensor is a time-of-flight optical sensor or optical image sensor, the process comprising a temporal readjustment and a spatial matching in order to obtain a set of measurement points each assigned to first characteristics derived from the radar data and second characteristics derived from the optical data, the determination of the radar vehicle trackings and of the optical vehicle trackings, a comparison of similarity between the radar vehicle trackings and the optical vehicle trackings, the elimination of the radar vehicle trackings for which no optical vehicle tracking is similar, the process comprising monitoring a parameter derived from first characteristics of a retained radar vehicle tracking.

Abstract: The invention relates to a process for monitoring vehicles on a road by a system comprising at least one radar sensor and a second sensor different from the radar sensor, wherein the second remote sensor is a time-of-flight optical sensor or optical image sensor, the process comprising a temporal readjustment and a spatial matching in order to obtain a set of measurement points each assigned to first characteristics derived from the radar data and second characteristics derived from the optical data, the determination of the radar vehicle trackings and of the optical vehicle trackings, a comparison of similarity between the radar vehicle trackings and the optical vehicle trackings, the elimination of the radar vehicle trackings for which no optical vehicle tracking is similar, the process comprising monitoring a parameter derived from first characteristics of a retained radar vehicle tracking.

Abstract: A detection gate for detecting substances carried by an individual or an object, has two lateral uprights facing one another and defining a passage there between for the individual or the object, a blowing device installed in a blowing chamber in one of the uprights which are adapted to exhaust the air contained in the blowing chamber towards the other upright, an exhaust device installed in an exhaust chamber in the other upright, which are suitable for exhausting the air thus blown, a detection device arranged upstream from the passage and adapted to detect the presence of the substances in the air thus blown, and a transfer line which, via one of the ends thereof, leads into the blowing chamber and, via the other end thereof, into the exhaust chamber, the blowing device and the exhaust device being such that a single volume of air has time to pass through the passage at least twice during the time that individual or the object is present in the passage.

Abstract: A detection gate for detecting substances carried by an individual or an object, has two lateral uprights facing one another and defining a passage there between for the individual or the object, a blowing device installed in a blowing chamber in one of the uprights which are adapted to exhaust the air contained in the blowing chamber towards the other upright, an exhaust device installed in an exhaust chamber in the other upright, which are suitable for exhausting the air thus blown, a detection device arranged upstream from the passage and adapted to detect the presence of the substances in the air thus blown, and a transfer line which, via one of the ends thereof, leads into the blowing chamber and, via the other end thereof, into the exhaust chamber, the blowing device and the exhaust device being such that a single volume of air has time to pass through the passage at least twice during the time that individual or the object is present in the passage.

Abstract: A peripheral security device is capable of being physically connected to a host terminal, on which is installed at least one software drive that is capable of permitting communication between said host terminal and a peripheral device with a human interface. This peripheral security device comprises a microprocessor capable of sending security data to the terminal during communication with the terminal. It is characterized in that the communication between the peripheral security device and the host terminal is managed at the level of the terminal via the software driver and simulates a communication between the peripheral device with a human interface and the host terminal.

Abstract: A method for secure loading of a key dedicated to securing a predetermined operation into memory of a microchip of an embedded system includes, as a first step, authenticating a security device by generating a first random number using the microchip, transmitting the first random number to the security device, generating a second random number in the security device, generating a first cryptogram from the first and second random numbers by applying an asymmetric signature algorithm using an asymmetric secret key, transmitting at least the first cryptogram to the microchip, and authenticating the security device by verifying the first cryptogram using the public key.

Abstract: The invention concerns a method for secure storage of a piece of so-called sensitive data, for example an encryption key, in a memory (M) of an embedded microchip system, particularly a smart card (CP). The memory (M) comprises two physically distinct storage devices (1, 2), for example a permanent memory of the “ROM” type (1), and a second, re-programmable memory of the “EEPROM” type (2). The piece of sensitive data is divided into at least two parts (d, d?), in a given logical configuration, each of these parts being stored in one of the distinct storage devices (1, 2). An additional piece of verification data, a checksum or hash data, can also be stored in the first storage device (1), at the same time as the first sensitive data part (d). The invention also concerns an embedded microchip system, particularly a smart card (CP).

Abstract: This invention concerns an optimised management method for allocating memory space of an onboard system to a data structure and a corresponding onboard system. The object code packets and the data packets being discriminated, and the memory being subdivided into addressable elementary memory blocks, the method consists in allocating (A1) to the object code packets a set of elementary memory blocks located in a first memory space (MS1) to addresses substantially adjacent and to the data packets another set of elementary memory blocks located in a second memory range (MS2). This enables to avoid fragmentation of the memory zone, during successive installations/deinstallations and to implement very easily an optimal defragmentation procedure, adapted to each type of data, code or application data.

Abstract: The invention concerns a method for dynamically allocating memory workspace of an onboard system to a data structure identified by an identification number (ID_Ak) and the corresponding onboard system. The storage area of the onboard system being subdivided into elementary memory blocks (BL1), the method is implemented on the basis of an allocation instruction and an erasure instruction. To allocate (A) an elementary memory block, the method consists in assigning an identification number (ID-Ak) to the block concerned. To erase (E) an elementary storage block, the method consists in assigning an arbitrary value (AAAA) different from any identification number. The system is applicable to onboard systems, such as multi-application microprocessor cards.

Abstract: The invention concerns a method for dynamically allocating memory workspace of an onboard system to a data structure identified by an identification number (ID_Ak) and the corresponding onboard system.

Abstract: The invention concerns a method and an embedded microchip system (8) for the secure execution of an instruction sequence of a computer application in the form of typed objects or data, particularly written in “Java” language. The memory (1) is organized into a first series of elementary stacks (2, 3) for storing instructions. Each typed object or datum is associated with one or more so-called typing bits specifying the type. These bits are stored in a second series of elementary stacks (4, 5) that correspond one-to-one with with the stacks (2, 3) of the first series. Before executing predetermined types of instructions, a continuous verification is performed, prior to the execution of these instructions, of the matching between a type indicated by the latter and an expected type, indicated by the typing bits. If they do not match, the execution is stopped.

Abstract: The invention concerns a method for secure storage of a piece of so-called sensitive data, for example an encryption key, in a memory (M) of an embedded microchip system, particularly a smart card (CP). The memory (M) comprises two physically distinct storage devices (1, 2), for example a permanent memory of the “ROM” type (1), and a second, re-programmable memory of the “EEPROM” type (2). The piece of sensitive data is divided into at least two parts (d, d′), in a given logical configuration, each of these parts being stored in one of the distinct storage devices (1, 2). An additional piece of verification data, a checksum or hash data, can also be stored in the first storage device (1), at the same time as the first sensitive data part (d).

Abstract: The invention concerns the securing of the pre-initialization phase of a smart card (CP) with a mutual authentication of this card (CP) storing a symmetric secret key (KM) and an asymmetric public key (n), and a security device (3) storing the same secret key (KM) and the asymmetric secret key (Kpq) corresponding to the public key (n). The card (CP) and the device (3) supply random numbers (NaC). The device (3) is authenticated by transmitting to the card (CP) a cryptogram (SR) derived from the two random numbers using an asymmetric algorithm. The card (CP) is authenticated by calculating a secret session key derived from the random number (NaC), using a symmetric algorithm and the secret key (KM), and by transmitting to the device (3) a cryptogram (CC) derived from the second random number, using the symmetric algorithm and the session key. The dedicated key (KF), encrypted by the session key (KS), is transmitted to the card.